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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Pollution is defined as introduction of materials into the environment that 
are potentially harmful or interfere with man's use of the environment. The 
contamination of soil, water, and the atmosphere by various substances are 
three types of special concern (Tver, 1981, pp. 252-3). The economic meaning 
of pollution is determined by physical and biological effects of pollutant 
discharges on scarce resources and by the loss of human welfare (Pearce and 
Turner, 1990, pp. 61-2). 
The large increase in the use of agricultural chemicals in modern 
agricultural practices has contributed to increased food and fiber production. 
However, intensive use of agricultural chemicals generates pesticide and 
nutrient residuals. These residuals can adversely affect water quality when they 
reach surface or ground water in excessive amounts (Duttweiler and Nicholson, 
1983). In recent years, public concern over adverse effects of water pollution on 
both human health and environmental quality has been growing. This growing 
concern partly stems from widespread reports of agricultural pollutants in both 
surface and ground water. 
Agricultural contaminants of major concern in surface water quality 
problems are soil particles, nutrients, and toxic chemicals including herbicides, 
insecticides, and fungicides. These materials reach nearby surface water 
1 
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carried by runoff water during rainfall, and contribute to three general forms of 
surface water pollution: (1) sedimentation; (2) nutrient enrichment by nitrogen 
and phosphorus; and, (3) contamination from toxic chemicals. Adverse impacts 
of sedimentation include damages to aquatic organisms, water-based 
recreation, and navigation, increased flood damages, and raised water 
treatment cost. Nutrient enrichment adversely affects aquatic habitats, damages 
water-based recreation, and hampers water purification by stimulating algal 
growth. Increased algal growth increases the cost of treating water for 
municipal and industrial uses. Furthermore, the combined effects of nutrient 
enrichment (eutrophication) in the stream can cause massive fish kills. The 
potential damage associated with a particular toxic pesticide depends upon its 
toxicity, solubility and persistence. Toxic chemicals in drinking water supplied 
by surface water may cause chronic effects such as cancer, miscarriage, and 
mutations (Libby and Boggess, 1990). 
Agricultural contaminants most likely to adversely affect ground water 
quality are pesticides and nitrates. Pesticides and nitrates, along with the 
percolating water after rainfall or irrigation, pass through the soil profile and 
below the crop root zone and may reach ground water. The potential for 
agrichemical leaching is largely determined by three categories of factors 
including (1) natural characteristics of the site of agrichemical use that affect 
leaching of water and thus transport of agrichemicals; (2) nature and extent of 
human modification to those natural characteristics that may affect leaching 
patterns; and, (3) characteristics of the agrichemicals (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1990). Factors included in the first category are local topography 
and landforms, vegetation, climatic parameters, the depth to the water table, 
and soil characteristics. The second category includes tillage practices, the 
amount and the timing of agrichemical applications, and irrigation. Chemical 
characteristics include solubility, mobility, degradation, and adsorption. (Office 
of Technology, 1990). 
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Since the mid-1970s, there have been increasing numbers of reports on 
pesticides and nitrates in ground water. In various regions in the United States, 
at least 5,500 contaminated wells with pesticide concentrations exceeding 
certain health advisory levels and at least 8,200 wells with nitrate 
concentrations exceeding the Maximum Contaminant Level established by the 
U.S. EPA to protect public health have been found (Cohen, 1989). Ground 
water has provided drinking water for approximately 50 percent of the total 
population and 90 percent of the rural population in the United States, and also 
is essential to agriculture in many regions of the country (Office of Technology, 
1990). Ingestion of certain pesticide residues through drinking water can cause 
health problems such as cancer, nervous system disorders, birth defects, and 
male sterility. High concentration of nitrate in drinking water can cause 
methemoglobinemia (blue-baby disease) in infants and gastric cancer (Bouwer, 
1990). 
Contributions by agriculture to water pollution have led to agricultural 
water quality legislation at both federal and state levels. The Clean Water Act of 
1972 was a significant action taken to protect the quality of water from point 
source pollution. The Clean Water Act was designed primarily to protect 
surface water from point source pollution. In the 1980s, public attention began 
to shift to nonpoint source pollution, including erosion and runoff from farmland, 
and ground water contamination. The soil conservation compliance provisions 
of the 1985 Farm Bill have contributed to improved water quality by reducing 
soil erosion. In the 1990s, the major concerns are pollutants in the water 
supply, where agricultural chemicals are one of the major sources of 
contamination (Knutson et al., 1990). 
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The Food Security Act of 1985 has been amended by adding a new 
chapter, 'Agricultural Water Quality Incentives', in the 1990 Farm Bill. This new 
chapter specifies that: 
The policy of Congress is that water quality protection, including 
source reduction of agricultural pollutants, henceforth shall be an 
important goal of the programs and policies of the Department of 
Agriculture. Furthermore, agricultural producers in 
environmentally sensitive areas should request assistance to 
develop and implement on-farm water quality protection plans in 
order to assist in compliance with State and Federal 
environmental laws and to enhance the environment. 
The new chapter also defines that: 
The term 'agricultural water quality protection practice' means a 
farm-level practice or a system of practices designed to protect 
water quality by mitigating or reducing the release of agricultural 
pollutants, including nutrients, pesticides, animal waste, sediment, 
salts, biological contaminants, and other materials, into the 
environment. 
Agricultural water quality provisions in the 1990 Farm Bill establish a 
voluntary incentive program "providing an annual incentive payment for 
developing and implementing agricultural production practices in accordance 
with an approved water quality protection plan submitted by the owner or 
operator of a farm" and a cost sharing program "providing cost share assistance 
for implementing the wetland preservation or wildlife habitat options." In order 
to receive annual incentive payments, a farm operator should (1) accurately 
report nutrient, pesticide and animal waste material usage rates on the 
management area for the past three years; (2) implement a water quality 
protection plan approved by USDA; and, (3) not conduct any practices on the 
farm that would tend to defeat the purpose of the agricultural water quality 
protection program. If the farm operator violates a term or condition of the 
agreement, any incentive or cost share payment received must be refunded 
with interest. In return for a voluntary incentive agreement, USDA will provide 
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an eligibility assessment and technical assistance for developing and 
implementing water quality protection plans. A voluntary incentive program 
participant can receive up to $3,500 per year in the form of incentive payments, 
and receive yield and base protection on the farm during the agreement period. 
Policies for controlling pollution can be classified into two groups: (1) 
incentive policies which intend to improve water quality indirectly by providing 
economic incentives, including taxes or subsidies for polluters to reduce 
pollution, and (2) regulatory policies which force the farmer to comply with 
certain restrictions on the magnitude of pollutant emissions (emission 
standards) or polluting activities. In the case of point source pollution, the use of 
incentive policies is more efficient than regulatory policies since the unit-tax 
approach can automatically produce the least-cost assignment of emission 
standards without the need for any complicated calculations by the regulatory 
agency (Baumol and Oates, 1975). 
Pollution caused by agricultural chemicals poses special problems 
because (1) agricultural pollution is typically a result of generally accepted farm 
management practices, such as spreading fertilizers or applying pesticides 
according to label instructions; (2) most agricultural pollution sources are 
nonpoint-sources making monitoring and testing procedures and their 
management difficult and expensive; (3) the pollution potential of agricultural 
chemicals and the effectiveness of control methods are site-specific; (4) there is 
strong resistance from agriculturalists to traditional approaches that force the 
polluter to bear the full cost of the polluting action; and, (5) the health and safety 
implications of ground water contamination are uncertain (Batie et al., 1989). 
Because of the diffuse nature of discharges and the time lag between 
discharges and actual contamination of the water body, however, monitoring 
agricultural discharges is quite difficult and costly. Thus, policy makers tend to 
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rely on regulatory policies, such as agricultural input use restrictions or permits, 
to abate agricultural pollution. Particularly, regulatory policies are known to be 
more effective in protecting local environmental conditions than incentive 
policies (Anderson et al., 1990). 
The most probable regulatory options are policy measures requiring 
reductions in the use of agricultural inputs, such as nitrogen fertilizer and 
pesticides. Nitrogen fertilizer use restrictions might limit use to a certain 
percentage of historic applications for the farm as a whole, or limit use to a 
certain percentage of historic applications for each acre of crop cultivated on the 
farm (Mapp et al., 1991 ). Pesticide use restrictions might be a form of 
prohibition on using pesticides likely to leach through the soil profile, a 
percentage reduction in total pesticide application, or a restriction on the 
frequency of treatments. Other possible restrictions include limiting the amount 
of irrigation water pumped from ground water sources on a total farm or per 
crop-acre basis. 
The magnitude of water pollution generated by agricultural production 
processes can be reduced by chemical input use reductions, input substitutions, 
crop rotations, and/or new technology adoption. Both incentive policies and 
regulatory policies would affect farm management practices, including tillage, 
chemical input usage, crop mix, and irrigation method which, in turn, would 
affect crop production and farm income. 
Study Area 
Caddo County, located in the west-central part of Oklahoma (Figure 1 ), is 
the area of concern in this study. Its land area is approximately 808,320 acres. 
The elevation of Caddo County ranges from 1,130 feet in the southeast to 1,718 
Cimarron Texas Beaver Harper Woods I Alfalfa Grant 
Ellis IWoodward Major Garfield 
Figure 1 . Map of Oklahoma Showing the Study Area 
-....J 
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feet in the northwest. Mean annual precipitation in the county ranges from 
about 27 inches in the northwest to about 33 inches in the southeast. About 34 
percent of the annual precipitation is in spring; 27 percent in summer; 24 
percent in fall; and 15 percent in winter. The average daily minimum air 
temperature ranges from 28.0°F in January to 69.7°F in July. The average daily 
maximum air temperature ranges from 51.8°F in January to 97.2°F in August. 
Wind velocity in Caddo County averages about 12.5 miles per hour and ranges 
from 11 miles per hour in August to 15 miles per hour in March and April (USDA 
Soil Conservation Service). 
About 90 percent of the county is made up of soils on uplands. On the 
prairie uplands, soils are level to gently sloping, deep, and loamy. These soils 
are the best soils in Caddo County for crop production. Over 50 percent of 
these soils consist of fine sandy loam soils and loamy fine sand soils (USDA 
Soil Conservation Service). 
In Caddo County, the major part of income comes from the sale of crops, 
livestock, and livestock products. Acres and production of major crops in recent 
two years (1990-91) are shown in Table 1. The major crops in the county are 
wheat, peanuts, cotton, grain sorghum, and hay crops. Among them, peanuts 
receive the major part of irrigation water. Peanut and cotton production 
generally requires an intensive use of pesticides. 
The intensive use of pesticides in peanut and cotton production poses a 
potential threat to water quality of the study area. The potential for 
environmental degradation is increased by intensive irrigation in most peanut 
acres. In addition, as stated above, sandy soils prevail in croplands of the study 
area. Sandy soils have large pores that allow water to drain rapidly, and they 
have few small pores to retain water for crop growth. Consequently, sandy soils 
increase the need for irrigation. Furthermore, sandy soils contain less clays 
TABLE 1 
ACRES AND PRODUCTION OF MAJOR CROPS IN 
CADDO COUNTY (1990-91) 
Crops Acres(Harvested) Production 
Wheat 2,600 119,000 bu 
(Irrigated) 1,200 47,000 
Wheat 217,400 7,381,000 bu 
(Dryland) 168,800 5,763,000 
Peanuts 33,000 106,210,000 lb 
(Irrigated) 33,300 99,575,000 
Peanuts 2,300 5,200,000 lb 
(Dryland) 1,700 4,340,000 
Cotton 4,150 2,652,000 lb 
(Irrigated) 2,600 1,200,000 
Cotton 12,350 4,656,000 lb 
(Dryland) 16,400 5,040,000 
Grain Sorghum 3,300 225,000 bu 
(Irrigated) 2,400 135,000 
Grain Sorghum 11,700 475,000 bu 
(Dryland) 7,100 235,000 
All Hay 62,000 147,000 ton 
73,000 166,000 
9 
Yield 
45.8 bu 
39.2 
34.0 bu 
34.1 
3,218 lb 
2,990 
2,261 lb 
2,553 
639 lb 
462 
377 lb 
307 
68.2 bu 
56.3 
40.6 bu 
33.1 
2.37 ton 
2.27 
Source: Oklahoma Department of Agriculture. Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics 
1990, 1991. 
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which can increase a soil's ability to hold organic and inorganic compounds, 
including most pollutants (Jackson et al., 1987). This may result in relatively 
rapid leaching of some potential ground water pollutants in the study area. In 
this context, it is important to conduct economic studies which address the 
policy question of what is the most efficient way to achieve certain water quality 
standards or to reduce the potential for environmental degradation in the study 
area. Nevertheless, few economic studies of production alternatives to achieve 
water quality objectives have been conducted. 
Objectives of the Study 
This study intends to enhance the understanding of the relationships 
between farm management practices, soil characteristics, the magnitude of 
major pollutants generated from the agricultural production process, types of 
pollution control policy measures and their effectiveness, and possible changes 
in net returns to the farm caused by alternative pollution control policy 
measures. The overall objective of this study is to develop an analytical 
framework and determine optimal farm-level responses to alternative 
agricultural water pollution control policies. The analytical framework is used to 
evaluate the effectiveness and distributional effects of alternative policy 
measures. More specific objectives are: 
1. To identify a representative farm reflecting the general crop 
production environment in the study area; · 
2. To identify alternative crop management practices involving 
alternative crop rotation systems, input use levels, and irrigation 
technologies for crop production available to farm operators in the 
study area; 
1 1 
3. To simulate crop yields, and the magnitude of pollutants generated 
from alternative farm management practices; 
4. To develop a modeling framework that will determine sets of 
production activities which maximize net returns, subject to the 
resource endowment, environmental constraints, and policy 
parameters; 
5. To determine both economic and water quality consequences of 
alternative agricultural pollution control policy measures. 
Procedures for Analysis 
In this study, a farm-level linear programming model is used to analyze . 
economic and water quality consequences of alternative agricultural pollution 
control policy measures. Formulation of the linear programming model begins 
with a review of the literature and a generalization of nonpoint externality theory 
which is delineated using a classical optimization framework (Griffin and 
Bromley, 1982). Nonlinear programming theory is widely used for the 
generalization of the theoretical basis, the derivation of economically efficient 
incentive and regulatory pollution control policies, and for the mathematical 
specification of optimal parameters. 
Modeling of the real world problem requires accurate representation of 
the production environment, crop yield responses to alternative crop 
management practices, estimates of costs and returns, and the magnitude of 
pollutants generated by the agricultural production process. Using data from 
the 1987 Census of Agriculture-County Data and the Soil Survey of Caddo 
County, a hypothetical farm is developed for Caddo County, Oklahoma. For the 
representation of farm management practices, combinations of published data 
available from various sources and interviews with the County Extension Agent 
(Beerwinkle, 1991, 1992) are used. Management practices-crop growth-
chemical movement relationships are developed using results from a 
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bio-physical simulation model, EPIC-PST (Sabbagh et al., 1991 ). To estimate 
operating costs associated with each farm management practice, the Expanded 
Budget Generator (Norris, 1990) is utilized. 
By linking data obtained from these preceding procedures, 36 linear 
programs, representing the combinations of nine agricultural pollution control 
policy scenarios and four alternative irrigation methods, are developed. The 
solution of each linear program provides (1) optimal production decisions for 
complying with the corresponding policy scenario; (2) the magnitude of various 
contaminants generated from the farm; (3) estimates of other policy parameters 
which would engender the same water quality consequences; and, (4) net 
returns to the farm. The investigation of effectiveness and influences of 
probable agricultural pollution control measures is conducted based on the 
solutions of these linear programs. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter II presents a review of 
the literature addressing the issue of agricultural pollution control, and develops 
the theoretical basis for a conceptual analysis of the problem at issue. The 
subject of Chapter Ill is the representation of the bio-physical simulation model 
and the description of crop production activities. Chapter Ill also presents the 
procedure of the empirical model formulation for conducting the economic 
analysis of agricultural pollution control. Chapter IV discusses data 
requirements for this study and the process of data acquisition. Chapter V uses 
the empirical model to analyze the effectiveness and influences of probable 
agricultural pollution control measures, and reports results of the analyses. 
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Chapter VI presents the summary and conclusions, draws policy implications, 
and discusses the limitations of the study and future study needs. 
CHAPTER II 
ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL 
POLLUTION CONTROL 
This chapter discusses the theoretical and methodological foundation of 
the mathematical programming model developed in Chapter Ill and the 
investigation of the empirical pollution control problem conducted in Chapter V. 
The first part of this chapter reviews the theory and literature on economics of 
pollution control. In the second part of this chapter, the main elements of 
nonlinear programming theory are introduced for a rigorous delineation of the 
economics of the agricultural pollution control problem. For a practical 
treatment of the agricultural pollution control problem, the linear programming 
approach is derived as a special case of nonlinear programming theory. 
Review of the Theory and Literature 
Simplistic Illustrations of the Problem 
The model in this section describes the nature of the economics of 
pollution control problem in a simplistic way. Consider a firm which produces a 
primary product (y) using a single type of input (x) in a competitive market. The 
firm is assumed to attempt to maximize profit. Consider also that the production 
process generates a single type of effluent (z) as a joint product. The 
production functions for these joint products are represented by: 
y = f(x) (2.01) 
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z =g(x) (2.02) 
where f is assumed to be a twice continuously differentiable strictly concave 
function, while g is assumed to be a twice continuously differentiable strictly 
convex function. Assume that these production functions are known with 
certainty by the firm as well as the regulatory agency. For the sake of simplicity, 
assume also that the damage cost per unit of effluent (c) is a constant and is 
known by the regulatory agency. If there are neither incentives nor regulations 
for reducing effluent discharges, the objective of the profit maximizing firm is: 
maximize(x): x(x) = pf(x) - rx (2.03) 
where p denotes the price of the primary product, and r represent the price of 
the input. Then the optimality condition for the profit maximizing firm is: 
pfx(x) = r (2.04) 
Equation (2.04) indicates that the firm needs to set the value of marginal product 
equal to the price of input. 
Meanwhile, the objective of society can be described by: 
maximize(x): s(x) = pf(x) - rx - cg(x) 
The optimality condition for society is: 
pf x(x) = r + cgx(x) 
(2.05) 
(2.06) 
Equation (2.06) indicates that the social optimum requires the value of marginal 
product be equal to the sum of the price of input and the marginal damage cost 
of the input at a certain input use level. 
In this example, the price of input represents the firm's (private) marginal 
cost, while the marginal damage cost represents the social marginal cost. Let 
* us assume that x denotes the input use level at which the social optimum 
condition (2.06) is satisfied. Because the production function (2.01) is assumed 
to be strictly concave, the input level satisfying the optimality condition for the 
* firm (2.04) would be greater than x . In other words, if there are no incentives or 
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regulations for reducing discharges, the firm would increase input use beyond 
the socially optimal level. This level of input use occurs because the social 
costs of the input use do not enter the firm's objective function. Therefore, it is 
necessary for society to formulate appropriate pollution control measures in 
order to attain the socially optimal level of input use. Four possible means of 
pollution control that can motivate the producer's optimal behavior, or that 
enforce optimal input use, are (1) an effluent tax; ,(2) an effluent standard; (3) an 
input tax; and, (4) an input use standard. 
The first policy tool imposes a tax (t2) per unit of effluent generated from 
the production process. The firm's new objective function under this tax policy 
is represented by: 
maximize(x): 1t(x) = pf(x) - rx - t2g(x) 
The optimality condition for problem (2.07) is: 
pfx(x) = r + t2gx(x) 
* 
(2.07) 
(2.08) 
Equations (2.06) and (2.08) reveal that the effluent tax rate (t2 ) needed to attain 
the social optimum equals to the damage cost per unit of the effluent (c). In this 
context, the optimal effluent tax is equivalent to a Pigouvian tax (Pearce and 
Turner, 1990, pp. 85-7). 
The second policy tool sets an upper limit (z0 ) on the magnitude of the 
effluent the firm may generate without penalty. Under this effluent standard, the 
objective function of the firm is: 
maximize(x): 1t{x) = pf(x) - rx 
subject to: z0 = g(x) 
The Lagrangian to problem (2.09) is: 
L(x; p,r,z) = pf(x) - rx + µ(z0 - g(x)) 
Optimality conditions for the problem are: 
pfx(x) = r + µgx(x) 
(2.09) 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
z0 = g(x) 
Comparison of equations (2.06), (2.08), and (2.11) reveal the following 
relationships between choice variables and parameters: 
* * z = g(x) 
* * c = t2 = µ(p,r,z ) 
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(2.12) 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
Equation (2.13) indicates that the optimum effluent standard needs to be set at 
the same level as the magnitude of effluent generated by the socially optimal 
* * input use level x . Equation (2.14) indicates that the optimal effluent tax t2 and 
* the optimal standard z are the dual of each other. 
The third policy tool imposes a tax (tx) on the level of input use. The 
objective function of the firm under the input tax scheme is: 
maximize(x): 1t{x) = pf(x) - (r + tx)x (2.15) 
The optimality condition for problem (2.15) is: 
pfix) = r+tx (2.16) 
* Equations (2.06) and (2.16) identify the optimal input tax rate (tx ) as: 
. * Equation (2.17) indicates that the optimal input tax rate (tx ) needs to be set at a 
level which equals the marginal damage cost of the input used at the optimal 
* level x. 
The fourth policy tool sets an upper limit (x0 ) on input use. The objective 
function of the firm under the input use standard is: 
maximize(x): 1t{x) = pf(x) - rx 
subject to: x = x0 
The Lagrangian to problem (2.18) is: 
L(x; p,r,x0 ) = pf(x) - rx + 11.(x0 - x) 
Optimality conditions for the problem are: 
pfix) = r + 11. 
(2.18) 
(2.19) 
(2.20) 
Comparison of equations (2.06), (2.16), and (2.20) reveals the following 
relationships between the Lagrangian multiplier 11. and parameters: 
* * * cgx(x ) = tx = 11.(p,r,x ) 
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(2.21) 
(2.22) 
* Equation (2.22) indicates that the optimal input standard should be set at x , 
and that the optimal input tax and the optimal input use standard are the dual of 
each other. Optimality conditions for the firm and the society, and optimal policy 
options are summarized in Table 2. 
Taxes, Standards, and Their Distributional 
Implications 
Economic analysis of policy options for controlling pollution must address 
the efficiency and distributional implications of the policy options. Economists 
have argued that economic incentives, such as taxes on effluent discharges or 
a subsidy for abatement of discharges, would lead to the least-cost 
achievement of certain environmental quality targets since these incentives do 
not deprive private decision makers of flexibility of choice (Kneese and Bouwer, 
1968; Baumol and Oates, 1975; Braden, 1988). Meanwhile, Anderson et al. 
(1990) argue that the superiority of the price mechanism is less apparent with 
limited information or considerable transaction cost. Furthermore, Miltz et al. 
(1988) demonstrate that the uniform standard outperforms the uniform tax in 
controlling ambient pollution levels over a potentially wide range of parameter 
values. Subsidies are not a viable policy option for controlling nonpoint 
pollution since they are too costly and subject to perversion (Braden, 1988). 
This section compares taxes and standards as alternative pollution control 
policy options. 
TABLE 2 
OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS AND OPTIMAL 
POLICY OPTIONS TO CORRECT THE 
EXTERNALITY PROBLEM 
Optimality conditions 
Problem of the Society 
pfx(x) = r + cgx(x) 
Problem of the Firm 
(1) Without Regulation: pfx(x) = r 
(2) With Effluent Tax: pfx(x) = r + t2gx(x) 
(3) With Effluent Standard: g(x) = z0 
(4) With Input Tax: pfx(x) = r + ~gx(x) 
(5) With Input Use Standard: x = x0 
Optimal Policy Options 
* (1) Optimal Effluent Tax: t2 = c 
* * (2) Optimal Effluent Standard: z = g(x ) 
* (3) Optimal Input Tax: tx = cgx(x) 
* (4) Optimal Input Use Standard: x0 = x 
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In the theoretical discussions of pollution control, it is often assumed that 
evaluation of environmental damages caused by pollution is possible. 
Freeman et al. (1973, p.83) interpret damages of pollution as society's 
maximum willingness to pay to restore the environment to a unpolluted state. 
However, it is difficult to determine the monetary value of damages caused by 
pollution. On the other hand, a regulatory agency can set minimum standards 
or acceptable standards of environmental quality that must be met in order to 
achieve a reasonable quality of life. No data on costs or damages of certain 
pollution levels are required to set these standards. An example of these 
standards is an upper limit on concentration of a certain pollutant in a waterway. 
To attain these standards through the price mechanism, the tax rates should be 
selected so as to achieve specific acceptable standards rather than attempting 
to base them on the unknown value of marginal damages (Baumol and Oates, 
1971 ). 
Consider a single firm that generates an effluent in the production 
process. The marginal abatement cost of effluent discharge for the firm is 
represented by MAC curve in Figure 2. Assume that the regulatory agency has 
* determined z as an acceptable standard. Then the tax rate for achieving this 
* * acceptable standard is t : the optimal tax rate t is the dual of the acceptable 
* standard z . Hence, both the tax policy and the standard policy are efficient. 
But these two policy options have quite different equity implications. Under the 
* standard policy, total cost to the firm to comply with the standard is AZz , and the 
* cost of damages resulting from effluent discharges z is internalized by the 
affected group in society. On the other hand, if the regulatory agency adopts the 
* * tax policy, then the firm should additionally pay Ot Az as an effluent tax. This 
tax is interpreted as the firm's compensation for the damages caused by effluent 
* discharges z (Anderson et al., 1990). 
$ 
MAC 
z 
0 z*' z* Pollution 
Figure 2. Truces versus Standards 
Both the true policy and the standard policy provide an incentive to shift 
the marginal abatement cost curve from MAC down to MAC'. After the shift of 
the marginal abatement cost curve, the firm would reduce the level of 
* 
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discharges to z ' to save an amount of true equal to the area ABZ under the true 
policy. Under the standard policy, the firm would maintain the level of 
* discharges at z since there is no additional incentive to reduce effluent 
discharges. If there is no need of further improvement in environmental quality, 
* then the true rate needs to be lowered from t tot'. 
Now consider two firms that have different marginal abatement costs: the 
marginal abatement cost curve of the first firm is represented by MAC1, and that 
of the second firm is represented by MAC2 in Figure 3. Assume that the 
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regulatory agency has determined 2zm (Ozm + Ozm) to be the acceptable 
* standard. In this case, the optimal tax rate t for achieving the standard needs to 
be set at the level rendering zmz1 equal to z2zm. Under the tax policy, the firm 
with MAC1 bears abatement cost equal to the area A1Zz1 and pays an amount 
* equivalent to the area Ot A1z1 as an effluent tax. On the other hand, the firm 
with MAC2 bears abatement cost equal to the area A2Zz2 and pays an amount 
* equivalent to the area Ot A2z2 as an effluent tax. Notice that a firm with lower 
marginal abatement cost pays less tax than a firm with higher marginal 
abatement cost. Under the standard policy, two differential standards are 
required for minimization of the total abatement cost: z1 for the first firm and z2 
for the second firm. Notice that a firm with lower marginal abatement cost bears 
a relatively heavier burden than a firm with higher marginal abatement cost 
under the differential standard policy. 
$ 
t1 1---..;;:i,,,,....,....~~~~.......;::~ 
t* 1---~~~~~.....,..~-+--~~ 
t2 ,~~~~~--1-~----.........__ 
0 Pollution 
Figure 3. Differential Standards versus Uniform Standards 
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Previously discussed pollution control policy options do not consider 
either who is going to pay the costs for improving environmental quality or how 
much a group should pay. Under the tax policy, firms bear the burden of the 
effluent tax as well as the abatement cost. It may be questionable whether such 
an additional burden (tax) beyond abatement costs should be imposed on 
polluters. The tax revenue could be used to further improve environmental 
quality or to compensate the affected group for loss of welfare. However, the 
main objective of imposing the effluent tax is to achieve the acceptable 
standard. In this context, the tax policy is considerably more disadvantageous 
to the affected firms than the standard policy. Furthermore, the economically 
efficient standard policy, which imposes a differential standard to each firm, 
emphasizes reducing discharges by firms with low marginal abatement cost. 
Consequently, the differential standard policy heavily penalizes firms with lower 
marginal abatement costs while allowing other firms with higher marginal 
abatement costs to continue their polluting activities. 
To rectify this inequity, one may propose a uniform standard policy 
whereby all polluting firms are forced to reduce discharges by certain 
percentages of their original discharge levels. In case no regulations are 
imposed, both firms in Figure 3 would discharge an amount of effluent equal to 
Z and bear neither the tax nor the abatement cost. Now, consider that the 
regulatory agency imposes the uniform standard zm on both firms. Notice that 
this uniform standard policy results in the same environmental quality with both 
the differential standards and the tax policy discussed above. The total amount 
of discharges from both firms is 2zm. Under the uniform standard policy, the first 
firm bears abatement cost equivalent to the area B1Zzm while the second firm 
bears abatement cost equivalent to the area B2Zzm. Compared with results 
under the differential standard policy, the firm with higher marginal abatement 
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cost bears greater abatement cost by an amount equivalent to the area 
A181zmz1. The firm with lower marginal abatement cost bears less abatement 
cost by an amount equivalent to the area A282zmz2. Consequently, the uniform 
standard policy involves a deadweight efficiency loss equivalent to the area 
A18 182 , although it contributes to the rectification of inequity problems. 
Review of the Literature on Economics of 
Pollution Control 
8aumol and Oates (1975, p. 18) define that "An externality is present 
whenever the decision maker, whose activity affects others' utility levels or 
enters their production functions, does not receive (pay) in compensation for 
this activity an amount equal in value to the resulting (marginal) benefits or 
costs to others." Pollution is a good example of an externality for which 
polluters do not pay. In the absence of economic incentives to internalize the 
externality, firms release pollutants at a level higher than is socially optimal. For 
this reason, it has been conceived that taxes on the emission of pollutants, 
pollution generating inputs, or polluting activities, are necessary to motivate 
firms to economize on pollutant emissions. Plott (1966) shows that the tax to 
correct externalities should be placed on pollution generating inputs, and that it 
is impossible to attain optimality by placing a tax on the primary product. 
8aumol and Oates (1975) provide an extensive conceptual discussion of 
externalities and the complexities of environmental policies. They assert that 
the quality of the environment depends on private, individual decisions and on 
collective action undertaken through the public sector because environmental 
quality is a public good consumed by all members of society. Therefore, they 
express doubts about the reliability of partial analysis and provide a theoretical 
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discussion of point source pollution problems utilizing general equilibrium 
models. Their analysis implies the standard Pigouvian result which requires a 
tax per unit of pollution generating activity equal to its marginal external 
damage. 
Holterman (1976) discusses the use of taxes to correct externalities, and 
identifies three alternative methods of taxing externalities: (1) a tax placed on 
every unit of the externality produced; (2) a tax imposed only on the externality 
above a specified level; and, (3) a subsidy paid for every unit of the externality 
abatement below a specified level. Holterman (1976) concludes that Pareto 
optimality can be attained by imposing a set of taxes or subsidies on all inputs 
and outputs which contribute to the externality creation, even though it is not 
possible to impose taxes on externalities directly. 
In a practical sense, it would be either impossible or too costly to 
determine consumers' valuations of marginal benefits of pollution abatement. 
For this reason, Griffin and Bromley (1982) develop a nonpoint externality 
theory by reformulating Baumol and Oates' general equilibrium models into a 
classical programming (optimization with equality constraints) framework. 
Assuming that a regional limit on pollutant emission discharges has been 
determined, and the objective is to achieve this goal at least cost to the region, 
they identify and model four types of policies regulating nonpoint-source 
pollution: (1) nonpoint incentives; (2) nonpoint standards; (3) management 
practice incentives; and, (4) management practice standards. Nonpoint 
incentives can be either a net charge or subsidy to each firm and depend on the 
incentive base level of pollutant emission. Management practice incentives also 
can be either a net charge or subsidy to each firm, and depend on the incentive 
base level of management practices. Nonpoint standards are the dual of 
nonpoint incentives, and management practice standards are the dual of 
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management practice incentives in Griffin and Bromley's framework. Therefore, 
once the optimal levels of incentives are determined, the optimal standards can 
be obtained by applying Hotelling's lemma (Varian, 1984). 
Griffin and Bromley (1982) consider just a single index of pollution since 
they implicitly assume that only a single pollutant is problematic in the region or 
that each pollutant is a perfect substitute for other pollutants. This assumption 
has been adopted in many conceptual studies. Shortle (1984) explicitly 
assumes that there is only one agricultural pollutant. He concludes that 
uncertainty regarding the magnitude of an agricultural pollutant would affect 
expected net benefits of alternative policy approaches and, therefore, should be 
considered when selecting appropriate pollution control policies. Shortle and 
Dunn (1986) incorporate the stochastic nature of runoff in their analysis and 
examine the relative expected efficiency of four general strategies proposed by 
Griffin and Bromley (1982). Assuming that farmers have better information 
about the effects of changes in farm management practices on profits, Shortle 
and Dunn (1986) suggest that appropriately specified management practice 
incentives would generally outperform the other three nonpoint-source pollution 
control policy options. 
Many empirical studies have dealt with a single type of agricultural 
pollutant. Among others, Abrams and Barr (1974) consider surface water nitrate 
pollution in the State of Illinois. Taylor (1975) considers nitrate concentrations 
in drinking water supplies in the State of Illinois. Horner (1975) considers 
nitrate-nitrogen irrigation return flows in the western San Joaquin Valley. 
Jacobs and Casler (1979) consider phosphorus pollution of the Fall Creek 
watershed in central New York. Miller and Gill (1976) consider equity problems 
in controlling cropland sediment in Indiana. Wade and Heady (1977) examine 
effects of alternative policies to control sediment in the rivers and streams of the 
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United States. Boggess et al. (1980) consider the agricultural cropland 
sediment problem of a subbasin of the Iowa River in east central Iowa. Walker 
and Timmons (1980) consider agricultural cropland sediment problems in the 
Nishnabotna River Basin in southwestern Iowa. Segarra et al. (1985) conduct 
an analysis of soil erosion control on a representative farm in the Piedmont area 
of South-Central Virginia using a stochastic programming model. Gardener 
and Young (1988) consider salt discharges from irrigated cropland of the Grand 
Valley in western Colorado. Wu et al. (1989), and Braden et al. (1989) consider 
cropland sediment control problems in Illinois watersheds. Dinar et al. (1989), 
Knapp et al. (1990), and Caswell et al. (1990) consider quantity of drainage 
water for cotton production in the San Joaquin Valley of California. Bouzaher et 
al. (1990) discuss various mathematical models for efficient control of 
agricultural sediment and apply the models to examine effects of sediment 
control in Illinois. Johnson et al. (1991) consider nitrate ground water pollution 
problems caused by irrigated farms in the Columbia Basin of Oregon. Oh 
(1991) considers nitrate ground water pollution in western Franklin County and 
eastern Benton County in the State of Washington. Cole (1991) considers 
nitrate ground water pollution in Northwest Tennessee. Weinberg (1991) 
considers quantity of the agricultural drainage water for multiple crop production 
in California's San Joaquin Valley. 
Only a few agricultural pollution control studies consider more than one 
kind of pollution load even though all types of agricultural pollutants deteriorate 
environmental quality or interfere with the use of natural resources. Taylor and 
Frohberg (1977) examine welfare effects of alternative erosion control methods, 
banning pesticides, and limiting nitrogen fertilizer for reducing agricultural 
pollution in the Corn Belt. Pfeiffer and Whittlesey (1978) consider river nitrogen 
concentration, water temperature, and cropland soil losses in Washington 
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State's Yakima River Basin. Braden et al. (1991) investigate the expected 
changes in farming practices and consequent losses in farming profit caused by 
control of soil erosion, sediment load, and pesticide losses in Lake Michigan 
tributaries. Richardson et al. (1991) attempt to quantify the impacts of pesticide 
and inorganic nitrogen fertilizer bans on farming profits for representative farms 
in several southern States. Hoag et al. (1991) consider soil erosion, pesticide 
leaching, pesticide runoff, and excess nitrogen simultaneously, and assess the 
effects of alternative abatement targets on net returns to various cropping 
systems typical of the North Carolina Piedmont region. Taylor (1991) considers 
nitrate loss with percolation, nitrate and organic nitrogen loss with runoff, and 
assesses the required cost of complying with alternative control policy options 
to representative farms in the Willamette Valley of Oregon. He emphasizes that 
if only one type of pollutant is targeted for control, the other pollutants may be 
exacerbated. 
The equity of pollution control policies should also be addressed. As 
discussed in the previous section, an efficient pollution control policy from 
society's point of view does not consider who is going to pay the costs of 
improving environmental quality. An efficient policy only emphasizes pollution 
abatement by polluters with low marginal costs of the abatement. Thus, it could 
heavily penalize those with low costs of abatement, while letting the polluters 
with higher costs of abatement continue their effluent discharges unmodified 
(Kneese and Bower, 1968, pp. 139-41 ). Political acceptability of such efficient 
policy options is highly questionable because of the expected strong resistance 
of affected groups, and the perceived inequity of the redistribution of factor 
income. Sharp and Bromley (1979), and Park and Shabman (1982) provide 
additional discussions of these distributional issues. 
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Jacobs and Casler (1979) propose an alternative effluent tax policy 
which would preserve the benefits of the tax policy, yet not be excessively 
burdensome to farmer as polluters. Their approach is to identify the maximum 
allowable level of discharge and impose no tax up to this amount. This 
approach has exactly the same effects as the differential standard policy since 
no tax is actually collected. Thus, every firm would comply with the differential 
standard. Consequently, this approach also imposes a heavier burden on firms 
with lower marginal abatement cost, as does the differential standard approach. 
Freeman et al. (1973, pp. 143-8) suggest the need to redistribute pollution 
control costs through direct subsidies or indirect cost subsidies, such as 
favorable tax treatment for certain kinds of pollution control activities. 
Theoretical and Methodological Foundation 
As mentioned previously, few agricultural pollution control studies 
consider more than one pollutant. If different pollutants can be assumed to be 
perfect substitutes, or if only one pollutant is problematic in the study area, then 
dealing with a single index of pollution can be justified. However, the 
assumption of perfect substitution between different pollutants may not be 
reasonable because there are broad types of pollutants, such as nitrate loss 
with surface runoff, nitrogen loss with percolation, pesticide loss with surface 
runoff, pesticide loss with percolation, and soil loss from water erosion that have 
quite different physical, chemical, and/or biological effects on natural resources. 
Furthermore, a policy mechanism restricting a particular pollutant may induce 
an increase in another pollutant currently not problematic up to a level 
exceeding the maximum allowable level. For this reason, the analytical model 
needs to incorporate as many pollutants as possible without introducing 
nonessential detail or complexity. In this section, a mathematical model that 
satisfies this need is developed utilizing nonlinear and linear programming 
theory1. 
Nonnnear Prograroroiog 
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Nonlinear programming extends the simplistic model in the previous 
section by accommodating the situation where a farm produces multiple outputs 
using multiple inputs and generates several types of effluents as byproducts. 
Let x = (x1, ... , xn)', x £ .Qc R", be a vector of inputs to the farm 
production process, F[(f1 (x), ... , fm(x))'] be a vector of produced crops, 
G[(g1 (x), ... , gh(x))'] be a vector of effluent discharges as a set of functions of 
inputs, and z = (z1, ..• , zh) be a vector of limits on effluent discharges imposed 
on the farm by the regulatory agency. Suppose that all functions above are 
deterministic and known by the farmer as well as the regulatory agency. 
Assume further that the objective of the farm is maximization of net returns over 
fixed costs subject to the resource endowments and discharge limits imposed 
on the farm. Mathematical representation of the farm problem is 
maximize(x): 1t{x) = p'F(x) - w'x 
subject to: G{x) ~ z 
X £ .Q {2.23) 
where F:R"--+ Rm, G:R"--+ Rh, n is a set constraint on input availability and is a 
convex set, pis an m-dimensional vector of crop prices, and w is an n-
dimensional vector of input prices. The Lagrangian to the problem (2.23) is 
defined as 
1 A large portion of material in this section regarding nonlinear and linear programming theory was 
adapted from Pyles (1986) and Pyles (1990). 
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L(X,Jl) = p'F(x) - w'x + Jl'[G(x) - z] (2.24) 
where Jl E Rh. Suppose that x0 is a local maximum solution to the nonlinear 
programming problem (2.23) and let both G and z be partitioned into two 
conformable sets of component functions as: 
G(x) = [(G 1(x))', (G2(x))')' 
Z = [z1', z2')' 
where G1(x0 ) < z1 and G2(x0 ) = z2. 
In the classical programming problem, which has neither explicit 
restrictions on the domain of the choice variables nor inequality constraints, the 
necessary condition for a local extremum is that the first-order partial derivative 
of the Lagrangian to the problem with respect to each choice variable and 
Lagrangian multiplier be zero. Similar types of necessary conditions in the 
nonlinear programming problem are known as the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are first-order necessary conditions only if certain 
restrictions on the constraint functions, called constraint qualifications (Chiang, 
1984, pp. 731-38), are satisfied. While the movement of the choice variable in 
the classical programming problem is confined to the level set defined by 
equality constraints, the possibilities of movements into the interiors of the upper 
set or lower set is allowed in the nonlinear programming problem. Such a less 
restrictive set of constraints leads to the more restrictive set of necessary 
conditions for local optimality. 
Theorem 1 Kuhn-Tucker (First-Order Necessary) Conditions: Assume 
that x0 is a local maximum solution to the nonlinear programming problem 
(2.23); each component function of Fis differentiable at xO, and G is 
continuously differentiable at x0 . Assume further that xO is a regular point of the 
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binding constraints (i.e., G2 is continuously differentiable at x0 and [VG2(x0 )]' is 
of full column rank), then there exists J1° e Rh such that: 
p'F x(x0 ) - w' - J1 °'VG(x0 ) = 0 
J1°'[z - G(x0 )] = 0 
Jlo ~ 0 
for the Lagrangian (2.24). 
Theorem 2 Second-Order Necessary Conditions for Local Maxima: 
Assume that x0 is a local maximum solution to the nonlinear programming 
problem (2.23); each component function of Fis twice differentiable at x0 , and 
that G is twice continuously differentiable at x°. Assume further that x0 is a 
regular point of the binding constraints. Then there exists J1° e Rh such that 
p'Fx(x0 ) -w' - J1°'VG(x0 ) = 0 
J1°'[z - G(x0 )] = 0 
Jlo ~ 0 
for the Lagrangian (2.24). Suppose that J1° and [z - G] are conformably 
partitioned as: 
where J1 1° = 0 and J12° > 0, then Lxx(x0 ,J1°) is negative semidefinite on the 
kernel of VG2 * (x0 ). 
Theorem 3 Second-Order Sufficient Conditions for Local Maxima: 
Assume that x° satisfies all constraints to the nonlinear programming problem 
(2.23). Assume also that there exists Jlo e Rh such that: 
p'Fx(x0 )-w' - JI 0 'VG(x0 ) = 0 
µ 0 '[z - G(x0 )] = O 
JJ.o~o 
* for the Lagrangian (2.24). Suppose that JI0 and [z - G] are conformably 
partitioned as: 
Jlo = [Jl1o•, Jl20 1 ]' 
* * [z - G(x0 )] = [(z1 - G1 (x0 ))', (z2 - G2 (x0 ))']' 
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where µ 1° = O and JI2° > 0. Suppose further that Lxx(x0 ,JI0 ) is negative definite 
* on the kernel of VG2 (x0 ), then x0 is a strict local maximum solution. 
To apply the local maximization theory to the determination of global 
maxima, the objective function needs to satisfy certain concavity properties and 
the feasible region to the maximization problem needs to be a convex set 
satisfying certain concavity properties. The following section reviews 
mathematical concepts and theorems related to the concavity properties. 
Definition 1 Upper Set, Lower Set, Level Set: Suppose that X is a 
nonempty set in R" and that g:X ~ R1, then 
1) The set {x e X: g(x) ~ z} is a lower set. 
2) The set {x e X: g(x) < z} is a strict lower set. 
3) The set {x e X: g(x) ~ z} is an upper set. 
4) The set {x e X: g(x) > z} is a strict upper set. 
5) The set {x E X: g(x) = z} is a level set. 
Definition 2 Concavity, Ouasiconcavjty: Suppose that Xis a nonempty 
convex set in R" and that f:X ~ R1. 
1) f is concave over X if: 
f[ax1 + (1 - a)x2] ~ af(x1) + (1 - a)f(x2) Va€ (0,1) and V x1, x2 € X 
f is strictly concave over X if the strict inequality holds. 
2) f is convex over X if: 
f[ax1 + (1 - a)x2] ~ af(x1) + (1 - a)f(x2) Va€ (0, 1) and V x1, x2 € X 
f is strictly convex over X if the strict inequality holds. 
3) f is quasiconcave if: 
f[ax1 + (1 - a)x2] ~ min[f(x1),f(x2)] Va E (0, 1) and V x1, x2 E X 
f is strictly quasiconcave over X if the strict inequality holds. 
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f is explicitly quasiconcave if the strict quasiconcavity holds for distinct f(x1) and 
f(x2). 
Corollary 1: Every concave function is both quasiconcave and explicitly 
quasiconcave. 
Corollary 2: Every strictly concave function is strictly quasiconcave. 
Corollary 3: Every strictly quasiconcave function is both quasiconcave 
and explicitly quasiconcave. 
Definition 3 Convex Set: Suppose that X c R". Xis a convex set if: 
ax1 + (1 - a)x2 E XV a E (0, 1) and V x1, x2 E X. 
Theorem 4: Suppose that Xis a nonempty convex set in R". If g:X ~ R1 
is convex on X, then the (strict) lower set is a convex set. Conversely, if g:X ~ 
R1 is concave on X, then the (strict) upper set is a convex set. 
Definition 4: A vector valued function is convex (concave) if each of its 
component function is convex (concave). 
Theorem 5: Suppose that Xis a convex set in Rn; z £ Rh; G:X-.+ Rh is 
convex on X; and that K:X -+ Rh is concave on X. Then, by Theorem 4 and 
Definition 2, 
1} The lower set {x E X: G(x} ~ z} is a convex set. 
2) The strict lower set {x £ X: G(x) < z} is a convex set. 
3) The upper set {x £ X: K{x} ~ z} is a convex set. 
4) The strict upper set {x E X: K(x) > z} is a convex set. 
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Theorem 6 Kuhn-Tucker Sufficiency Theorem (Eguivalence Theorem}: 
Suppose x0 is a local maximum solution to a nonlinear programming problem. 
If the feasible region is a convex set, and if the objective function is 
differentiable and concave over the feasible region, then x0 is a global 
maximum solution (Kuhn and Tucker, 1951 ). 
The concavity and convexity requirements in the Kuhn-Tucker theorem 
are relaxed to the quasiconcavity and quasiconvexity requirements in the 
Arrow-Enthoven sufficiency theorem. These relaxed requirements have 
widened the scope of applicability of nonlinear programming {Chiang, 1984, p. 
744). 
Theorem 7 Arrow-Enthoven Sufficiency Theorem: Assume that the 
objective function of a nonlinear programming problem, 1t{x), is differentiable 
and quasiconcave over the feasible region, and that every constraint function 
(z. - 9. (x}} is differentiable and quasiconcave over the feasible region. Let x0 
satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and let one of the following conditions be 
satisfied: 
1 } ox{x0}/oxi < O for at least one variable xi 
2) ox{x0 }/oxi > O for some variable xi which is in the feasible region 
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3) d1t(x<>)taxi ::t: O for at least one variable xi and 1t(x) is twice differentiable in the 
neighborhood of x0 
4) 1t(x) is concave. 
Then x0 maximizes 1t(x) subject to the constraints z - G(x) ~ 0, 
x e O (Arrow and Enthoven, 1961 ). 
Unfortunately, there is a possibility that some component functions of the 
vector function G which represents effluent production functions may be neither 
quasiconcave nor quasiconvex over O. For example, a lack of synchronization 
between soil nitrogen availability and crop nitrogen requirement caused by 
disproportionate use of irrigation water and nitrogen fertilizer leads to more 
nitrogen losses even with less use of both inputs. In this case, there is no 
guarantee that a local maximum solution provided by a nonlinear programming 
software is a true global optimum solution for the problem. However, linear 
programming (LP) provides an acceptable framework for solving the problem 
involving multiple crops, multiple soil types, and multiple types of effluent 
discharges. 
Linear Programming 
A linear programming model can be represented by following general 
form: 
maximize(x): c'x 
subject to: Ax s; b 
x~O (2.25) 
where A is a matrix of constants, c and b are constant vectors, and x is an 
activity vector. Since a linear programming problem is a special case of 
nonlinear programming problems, the nonlinear programming theory pertaining 
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to necessary conditions and sufficient conditions strictly applies also to the 
linear programming problem. In the linear programming model, however, both 
the objective function and constraint functions are linear functions, which are 
concave as well as convex. Hence, a local optimum solution to a linear 
programming problem is always a global optimum solution to the problem. 
A reformulation of the problem {2.23) in a more explicit linear 
programming framework is: 
maximize{x): x{x) = p'Fx - w'x 
subject to: Ax s b 
Gx s z 
X ~ 0 {2.26) 
where x is an nx1 vector of farm production activity levels; F is an mxn 
coefficient matrix representing technological relationships between activities 
and output; A is an lom technical coefficient matrix; b is an kx1 vector of RHS 
values; G is an hxn coefficient matrix representing relationships between 
activities and the magnitude of effluent discharges; z is an hx1 vector of 
emission limits imposed on the farm; pis an mx1 vector of product prices; and w 
is an nx1 vector of unit costs for activities. 
* . . Suppose that x is a global maximum solution to the linear programming 
problem {2.26} and assume that A and [b - Ax] are conformably partitioned as: 
* * where A 1 = 0 and A 2 > 0. Assume further that J1 and [z - G] are conformably 
partitioned as: . 
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* * * [ I ']' Jl = Jl1 ' Jl2 
* * * where J.1 1 = 0 and J.12 > 0. Then x is the global maximum solution to the 
following problem: 
maximize(x): x(x) = p'Fx - w'x 
(2.27) 
The Lagrangian to the problem is 
Since the problem (2.28) is simply a classical programming problem, the 
theory pertaining to the classical programming problem can be readily applied. 
Suppose the parameters to the problem are fixed at (p0 ,w0 ,b2°,z2°). Necessary 
conditions for a solution to occur at X° are that there exist 1 2 ° and J.12 ° such that 
(2.29) 
To justify writing the endogenous variables as functions of the 
exogenous variables, the utilization of the implicit function theorem is essential. 
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Theorem 8 Implicit Function Theorem: Suppose a vector function E(x,a) 
where E:Rn+m ~ R", x E R" is a vector of endogenous variables, and a E Rm is a 
vector of exogenous variables. Consider the system of equations E(x,a) = 0. If 
there exist :x° E R" and a O E Rm such that all of the following conditions hold: 
1) E(:x°,a 0 ) = 0 
2) Eis continuously differentiable to degree c ~ 1 at (:x°,a 0 ) 
3) oE(x0 ,a 0 )/ox is nonsingular 
then there exists an implicit vector function X:Rm ~ R" and an open 
neighborhood N of a O such that all of the following conditions hold: 
1)E[X(a),a]=0 r/a EN 
2) X(a 0 ) = x0 
3) X is continuously differentiable to degree c on N. 
If the system of equations (2.29) is continuously differentiable over some 
open neighborhood of (p0 ,w0 ,b2°,z2°), and if the endogenous-variable 
Jacobian matrix to the system of equations (2.29) is nonsingular, then, by the 
implicit function theorem, there exist choice functions X0 (p,w,b2 ,z2), 
t 2°(p,w,b2,z2), and .u2°(p,w,b2 ,z2) such that x = X0 (p,w,b2,z2), 1 2 = 
1 2°(p,w,b2,z2), and .u2 = J12°(p,w,b2,z2) solve the first-order conditions for all 
(p,w,b2 ,z2) in some open neighborhood of (p0 ,w0 ,b2°,z2°). 
Clearly, the linear system (2.29) is continuously differentiable at every 
(x,1 2 ,.u2 ,p,w,b2,z2), and the endogenous-variable Jacobian matrix to the linear 
system is always nonsingular since [A2',G2']' is of full column rank by the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. Hence the economic meaning pertaining to each variable of 
the linear programming problem is at one's disposal. Now, consider the farm 
problem (2.26) again. The original emission limits imposed on the farm by the 
regulatory agency were assumed to be z. If the farmer is rational, however, 
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there is no need to impose restrictions on all kinds of emissions. The agency 
needs to impose restrictions only on the kinds of emissions that fall under the 
category of z2, which is a reduced set of the original restrictions. This vector of 
* binding emission limits (z2 ) conforming to the optimum solution represents 
nonpoint standards. 
The second pollution control policy parameter is a set of economic 
incentives the farm operator would be confronted with for reducing pollutant 
emissions to the levels that are equal or below the limit prescribed by the 
regulatory agency. This set of economic incentives represents nonpoint 
incentives. In terms of mathematical economics theory, nonpoint incentives can 
be obtained from equation (2.28) using the envelope theorem: 
* * * * 
,11 2 = a1t (p,w,b2,z2 )/az2 = aL(p,w,b2,z2 )/az2 (2.30) 
* The existence of ,112 , which is interpreted as a vector of shadow prices of 
binding emission limits, is guaranteed by the implicit function theorem. The 
* original limits on emissions, which is z, would be achieved by imposing ,11 2 as 
effluent taxes on effluents associated with the binding limits. There are some 
alternative ways to charge these effluent taxes. Each alternative is equally 
efficient in the economic sense, but has quite different equity implications. 
* Effluent taxes charged to every unit of effluent (.112 'G2x) would significantly 
decrease net returns to the farm relative to effluent taxes charged to the excess 
* * effluents over the emission limits [(J12 '(G2x - z2 )], even though the resultant 
effluent discharge levels for both cases would be exactly the same if the farmer 
is rational. In the empirical analysis chapter (Chapter V), the equity implications 
of the alternative ways of charging the effluent taxes will be discussed. Also the 
* changes in both composition and values of ,11 2 with respect to changes in the 
vector of emission limits z will be discussed in the empirical analysis chapter. 
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The third pollution control policy tool, which enforces certain crop mixes 
and input use levels, represents management practice standards. The 
* management practice standards are defined by a vector of choice functions x = 
* * . X (p,w,b2,z2 ). The last pollution control policy tool, management practice 
* incentives, uses JI2 'G2 as a vector of charges on corresponding activity levels 
undertaken by the farmer. The total amount of management practice incentives 
* * paid by the farmer would be JI2 'G2x since the rational farmer would adopt the 
* optimal production activities x . Consequently, all four policy options induce the 
least-cost rearrangement of production activities to comply with the given policy 
goal. In this sense, the four policies are equally efficient, even though 
administration costs may be different. The decrease in net returns to the farmer 
can be compensated through lump-sum payments without losing economic 
efficiency .. 
Monitoring effluent discharges from agriculture is extremely difficult since 
most cases of water pollution from agriculture appertain to nonpoint source 
pollution that cannot be traced to a specific spot. However, monitoring effluent 
discharges is not necessary to implement the four policy tools in the above 
framework. If the linkage between production activities and effluent generation 
is explicitly included in the analysis, the levels of effluent discharges can be 
estimated whenever production activities are known. The use of a crop 
growth/chemical movement simulation model like EPIC-PST (Sabbagh et al.) 
provides technical data showing the linkages for the analysis. 
In Chapter 5, alternative policy scenarios of changing certain elements of 
vectors wand/orb (e.g., total nitrogen use limits, taxes on nitrogen and 
pesticide use, limits on the total quantity of groundwater use, taxes on 
groundwater use, etc.) will also be tested to determine whether the policy goal 
can be attained through policy options incurring less policy transaction costs 
than the above four efficient policy options. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
THE EMPIRICAL MODELS 
As stated in the first chapter, the primary objective of this study is 
assessing both economic and environmental consequences of alternative water 
quality policies on a typical farm in the study area. Thus, the empirical analysis 
requires agronomic, biochemical, hydrologic, and economic information. 
To meet these requirements, the analysis proceeds in a two-stage simulation 
involving crop growth/chemical movements and economic optimization. This 
chapter outlines the empirical framework used for the farm-level economic 
analysis of agricultural pollution control. 
The entire modelling framework is presented in Figure 4. The modeling 
procedure centers around the biophysical simulator and the mathematical 
programming model. Input sets for the biophysical simulator are site 
characteristics and crop management practices. The former input set includes 
weather, topography of the land, and chemical/physical properties of major soils 
in the study area. The latter input set includes crop management practices, 
such as tillage, fertilizer and pesticide applications, and irrigation. The 
biophysical simulator provides crop yield and the magnitude of effluents from 
alternative crop management practices. The mathematical programming model 
links operating costs, prices, outputs of EPIC-PST simulation, and pollution 
control policy alternatives. An intermediate step involves calculating operating 
costs using the Expanded Budget Generator (Norris, 1990). The outputs of the 
43 
Management 
Practices 
-Tillage 
-Fertilizer 
-Pesticide 
-Irrigation 
, 
1 
BIOPHYSICAL 
SIMULATOR 
(EPIC-PST) 
1 • 
Site 
Characteristics 
-Weather 
-Topography 
-Soil 
Crop Yield Environmenta Output 
BUDGET 
GENERATOR 1---:-~ 
1 
Economic 
Parameters 
-Prices 
-Commodity 
Policies 
--
MATHEMATICAL 
PROGRAMMING 
MODEL 
1 
--
Production 
Decisions Water Quality Consequences 
Net Returns 
Figure 4. Overall Modeling Framework 
Water Quality 
Policy 
Scenarios 
44 
45 
mathematical programming model include optimal production decisions, net 
returns, and water quality consequences. Based on these results, the 
evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of alternative policies is conducted. 
EPIC-PST: A Biophysical Simulation Model 
In most cases, agricultural pollution is nonpoint source pollution that 
cannot be traced to a specific spot with reasonable accuracy and at reasonable 
cost. Bailey and Swank {1983, p. 29) characterize agricultural nonpoint source 
pollution as: 
1. Nonpoint source discharges are diffuse in nature and primarily 
occur during rainfall events when storm runoff from the land 
surface carries sediment, sediment-adsorbed chemicals, and 
dissolved chemicals {nutrients, pesticides, heavy metals, easily 
oxidizable organics) into receiving water systems. Dissolved 
chemicals may also percolate through soil to interflow regions 
and groundwater which may eventually reappear in surface 
waters as baseflow. 
2. Nonpoint source pollution is stochastic and dynamic and has 
multimedia dimensions. It is dynamic in the sense that land 
uses and configurations change over time making the pollutant 
mix vary both spatially and temporally. 
3. Nonpoint source discharge of some chemicals may have no 
apparent direct adverse impacts in the receiving medium. 
However, intermedia transfer, together with the formation of 
degradation products, may be cause for concern in other 
media. 
The potential for discharge of dissolved or adsorbed chemicals is related 
to chemical, topographical, and chemical/physical characteristics of the soil, 
and crop production management practices, such as tillage, crop rotations, 
irrigation, fertilizer use, and pesticide applications. Furthermore, as stated 
above, the magnitude of agricultural effluent discharges is stochastic in nature 
due, in part, to the stochastic weather process. Thus, policy analysts must rely 
on a biophysical simulation model that can represent both the complex 
characteristics of the agricultural nonpoint source pollution problem and the 
relationships between farm management practices, crop production, and 
environmental outputs. 
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Several crop growth or environmental flow simulation models such as 
CREAMS (Knisel, 1980}, EPIC (Williams et al., 1984}, DRASTIC (Kerr, 1985}, 
CERES-MAIZE (Jones and Kiniry, 1986}, GLEAMS (Leonard et al.,· 1987}, 
PNUTGRO (Boote et al, 1988}, SOYGRO (Jones et al., 1989}, and EPIC-PST 
(Sabbagh et al., 1991} are available in the literature. Among them, CREAMS, 
DRASTIC, and GLEAMS do not provide information on crop growth because 
they are developed to simulate mainly pesticide and/or nutrient activities. On 
the other hand, CERES-MAIZE, PNUTGRO, and SOYGRO are not able to 
provide information on chemical related activities since they are crop growth-
oriented models. 
The EPIC (Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator} model (Williams et al., 
1983, 1984, 1989) was developed to determine the relationship between soil 
erosion and soil productivity. It is a mathematical model consisting of 
subroutines for simulating soil erosion, crop growth, and related processes. 
Major components of EPIC consist of weather, hydrology, erosion-
sedimentation, nutrient cycling, crop growth, tillage, soil temperature, 
economics, and crop environment control (Williams et al., 1984). EPIC is 
efficiently and conveniently applicable to a wide range of soils, climates, and 
crops in the United States because major input data, such as weather, soils, 
crop parameters, and tillage/operation parameters, are readily available from 
EPIC data files. Daily precipitation, air temperature, and solar radiation can be 
either read from the user-supplied data file or simulated by the weather 
subprogram itself. If daily maximum and minimum air temperature and solar 
radiation are simulated by the weather subprogram, they are generated from a 
47 
multivariate normal distribution. Snowfall is determined by precipitation and air 
temperature. 
The hydrology subprogram simulates runoff, lateral subsurface flow, 
drainage, and percolation as functions of daily rainfall and irrigation. The runoff 
model uses the SCS curve number equation (USDA Soil Conservation 
Service, 1972) to predict surface runoff volume. The percolation model of EPIC 
uses a storage routing technique to predict water flow through soil layers. If soil 
water content exceeds field capacity, then water flow from a layer occurs. Water 
drainage stops when the water content returns to field capacity. Lateral 
subsurface flow is estimated simultaneously with percolation. 
Nitrogen and phosphorus are two plant nutrients EPIC considers. EPIC 
predicts nitrate loss with surface runoff, organic nitrogen loss with sediment 
loss, nitrate loss with percolation, upward nitrate movement by evaporation, and 
crop uptake, given fertilizer application, precipitation, and irrigation. Also it 
simulates soluble phosphorus with runoff, and mineral and organic phosphorus 
loss with sediment. 
A general plant growth model is used in EPIC for simulating above-
ground biomass, yield, and roots of all considered crops (corn, grain sorghum, 
wheat, barley, oats, sunflower, soybean, alfalfa, cotton, peanuts, potatoes, 
Durham wheat, winter peas, faba beans, rapeseed, sugarcane, sorghum hay, 
range grass, rice, cassava, lentils, and pine trees). Each crop has its own crop 
parameters for the plant growth simulation. EPIC is capable of accommodating 
multiple crops during a year and any crop rotation. The plant growth subroutine 
simulates energy interception, energy conversion, and plant uptake of water 
and nutrition. Water, nutrient, and air temperature stresses constrain crop 
growth. 
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The EPIC tillage subprogram simulates the change in soil bulk density, 
the transition from standing crop residue to flat residue, and mixing of soil 
layers, nutrients, and crop residues within the plow depth. The EPIC farm 
machinery data file lists about 50 types of farm equipment and related data. 
The data can be modified or equipment can be added to the data file to better 
suit the user's local conditions. 
Management practice information for EPIC simulation runs is supplied by 
the user based on various operation codes (Sharpley and Williams, 1990b). 
The irrigation code specifies the irrigation technology (sprinkler, furrow, 
dryland). Two modes of irrigation, manual and automatic, are available. With 
manual irrigation, the user specifies the irrigation dates and volumes of water to 
be irrigated. With automatic irrigation, the user specifies the minimum 
application interval in days and the water stress factor between O and 1. If the 
plant water stress factor reaches the specified level after the specified minimum 
application interval, EPIC triggers automatic irrigation. The user can regulate 
individual irrigation volume by specifying the minimum and maximum volumes 
allowed for single irrigation. Total irrigation volume allowed for a year can be 
limited by the user. Operation codes for two nitrogen fertilizer application 
modes function much like irrigation codes. 
In EPIC, the user can provide the tillage operations listed by date and 
operation identification number. For planting and harvesting operations, the 
crop identification number, date of operation, and the operating equipment can 
be specified. If the manual fertilizer application mode is selected, the user can 
specify the date, rate, and depth of individual application. Likewise, if the 
manual irrigation mode is selected, the user can specify the date and volume of 
individual irrigations. 
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The EPIC model has been extensively evaluated and validated at 
various locations in the continental United States and in Hawaii (Sharpley and 
Williams, 1990a). Evaluation results indicate that the EPIC model simulates 
weather, soil erosion, nutrient loss, and crop yield with reasonable accuracy. 
Even though EPIC is capable of simulating soil erosion, nutrient losses, 
and crop growth reasonably well, it is not capable of simulating pesticide 
activities. The need for a more comprehensive mathematical model that can 
simultaneously simulate the effects of different agricultural practices on crop 
yield and nutrient/pesticide losses by surface runoff, sediment movement, and 
leaching below the crop root zone has prompted the development of EPIC-PST 
(Sabbagh et al., 1991 ). EPIC-PST is developed by incorporating pesticide 
subroutines of the GLEAMS (Groundwater Loading Effects of Agricultural 
Management Systems) model into EPIC. GLEAMS is a mathematical model 
that simulates the impacts of agricultural management practices on the 
movement of pesticides into, within, and through the crop root zone, as well as 
the runoff and sediment transport of pesticides (Leonard et al., 1987). EPIC-
PST uses the same parameter editor developed for the pesticide component of 
GLEAMS. The user can provide the date and rate of individual pesticide 
application, depth of incorporation when a pesticide is incorporated into the soil, 
and pesticide characteristics such as water solubility, foliar residue half-life, 
partitioning coefficient (ratio of the concentration of pesticide in organic carbon 
to concentration of pesticide in water), and soil half-life. 
The resulting model can simulate nutrient and pesticide losses by 
surface runoff, sediment movement, and leaching below the soil profile as well 
as the effects of different agricultural management practices in a specific soil on 
crop yield. Ability of EPIC-PST to simulate chemical movements has been 
validated by comparing simulated results with observed data from Ben Hur 
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Research Farm, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and a farm which is located near 
Tifton, Georgia (Sabbagh et al., 1991 ). Ability to simulate crop yields also has 
been validated by comparing simulated yields with yield data for four crops 
(wheat, grain sorghum, corn, and alfalfa) from the Panhandle Research Station, 
Goodwell, Oklahoma (Mapp et al., 1991 ). Simulated crop yields for the soils 
and production practices under both irrigated and dryland conditions in Caddo 
County are higher than county averages, but match the yields experienced by 
highly-managing farm operators in the area reasonably well (Beerwinkle, 
1992). Field data on chemical movements do not exist for Caddo County, so 
field validation of that component of the model was not possible. Nevertheless, 
chemical movements were predicted using EPIC-PST, and the analysis was 
based on those predictions. 
The Mathematical Programming Model 
Basic Assumptions 
The response of the farmer to alternative water quality policies can be 
simulated using a mathematical programming model. The primary role of the 
mathematical programming model is the efficient allocation of limited resources 
among various production enterprise alternatives. Furthermore, the farm level 
mathematical programming model in this study needs to be capable of 
evaluating both the economic and environmental impacts of alternative water 
quality policies. Nonlinear programming is not considered to be capable of 
providing an acceptable framework for solving the problem since EPIC-PST 
simulation results indicate that the functional form of the effluent production 
function is not quasiconcave. Instead, linear programming is chosen for the 
51 
analysis of the economic and environmental consequences of alternative water 
quality policies. 
A general form of the maximizing linear programming model may be 
described as: 
maximize(x): c'x 
subject to: Ax~ b 
x~O 
where x is a n x 1 vector of activities, c is a n x 1 vector of objective function 
coefficients, A is am x n matrix of technical coefficients, and bis am x 1 vector 
of resource endowments. 
A number of assumptions are implicit in the generalized linear 
programming model. The assumptions are (Hazell and Norton, 1986, pp. 12-
13): 
1. Determinism: all coefficients in the model are assumed to be 
known with certainty. 
2. Additivity: interaction effects between activities are not 
permitted. 
3. Continuity: both activities and resources uses can be fractional 
units. 
4. Homogeneity: all units of the same resources or activities are 
identical. 
5. Proportionality: gross margin and resource requirements per 
unit of activity are assumed to be constant regardless of the 
level of the activity used. 
In this study, it is assumed that the objective of the farmer is to maximize 
net returns (returns above total operating cost) from crop production subject to 
the resource endowments and water quality policy parameters. If a standard 
policy, such as the maximum level of effluents the farm may discharge, is 
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imposed at the farm level, then the farm problem may be formulated in a more 
explicit linear programming model as follows: 
maximize(x): 1t{x) = p'Fx - w'x 
subject to: Ax~ b 
Gx~z 
x~O 
where x is a n x 1 vector of farm production activity levels, F is a m x n matrix of 
coefficients representing relationships between activities and output, A is a k x n 
matrix of technical coefficients, and b is a k x 1 vector of right hand side (RHS) 
values, G is a h x n matrix of coefficients representing relationships between 
farming activities and effluent generation, z is a h x 1 vector of effluent limits set 
by the regulatory agency, pis am x 1 vector of output prices, and w is an x 1 
vector of unit costs for activities. The matrix of coefficients representing 
relationships between farming activities and effluent generation (G) is assumed 
to be known to both the farmer and the regulatory agency. If economic 
incentives such as effluent taxes are imposed, then the farm problem may be 
reformulated as: 
maximize(x): 1t{x) = p'Fx - w'x - .11'Gx 
subject to: Ax~ b 
x~O 
where .11 denotes a vector of effluent taxes. 
To reduce the mathematical programming model to a manageable size, 
certain simplifying assumptions are necessary. Although these assumptions 
may not be exact descriptions of the farm situation in the study area, they are 
necessary for developing a set of mathematical programming models 
sufficiently comprehensive and detailed to address the objectives of the 
analysis. The assumptions are as follows: 
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1. The hypothetical farm consists of four different soils that have different 
yield and hydrologic implications. 
2. The farmer has the choice of producing four crops {wheat, peanuts, 
cotton, grain sorghum) which dominate crop production in the study 
area. 
3. The farmer has the choice of producing each of the four crops under 9 
different input levels - 3 irrigation levels {High, Medium, Dryland) and 
3 different nitrogen application levels {High, Medium, Low) for each 
irrigation level. 
4. Both the tillage system and the set of pesticides used for each crop 
are fixed, and represent the most common tillage practices and 
pesticides used by study area producers. 
5. The regulatory agency has information for setting the acceptable 
standards of environmental quality that must be met in order to 
achieve a reasonable water quality. 
The first assumption is necessary to keep the size of the mathematical 
programming model manageable, while representing most of soils of the study 
area without sacrificing accuracy. The fourth assumption also is required keep 
the number of EPIC-PST runs and activities in the mathematical programming 
model within a manageable size. The third assumption is necessary to provide 
the economic model more flexibility in choosing profitable cropping systems 
while easily complying with the given water quality policies. 
Model formulation 
Benefits which accrue from peanut and cotton rotations are well 
documented in the literature. Peanuts are quite susceptible to attack by 
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nematodes and soil-borne diseases, and should be rotated with other crops 
such as small grain or grain sorghum that are not susceptible to the same 
pathogens (Woodroof, 1983). Cotton rotations with grain sorghum, small grain, 
or legumes decrease the incidence and severity of diseases and weed 
problems {Bell, 1984; Chandler, 1984). Higgs et al. (1990) argue that crop 
rotations that include grain and forage crops are profitable and contribute to a 
sustainable agriculture. 
The importance of peanut and cotton rotations requires adequate 
modeling of multi-year crop rotations. In addition, the model should allow 
flexibility in choosing input use levels associated with each rotation system and 
free adjustment in response to pollution control policy restrictions. Before 
presenting rotational combinations that are actually adopted by farmers in the 
study area, certain simplifying assumptions on agronomic matters that reflect 
the crop production environment of the study area need to be mentioned. The 
assumptions are: 
1. The yields of peanuts and cotton depend on rotation crops grown 
during the previous two years because of rotational effects. The 
second year peanut production following the first year peanuts would 
require more pesticide application {e.g., full label dose and/or more 
frequent treatment) and result in certain percentage of yield reduction. 
Three-year continuous peanut production on the same soil is 
assumed not feasible due to adverse yield impacts. Three-year 
continuous cotton production is feasible, however, would result in 
increasing yield reduction year by year. Details on the yield effects 
are discussed in the following chapter. 
2. Peanuts are extremely sensitive to the effects of other crops grown in 
the rotation. Furthermore, peanuts and cotton have common pests 
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such as nematodes, thrips, and mites. Thus, rotations composed of 
only peanuts and cotton are not economically viable and are, hence, 
not included in the analysis. 
3. The quantity of nitrogen fertmzer or the volume of irrigation water 
applied in the previous two years does not affect yield in the third year 
because the soil loses residual nitrogen through runoff or percolation 
below the crop root zone and recovers the moisture level during the 
period following harvest. This assumption is realistic since even the 
highest nitrogen level specified for the crop growth/chemical 
movement simulation is below the level that causes accumulation of 
excess nitrogen in the soil. In addition, the mean annual precipitation 
in the study area is about 30 inches. However, this assumption is not 
applied to double cropping systems since preceding crop 
management practices have considerable impact on the soil moisture 
and nitrogen carryover for the following crop. 
4. Peanuts or cotton may not be planted right after harvesting wheat. 
Only grain sorghum can be planted right after wheat harvest as a 
double crop activity. This wheat/grain sorghum double crop can be 
practiced at most in one of every three years. 
5. Wheat may not be planted right after harvesting cotton, but may be 
planted right after harvesting grain sorghum or Spanish type peanuts 
that can be grown in short-season conditions. Either grain 
sorghum/wheat or peanuts/wheat double cropping can be practiced 
at most in one of every three years. 
6. When wheat and grain sorghum are grown as a double crop activity, 
or when wheat is planted right after harvesting peanuts or grain 
sorghum, each crop has an effect on operating costs and yield for the 
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other crop since soil moisture, tillage practices, planting period, and 
harvesting period for each crop depend on that of the other crop 
placed in the double crop activity. If wheat or grain sorghum is grown 
after an ordinary fallow period, then there will be no yield reduction 
regardless of the preceding crop placed in the rotation. 
Considering the above assumptions on agronomic matters, 23 cropping 
systems involving the four crops are identified: (1) Peanuts-Peanuts-Grain 
sorghum (P-P-G); (2) Peanuts-Grain sorghum-Grain Sorghum (P-G-G); (3) 
Peanuts-Cotton-Grain sorghum (P-C-G); (4) Grain sorghum-Grain sorghum-
Cotton (G-G-C); (5) Grain sorghum-Cotton-Cotton (G-C-C); (6) Peanuts-
Peanuts-Wheat/Grain sorghum (P-P-W/G); (7) Grain sorghum-Peanuts-
Wheat/Grain sorghum (G-P-W/G); (8) Cotton-Peanuts-Wheat/Grain sorghum (C-
P-W/G); (9) Peanuts-Grain sorghum-Wheat/Grain sorghum (P-G-W/G); (10) 
Grain sorghum-Grain sorghum-Wheat/Grain sorghum (G-G-W/G); (11) Cotton-
Grain sorghum-Wheat/Grain sorghum (C-G-W/G); (12) Peanuts-Fallow-
Wheat/Grain sorghum (P-F-W/G); (13) Grain sorghum-Fallow-Wheat/Grain 
sorghum (G-F-W/G); (14) Cotton-Fallow-Wheat/Grain sorghum (C-F-W/G); (15) 
Peanuts-Wheat-Wheat/Grain sorghum (P-W-W/G); (16) Grain sorghum-Wheat-
Wheat/Grain sorghum (G-W-W/G); (17) Fallow-Wheat-Wheat/Grain sorghum (F-
W-W/G); (18) Continuous Grain sorghum; (19) Continuous cotton; (20) 
Continuous wheat; (21) Peanuts-Wheat/Grain sorghum (P-W/G); (22) Grain 
sorghum-Wheat/Grain sorghum (G-W/G); and (23) Fallow-Wheat/Grain sorghum 
(F-W/G), where "-" separates crop years and"/" separates double crops within a 
year. 
In the previous section, it was assumed that the farmer has the choice of 
producing each of the four crops under 9 different input levels - 3 irrigation 
levels (High, Medium, Dryland) and 3 different nitrogen application levels (High, 
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Medium, Low) for each irrigation level. The purpose of this assumption is to 
provide the mathematical programming model more flexibility in choosing 
profitable production activities while complying with the given water quality 
policy options. No doubt, sometimes changing the cropping system is more 
profitable than changing the input level within the system. However, when a 
rotation system is much more profitable than the others, changing the input level 
within the more profitable cropping system would bring less profit loss than 
changing to another cropping system. With the choice of various input levels 
within a cropping system, the economic model may freely change the input 
levels within the profitable cropping system to comply with the given water 
quality constraints. Otherwise, the economic model has to choose among other 
cropping systems with greater profit losses. In that case, economic impacts of 
water quality policies may be exaggerated. In this context, providing the 
economic model with flexibility in choosing~ alternative input levels within a 
cropping system is necessary. One important problem associated with the 
provision of multiple input levels in a cropping system is the exponentially 
increasing number of activities. To keep the empirical model to a manageable 
size, a special modeling approach is needed. 
Suppose that the yield of a crop depends on the crops grown on the 
same soil in the previous two years because of rotational effects. Suppose 
further that the nitrogen application and irrigation levels of the previous years do 
not affect yield the following year because the soil loses residual nitrogen 
through runoff or percolation below the crop root zone and recovers the 
moisture level during the period following harvest. Consider three-year crop 
rotation systems peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum (P-C-G), cotton-grain sorghum-
grain sorghum (C-G-G), and cotton-cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G) that have the 
choice of high (H), medium (M), and low (L) input levels for each crop within the 
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rotation systems. This farm situation leads to a rotation model with activities and 
constraints as in Table 3. 
To illustrate, suppose we wish the model to yield a three-year rotation 
system of peanuts with the high input level followed by cotton with the medium 
input level followed by grain sorghum with the low input level (PH-CM-GL). This 
rotation could be produced by a combination consists of CGPH, GPCM, and 
PCGL. Notice that each activity produces only one crop indicated by the last 
two characters. For example, CGPH produces peanuts using the high input 
level on the land where cotton and grain sorghum are grown in the previous two 
years. The objective function sums the returns to the three activities. The land 
constraint allows no more than the total acreage available, denoted by Nin 
Table 3. The rotational linkages are the key element of the rotation model. 
Notice that CGPH, GPCM, and PCGL are interconnected by rotational 
constraints CG, GP, and PC. One acre of CGPH uses one acre of CG and 
supplies one acre of GP, one acre of GPCH uses one acre of GP and supplies 
one acre of PC, and one acre of PCGL uses one acre of PC and supplies one 
acre of CG. Therefore, the rotational constraints (CG, GP, and PC) are satisfied 
with binding condition. On the other hand, continuous cropping systems do not 
require rotational linkages since they use and supply the same rotational 
constraints (e.g. CCC uses CC and supplies CC). Again suppose that we wish 
the model to yield a two-year rotation system of cotton with the high input level 
followed by grain sorghum with the low input level (CH-GL). Then the model 
would choose CGCH and GCGL. Suppose further that we wish the model to 
produce a five-year rotation system PH-CH-GL-CM-GL. This rotation would be 
produced by choosing CGPH, GPCH, PCGL, CGCM, and GCGL. 
A conventional rotation modeling method that considers explicit 
sequences of rotations limits the choice of rotation to the combinations that the 
PC 
CG 
GP-
GC 
GG 
cc 
LAND 
PC 
CG 
GP 
GC 
GG 
cc 
LAND 
PC 
CG 
GP 
GC 
GG 
cc 
LAND 
TABLE 3 
SIMPLIFIED ROTATION MODEL 
PCGH PCGM PCGL CGPH CGPM CGPL GPCH GPCM GPCL 
1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 1 1 1 
-1 -1 -1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CGGH CGGM CGGL GGCH GGCM GGCL GCGH GCGM GCGL 
1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 1 1 1 
-1 -1 -1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CCGH CCGM CCGL CGCH CGCM CGCL GCCH GCCM GCCL 
-1 -1 -1 1 1 1 
-1 -1 -1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 -1 -1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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modeler develops. Furthermore, the number of activities required with the 
conventional modeling method increase exponentially as the number of input 
levels considered increases. For example, a model that can yield every 
combination of P-C-G-C-G rotation with three input levels would require 243 
(35) activities. In this study, it was assumed that nine different input levels are 
available for production of each crop. In this case, a model considering just a 
single three-year rotation system in terms of explicit crop sequences would 
require 729 (93) activities, while the above rotation modeling approach requires 
27 (9 x 3) activities. This remarkable reduction in the number of required 
activities is the primary contribution of the above modeling approach. In 
addition, this modeling approach has the advantage of EI-Nazer and McCarl's 
modeling approach (1986). in that it freely determines the optimal long-run 
rotation. 
The most common tillage practices and pesticides used by study area 
producers of each crop were identified through personal interviews with the 
County extension agent (Beerwinkle, 1991, 1992). The nine input use levels for 
each crop/soil combination were determined using data from numerous EPIC-
PST test runs. The nine input use levels are denoted by HH, HM, HL, MH, MM, 
ML, LH, LM, and LL. HM stands for high irrigation and medium nitrogen 
application, MH stands for medium irrigation and high nitrogen application, LL 
stands for dryland and low nitrogen application, and so on. Except for peanuts, 
HH, MH, and LH use nitrogen levels which approximately equate marginal 
value product and marginal factor cost of nitrogen fertilizer with respect to each 
irrigation level, given the relative prices used in this study. Peanut yields do not 
change in accordance with nitrogen applications since peanuts are a legume 
crop. Except for peanuts, the differences in nitrogen use between the high and 
subsequent levels are 15-20 pounds per acre under irrigated conditions, and 
1 o pounds per acre for dryland. Phosphorus, potassium, and micronutrient 
application levels are assumed to be fixed for each crop. 
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For each cropping system, soil, irrigation level, and nitrogen level, a 28-
year EPIC-PST simulation run was conducted using daily weather data for the 
study area. EPIC-PST generates a 28-year distribution of crop yields, soil 
erosion with runoff (LISLE), nitrate loss with runoff (YN03), mineral nitrogen loss 
with percolation (PRKN), pesticide (active ingredient) loss with runoff and 
sediment, and pesticide (active ingredient) loss with percolation for each soil-
management strategy combination. The potential of pesticide losses to surface 
and ground water from each activity is aggregated into a single index number 
using a method similar to that developed by Hoag and Hornsby (1991 ). The 
surface water hazard index (Is) is calculated as 
pesticide losses (active ingredient) with runoff and sediment 
I -s -
Lethal Concentration 50 
and the ground water hazard index (lg) is calculated as 
pesticide losses (active ingredient) with percolation x 100 
I -g -
Lifetime Health Advisory Level (Equivalent) 
The Lifetime Health Advisory Level or Equivalent is defined by USEPA as the 
concentration of a chemical in drinking water that is not expected to cause any 
adverse health effects over a lifetime exposure with a margin of safety. Lethal 
Concentration 50 is the concentration of a chemical at which 50 % of the test 
fish species die. In this analysis, mean values of the 28-year distributions of 
nitrate runoff (YN03), nitrogen percolation (PRKN), and pesticide movements 
(Is, lg) are used. Among them, YN03, and Is are perceived as the potential of 
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surface water contamination, while PRKN and 19 are perceived as the potential 
of ground water contamination. 
To convert EPIC-PST output into the coefficient matrix of the 
mathematical programming model, several programs written in PASCAL 
language were used. For the calculation of operating costs, the Expanded 
Budget Generator developed by Norris {1991) is used. The entire model 
structure is presented in Table 4. The model contains 1,650 activities and 100 
constraints. 
Objective Function 
Rotational Linkages 
Soil Acreage 
Constraints 
Irrigated Land 
Constraints 
Crop Production 
Accounting Rows 
Water Pumping 
Accounting Rows 
Nitrogen 
Application 
Accounting Rows 
Pesticide Cost 
Accounting Rows 
Soil and 
Chemical 
Movement 
Accounting Rows 
Water Pumping 
Constraint 
Nitrogen 
Application 
Constraint 
Soil and 
Chemical 
Movement 
Constraints 
TABLE 4 
SIMPLIFIED TABLEAU OF MATHEMATICAL 
PROGRAMMING MODEL 
Production Crop Sale 
-A 8 
1 or -1 
1 orO 
-E 
w 
F 
G 
H 
Water 
Pumping 
-C 
-1 
Nitrogen 
Purchase 
-D 
-1 
Pesticide Soil & 
Purchase Chemical 
Movements 
-1 -1 or-µ2*· 
-1 
-1 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS 
This chapter specifies the data required for the simulation of crop 
growth/chemical movements and the formulation of the mathematical 
programming model. The crop growth/chemical movement simulation model 
{EPIC-PST) requires information about soil properties, weather, and 
management practices, including tillage, irrigation, fertilizer and pesticide uses. 
Output from the EPIC-PST simulation model, such as data on crop yield and 
environmental consequences of farm management practices, are fed into the 
economic model. In addition to these data, the economic model requires 
information about the resource endowment of the representative farm, farm 
program participation, price assumptions, and costs for production activities. 
Production Environment of the Representative Farm 
Specifying the resource endowment for the representative farm analyzed 
in the mathematical programming model for this study requires the 
determination of the total farm acreage, the nature and distribution of soils, the 
chemical/physical characteristics of soils, and the extent and nature of dryland 
and irrigated crop production. Farm operations in Caddo County vary 
considerably in size. According to the 1987 Census of Agriculture, for example, 
farms less than 50 acres in size account for 12.9 percent of total farms, while 
farms more than 1,000 acres account for 13.2 percent of total farms. The 
average size of farm in Caddo County is 469 acres. Farm types also exhibit 
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considerable variation. In 1987, among 1,530 farms in the County, 345 farms 
had some irrigated acres, and the rest were strictly dryland operations. The 
average size of irrigated farms was 725 acres. In most cases, irrigation water is 
withdrawn from underground sources. The most widely adopted irrigation 
technology by farmers in Caddo County is the high pressure center pivot system 
(Beerwinkle, 1991 ). Considering these, a farm that has 480 acres of total 
cropland with 260 acres of irrigated cropland is defined as the representative 
farm for this study. The irrigated acreage is assumed to be covered by two one-
quarter mile center pivot irrigation systems. It is difficult to determine which part 
of the farm can be irrigated because the hypothetical farm is assumed to have 
four types of soils. Thus, it is assumed that each type of soil can be irrigated. 
Physical/chemical properties of soils on a farm have influence not only 
on crop yield but also on the magnitude of nutrient and pesticide losses. The 
soil series and the soil phase are the most widely used categories of soil 
classification (USDA Soil Conservation Service, 1973). Soils that have almost 
the same profiles make up a soil series. All the soils of one series have 
horizons that are similar in thickness, arrangement, and other important 
characteristics. Soils of one series may differ in texture of the surface soil and in 
slope, stoniness, or other characteristics. Based on such differences, a soil 
series is divided into several phases. A feature of a soil that affects 
management is indicated by the name of the soil. For example, Pond Creek 
fine sandy loam, 1 to 3 percent slopes, is one of several phases within the Pond 
Creek series. About 30 soil series are found in the Soil Survey of Caddo 
County. Considering the proportionate extent, suitability for major field crops, 
and similarity in chemical/physical properties of Caddo County soils, four 
phases of soils are selected as the soils composing the representative farm: 
they are 120 acres of Cobb fine sandy loam with 3 percent slope, 120 acres of 
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Grant loam with 3 percent slope, 150 acres of Pond Creek fine sandy loam with 
3 percent slope, and 90 acres of Port silt loam with 3 percent slope. Soil profile 
characterization data for these soils are presented in Tables 19-22, Appendix. 
Historic weather data (Jan. 1, 1948 - Dec. 31 , 1975) for Fort Cobb, 
including daily precipitation, and minimum and maximum air temperatures, 
were used in EPIC-PST simulations. Fort Cobb is located in southwestern part 
of Caddo County. Solar radiation was simulated for this location by the weather 
subprogram in EPIC-PST. 
Assumptions on Labor, Capital and 
Machinery Complement 
In some farm-level mathematical programming models, the seasonality of 
labor requirements and the timing of field operations using the tractor units 
during critical periods of the year are taken into account. In this analysis, no 
constraints on seasonal availability of family labor or on the timing of field 
operations are included in the economic model. Labor availability or timeliness 
of field operations might be problematic in the case of double crop activities. 
However, the focus of the mathematical programming analysis is on the 
relationship between production practices and environmental damage. Thus, it 
is assumed that required labor above that provided by the operator may be 
hired at $5.00 per hour. In addition, tillage and other production practices are 
assumed to be conducted by the machinery complement that consists of a 140 
HP tractor, a 90 HP tractor, and accompanying equipment owned by the farm 
without time conflicts. Operating costs and labor requirements associated with 
each field operation using machinery complements are calculated by the 
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Expanded Budget Generator (Norris, 1990). Operating capital is assumed to be 
available at an interest rate of 12 percent. 
Assumptions on Irrigation Strategies 
Two different center pivot irrigation technologies, high pressure center 
pivot and LEPA (low energy precision application) systems, are considered in 
the analysis. Center pivot irrigation systems are considerably more efficient 
than furrow irrigation systems on sandy or sandy loam soils where excessive 
deep percolation occurs under furrow irrigation. Center pivot systems are also 
capable of irrigating gently rolling land and offer improved control over 
application rates (Dale et al., 1989). Center pivot systems are used throughout 
the study area where fine sandy loam soils with up to 3 percent slopes 
represent the majority of the irrigated cropland. 
The LEPA system is a further refinement of the center pivot system. 
LEPA technology offers the benefits of both high application efficiency and 
reduced operating pressure. This irrigation technology reduces water 
evaporation losses due to wind and high air temperatures, and reduces 
application non-uniformity problems caused by wind. LEPA systems employ 
drop tubes which hang from the pivot lateral and transport water to nozzles only 
12 to 15 inches above the ground. When LEPA irrigation is employed, furrow 
dikes are often constructed around the pivot and appropriately spaced to allow 
direct application into the furrow dikes as the sprinkler revolves. To minimize 
evaporation from the soil surface, the LEPA system may apply water only into 
alternate furrows while irrigating more frequently (Dale et al., 1989). The furrow 
dikes also reduce runoff of rainfall. 
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Major differences between the high pressure center pivot and LEPA 
systems are application efficiency and energy requirements for pumping water 
from underground sources. The high pressure center pivot system operates at 
an average application efficiency of 75 percent, while the LEPA system applies 
water at an average application efficiency of 95 percent. The relative energy 
required to deliver an acre inch of water using the high pressure center pivot 
system is about 1.7 times the energy requirement associated with the LEPA 
system (Dale et al., 1989). Nevertheless, as mentioned in the preceding 
section, the high pressure center pivot system is the dominant irrigation 
technology in the study area. 
In general, it is expected that the shift from high pressure center pivot 
irrigation to more efficient LEPA irrigation technology would reduce not only the 
volume of irrigation water but also the magnitude of chemical movements. 
Further, the volume and timing of irrigation applications influence the magnitude 
of chemical movements as well as crop yield. Thus, it appears that comparing 
the influence of different irrigation technology/irrigation management strategies 
on crop yield and chemical movements would provide important economic and 
water quality implications. Considering these, the two irrigation technologies, 
high pressure center pivot and LEPA irrigation systems, and the four irrigation 
management strategies, are combined to formulate four irrigation scenarios: 
they are (1) high pressure center pivot system-maximum single irrigation 
volume of 4 acre inches-minimum irrigation interval of 14 days (High 4-14); (2) 
high pressure center pivot system-maximum single irrigation volume of 3 acre 
inches-minimum irrigation interval of 7 days (High 3-7); (3) LEPA system-
maximum single irrigation volume of 3 acre inches-minimum irrigation interval 
of 10 days (LEPA 3-10); and (4) LEPA system-maximum single irrigation 
volume of 2 acre inches-minimum irrigation interval of 5 days (LEPA 2-5). 
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Among them, the first is assumed to be the base irrigation scenario. To simulate 
the four irrigation scenarios, four separate EPIC-PST simulation runs with four 
different sets of parameters that determine the efficiency of irrigation (EFI and 
EVTRI), the minimum application interval (IRI), and the maximum volume 
allowed for individual irrigations (ARMX), were conducted. To simulate the high 
and medium irrigation levels within each irrigation scenario, the water stress 
factor to trigger automatic irrigation (BIR) was modified. If the plant water stress 
factor reaches the specified level after the specified minimum application 
interval, EPIC-PST triggers an irrigation automatically. The daily weather data 
are used to simulate and replicate various irrigation strategies, thus producing 
distributions of yields for each crop under each irrigation scenario. Also, the 
distributions of nitrate and pesticide movements are generated simultaneously. 
EPIC-PST simulation results associated with each irrigation scenario were 
incorporated into a separate mathematical program. 
Crop Production Systems 
Peanut Production Systems 
Crop production and pest control benefits accruing from crop rotations 
are well documented in the literature (Johnson et al., 1975; Kommedahl, 1981; 
Minton et al., 1981 ). A well developed crop rotation (1) reduces populations of 
pathogens and keep them low; (2) aids in productivity and microbial balance in 
soil; (3) improves pest control, including insects, diseases, and weed pests; (4) 
preserves the physical condition of soil; (5) aids in reducing soil erosion; and, 
(6) is practical from agronomic and economic points of view. 
There are several factors that should be considered in a peanut rotation 
system. Peanuts should not be grown on the same land continuously, but 
should be grown in a rotation system. Peanuts are extremely sensitive to the 
effects of other crops grown in the rotation, especially the crop which 
I 
immediately precedes peanuts. Crops such as corn, grain sorghum, millet or 
small grain should be grown before peanuts for partial control of diseases, 
nematodes, and weeds. Peanuts should not be planted following peanuts 
(Henning et al., 1982). 
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Although much has been said and written about the benefits of rotating 
peanuts with these crops, only a few results on peanut rotation experiments 
have been reported. Results of an earlier study (1940-44) at the Georgia 
Coastal Plain Experiment Station (Anonymous, 1946) shows progressive yield 
reduction (from 25 to 43 percent in 3-year continuous peanuts) with successive 
peanut growing. Moor and Hoelscher (1977) attribute the low peanut yield in 
Comanche County, Texas, to continuous peanut cropping practices. Results 
from three-year experiments conducted by King et al. (1984) show that higher 
peanut yields were obtained from plots which had been planted to corn or grain 
sorghum in the previous two years than from plots with continuous peanuts. 
Nickels and Sholar (1991 ), in the first peanut rotation research done in 
Oklahoma, reported that plots planted to peanuts for two years (1990 and 1991) 
yielded about 11 percent less than plots that were planted to grain sorghum or 
cotton in 1990 and then were planted to peanuts in 1991. This test was 
conducted on land that had been out of peanut production since 1976. If plots 
have been planted to peanuts many years, one year out of peanuts makes little 
difference in yields the next year. After two years out of peanuts, yields the 
following year are about 25 percent above continuous peanuts. However, three 
years out of peanuts result in about the same yield as two years out (Sholar, 
1992). Considering these, it is assumed that the third year of peanuts in a 
peanuts-another crop-peanuts rotation yields 1 O percent less. Also, the third 
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year of peanuts in an another crop-peanuts-peanuts rotation yields 15 percent 
less than peanuts in an another crop-another crop-peanuts rotation. Few 
farmers grow peanuts three consecutive years because of lack of available land 
for rotations or because alternative fields do not have an irrigation source 
(Sholar, 1992). Thus, three-year continuous peanuts are not included among 
the production activities in this study. The rotation systems that involve peanuts 
were presented in the previous chapter. 
In Caddo County, peanut planting generally takes place from early May 
through early June, and harvesting season ends in November. The period 
between planting and harvesting is usually 130-170 days. In general, peanut 
seedbed preparation takes place in March through May. In this study, it is 
assumed that the tillage system for peanut production is a conventional tillage 
system using a moldboard plow. The dates and types of tillage activities and 
other field operations for peanut production are presented in Table 23, 
Appendix. 
Two Spanish type peanuts, Pronto and Spanco, and another two Runner 
type peanuts, Florunner and Okrun, are popular in the study area. Pronto is 
more desirable than other varieties ,since it has the ability to yield relatively well 
and to grade high when grown in short seasons and with limited soil moisture. 
Spanco is a high-yielding, early maturing variety with erect growth habits. 
Spanco may be harvested 10-14 days earlier than other varieties, but later than 
Pronto. Florunner requires higher moisture level and a longer growing season 
than Spanish peanuts. However, it also has higher yield potential and 
generates more income per acre if allowed sufficient time to mature. Okrun is 
less susceptible to leafspots and podrots, and more drought-tolerant than 
Florunner. In peanut variety tests conducted at five different locations in 
Oklahoma, Runner-type peanuts significantly outperformed Spanish-type 
peanuts at all test sites (Sholar and Kirby, 1990). 
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With Spanish varieties, planting 6-7 seeds/ft of row is needed to obtain 
about 5-6 plants/ft of row. With Runner-type peanuts, planting 5 seeds/ft of row 
is required to obtain 4 plants/ft of row (Sholar et al., 1990). Assumed seeding 
rates are 100 lb/A for irrigated peanuts and 75 lb/A for dryland peanuts. 
Only 10-20 pounds per acre of starter fertilizer are required for peanut 
production (Sholar et al., 1990). In EPIC-PST simulation runs, 20 pounds per 
acre for the high nitrogen level, 15 pounds per acre for the medium nitrogen 
level, and 1 o pounds per acre for the low nitrogen level are assumed to be 
applied before planting, regardless of the irrigation level or soil. Phosphorus 
I 
recommendations for peanuts vary from 20 to 80 lb of P 20 5 per acre, and 
potassium recommendations vary from 30 to 80 lb of K20 per acre (Sholar et al., 
1990). Assumed application rates for phosphorus are 40 lb/A for irrigated 
peanuts and 20 lb/A for dryland peanuts. It is assumed that the secondary 
nutrients (calcium, magnesium, and sulfur) and the micronutrients (iron, zinc, 
boron, etc.) are sufficient in Caddo County soils. Assumed potassium 
application rates are 40 lb/A for irrigated peanuts and 30 lb/A for dryland 
peanuts. 
The most commonly used preplant herbicides in peanut production are 
Dual, Pursuit, Prowl, and Treflan. For controlling annual weeds and grasses, 
these preplant herbicides are incorporated into the soil immediately after 
application. The most common insects damaging peanut production in the 
study area are thrips. Insecticides applied at planting to control thrips are 
Thimet 20G, Temik 15G, and Di-syston 15G. Malathion, Sevin, and Orthene are 
commonly applied insecticides to control thrips after emergence. The most 
serious damage in peanut production is caused by diseases and nematodes. 
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Common peanut diseases are Southern blight, Sclerotinia blight, and foliar 
diseases. Foliar diseases may reduce yields by 50 percent or more if not 
controlled. Commonly used fungicides for peanut disease control are Bravo, 
Ridomil, Terrachlor, and Vitavax. Furadan, Mocap, Nemacur, Telone, and 
Temik are commonly used nematicides {OSU Cooperative Extension Service, 
1991 ). Details of assumptions on peanut pesticide applications, including 
types, rates, and times of application, are presented in Table 30, Appendix. 
Grain Sorghum Production Systems 
In Caddo County, most sorghums are planted from late April to mid June. 
Harvesting season extends from late September to early November. In general, 
tillage practices for grain sorghum seedbed preparation are conducted from 
January through May. The assumed tillage system for grain sorghum 
production is conventional tillage without moldboard plowing. The dates and 
types of tillage and other crop management activities for grain sorghum . 
production are described in Tables 24-25, Appendix. 
Grain sorghum hybrids can be grouped into early, medium, and late 
maturing types. Early maturing types need 45 to 50 days, medium maturing 
types need 50 to 60 days, and late maturing types require over 60 days to reach 
the mid-bloom stage under reasonably good conditions for growth. Time 
required to reach the harvest stage is 95 to 100 days for early maturing types, 
11 O to 120 days for medium maturing types, and over 120 days for late maturing 
types {Hawkins et al.). 
When the planting date is selected, soil temperature, moisture conditions 
at planting, available moisture over the growing season, expected harvest date, 
and the maturity of the hybrid, and the occurrence of sorghum midge need to be 
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considered. If winter wheat follows grain sorghum, early or medium maturing 
types should be planted as early as possible to allow seed-bed preparation 
before fall wheat seeding. If grain sorghum follows wheat, a short season type 
grain sorghum should be planted in order to reach maturity before frost. 
However, these operations are successful only under irrigation. If soil moisture 
is not a limiting factor and full growing season is available, a medium or late-
maturing type should be planted since yields of later maturing types are 
generally significantly higher than yields of early maturing ones (Hawkins et al.). 
Optimum grain sorghum plant population per acre varies quite widely. If 
soil moisture is not a limiting factor, row spacings from 20 to 28 inches with plant 
populations of 65,000 to 100,000 plants per acre are necessary for maximum 
yields. In lower rainfall areas, optimum plant populations for dryland grain 
sorghum production are 20,000 to 30,000 plants per acre. In this study, it is 
assumed that grain sorghum seeding rates for the high irrigation level, the 
medium irrigation level, and the low irrigation level are 8 lb/A, 7 lb/A, and 5 lb/A, 
respectively (Hawkins et al.). 
Grain sorghum requires relatively large amounts of nitrogen fertilizer. 
Nitrogen requirements are based on a yield goal and the level of nitrogen in the 
soil. Fertilization decisions for grain sorghum are based on reasonable yield 
goals, nutrient requirements to achieve the goals, and the soil nutrient level. To 
produce 40 cwt, 50 cwt, and 70 cwt of grain per acre, for example, about 70 lb/A, 
100 lb/A, and 170 lb/A of nitrogen are required, respectively (Johnson and 
Tucker, 1990). Fertilization decisions for the crop growth/chemical movement 
simulation were based on results from numerous EPIC-PST test runs. It is 
assumed that grain sorghum production activities with high nitrogen levels (HH, 
MH, and LH) use the amount of nitrogen that approximately equates marginal 
value products and the price of nitrogen. The highest nitrogen level associated 
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with the high irrigation {HH) specified in EPIC-PST simulation ranges from 90 
lb/A for Port silt loam soil to 150 lb/A for Cobb fine sandy loam soil. The highest 
nitrogen level under dryland condition {LH) ranges from 30 lb/A for Port silt loam 
soil to 70 lb/A for Cobb fine sandy loam soil. The differences in nitrogen use 
between the high and subsequent levels are 20 lb/A with irrigation and 1 O lb/A 
without irrigation. 
Phosphorus recommendations for grain sorghum vary from 20 lb/A of 
P20 5 to 60 lb/A of P20 5, and potassium recommendations vary from 30 to 100 
lb/A of K20 {Johnson and Tucker, 1990). Phosphorus rates assumed are 40 . 
lb/A for the high irrigation level, 30 lb/A for the medium irrigation level, and 20 
lb/A under the dryland condition. Assumed potassium rates for the high, 
medium, and low irrigation levels are 50 lb/A, 40 lb/A, and 30 lb/A, respectively. 
In the study area, Atrazine, 2,4-d, Banvel, and Basagran are the most 
commonly used herbicides in grain sorghum production. In most cases, these 
herbicides are sprayed postemergence after sorghum is about 6 inches tall 
{Greer and Hawkins). The major insects that damage grain sorghum in the 
study area are sorghum greenbug and sorghum midge. Insecticides commonly 
used to control sorghum greenbug are Ethyl Parathion, Di-Syston, Lorsban, and 
Furadan. Sevin, Di-Syston, Ethyl Parathion, Lorsban, and Cygon are common 
insecticides used to control sorghum midge {Coppock and Massey). Details of 
assumptions on grain sorghum pesticide uses, including types, rates, and 
timing of applications, are presented in Table 31, Appendix. 
cotton Production Systems 
There has been much discussion about the benefits of rotating cotton 
with crops such as small grains and grain sorghum. Bell {1984) indicates that 
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rotations with small grains, rice, grain sorghum, or legumes generally reduce 
the amount of inoculum of soilborne pathogens of cotton and decrease the 
incidence and severity of diseases. Williams (1992) recommends that 
Oklahoma cotton producers rotate cotton with alfalfa, small grain, and grain 
sorghum for efficient disease management. Chandler (1984), and Greer and 
Murray (1992) indicate that rotating cotton with grass-type crops often permits 
the use of additional herbicides or tillage practices on weeds that are difficult to 
control in continuous cotton production. Further, crop rotation is an efficient way 
to reduce the soil population density of the target nematode to a level below the 
economic threshold for cotton (Veech, 1984). 
Experimental results from Johnson et al. (1975) show that cotton rotated 
with other crops has significant yield gains (13 - 24 %) over continuous cotton. 
On the other hand, experimental results from Keeley et al. (1983) and Motocha 
and Hopper (1990} reveal that rotated cotton shows only slight yield gains (5 -
10 %) over continuous cotton. Thus, it is assumed that the yield reduction for 
two-year continuous cotton production is 5 percent below the first year's yield, 
and that the yield reduction for three-year continuous cotton production is 1 O 
percent below the first year's yield. 
In Caddo County, cotton planting generally takes place in May, and most 
cotton is harvested in November. Tillage for cotton production begins in 
December and continues through May before planting. A conventional tillage 
system with moldboard plow is assumed for cotton production. The dates and 
types of tillage and other field operations for cotton production are presented in 
Tables 26-27, Appendix. 
One of the most important decisions made by cotton producers is cotton 
variety selection. Long-season, medium-season, and short-season varieties 
are available, and some varieties provide higher expected net returns than 
others. Important factors which must be considered are lint yield, maturity 
length, pest resistance, and fiber properties. Early maturity is important in 
Oklahoma because the growing season is comparatively short. Under 
irrigation, however, early maturity is not as critical as it is under dryland 
conditions (Verhalen and Greenhagen, 1992). 
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To achieve the maximum yield potential, and for efficient mechanical 
harvesting, the optimum cotton plant population at the end of the season is in 
the range of 30,000 to 50,000 uniformly spaced plants per acre. Yield and 
harvester performance are acceptable with cotton plant populations in the 
range of 20,000 to 60,000 per acre (Verhalen and Williams, 1992). Assuming 
4,500 seeds/lb, an 80 percent germination rate, an 80 percent emergence rate, 
and a 95 percent survival to harvest, for example, about 22 lb/A of cotton seed 
must be planted when 60,000 plants/Ais the desired plant population at 
harvest. The seeding rates assumed in the analysis are 22 lb/A for the high 
irrigation level, 19 lb/A for the medium irrigation level, and 15 lb/A for the low 
irrigation level. 
Fertilizer recommendations for cotton should be based on realistic yield 
goals under existing soil and climatic conditions. In cotton production, nitrogen 
is the first limiting nutrient. The estimated nitrogen requirements for producing a 
bale of cotton per acre is approximately 60 lb/A. If 2 bale/A is the yield goal, 
then approximately 120 lb/A of nitrogen is recommended (Banks, 1992). Cotton 
production activities with high nitrogen levels (HH, MH, and LH) also use the 
amount of nitrogen that approximately equates marginal value products and the 
price of nitrogen. The highest nitrogen level associated with the high irrigation 
(HH) specified in EPIC-PST simulation ranges from 40 lb/A for Port silt loam soil 
to 100 lb/A for Cobb fine sandy loam soil. The highest nitrogen level under 
dryland condition (LH) ranges from 1 O lb/A for Port silt loam soil to 40 lb/A for 
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Cobb fine sandy loam soil. The differences in nitrogen use between the high 
and subsequent levels are 20 lb/A with irrigation and 1 O lb/A without irrigation. 
In case of Port silt loam soil, however, the assumed medium and low nitrogen 
levels under dryland conditions are 5 lb/A and zero, respectively. 
Phosphorus recommendations for cotton vary from 30 lb/A to 75 lb/A of 
P2o5, and potassium recommendations vary from 40 lb/A to 11 O lb/A of K20 
(Banks, 1992). Phosphorus rates assumed for cotton are 45 lb/A for the high 
irrigation level, 40 lb/A for the medium irrigation level, and 30 lb/A for dryland 
cotton. Assumed potassium rates for cotton are 60 lb/A for the high irrigation 
level, and 50 lb/A and 40 lb/A, respectively, for the subsequent irrigation levels. 
Weed management is important in cotton production since weeds reduce 
yields by competing with cotton for water, nutrients, light, and space. To control 
annual weeds, grasses, and yellow nutsedge, preplant incorporated herbicides 
such as Treflan, Prowl, and Lasso are applied. To kill weeds that are not 
controlled with soil applied herbicides, postemergence herbicides, such as 
Caparol, Cotoran, Fusilade, and Roundup, are used for directed spray 
application(Greer and Murray, 1992). 
Cotton cannot be produced without insect problems. Highest net returns 
can be obtained only if insect pests are kept below their economic threshold. 
When insects are below their economic threshold, however, repeated 
insecticide applications should be avoided. The most common insects that 
attack cotton in the study area are boll weevils, bollworms, and cotton 
fleahoppers. Insecticides recommended for controlling boll weevils are Bidrin, 
Guthion, Cythion, Marathion, Methyl Parathion, Sevin, and Vydate. Insecticides 
often recommended to control bollworms are Bolstar, Curacron, Lannate, 
Orthene, Ambush, Ammo, and Karate. To control cotton fleahoppers, Bidrin, 
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Cygon, Di-Syston, or Lorsban is applied (OSU Cooperative Extension Service, 
1991 }. 
The most serious cotton disease in the study area is Fusarium wilt-
nematode complex. Although Fusarium wilt can occur without nematodes, the 
wilt disease itself is not serious unless nematodes are present. To control 
Fusarium wilt-nematode complex, treatment of soil infested with root-knot or 
root-lesion nematodes is necessary (Williams, 1992). Nematicides suggested 
for controlling nematodes are Nemacur, Temik, and Terraclor. These 
nematicides are applied at planting in furrow or banded over row (OSU 
Cooperative Extension Service, 1991 }. Detailed assumptions regarding cotton 
pesticide applications, including types, rates, and timing of applications, are 
presented in Table 32, Appendix. 
Wheat Production Systems 
In Caddo County, wheat is planted from mid-September through mid-
October. Optimum planting dates for wheat intended for only grain production 
are the first two weeks of October. Harvesting season starts in early June and 
ends in early July. Tillage begins in June after harvest and continues until 
planting. The objectives of tillage in wheat production are (1} to control weeds; 
(2) to conserve soil moisture; (3) to recycle nutrient; and, (4) to prepare a 
seedbed suitable for rapid germination, emergence, and plant development 
(OSU Cooperative Extension Service, 1985). In this study, a conventional 
tillage system without moldboard plowing is assumed for wheat production. 
The dates and types of tillage and other field operations for wheat production 
are presented in Tables 28-29, Appendix. 
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One of the most important factors in wheat production is seed quality. 
Traits that need to be considered when selecting seed are plant maturity, 
height, straw strength, winter hardiness, and disease and insect resistance. 
Seeding rates depend on the availability of soil moisture, size of the seed, and 
the crop's intended use (grain, pasture, or both) (OSU Cooperative Extension 
Service, 1985). In this study, it is assumed that wheat is grown for grain 
production only. Assumed seeding rates are 1.25 bu/A under irrigated 
condition and 1.0 bu/A under dryland condition. 
Soil nitrogen requirements for wheat are determined based on a yield 
goal and the nitrate nitrogen found from a soil test. Soil nitrogen requirements 
for wheat at the yield levels of 30 bu/A, 40 bu/A, and 60 bu/A are 60 lb/A, 80 
lb/A, and 125 lb/A, respectively. Different nitrogen sources do not produce 
significant differences in wheat yields if equal amounts of nitrogen are applied. 
However, anhydrous ammonia applied preplant during the fallow period is the 
most popular form of nitrogen for wheat production in Oklahoma. To avoid 
seedling injury, anhydrous ammonia needs to be applied at least one week 
before planting. In winter or spring, nitrogen is topdressed on the soil surface 
and washed into the root zone by rainfall (OSU Cooperative Extension Service, 
1985). The highest nitrogen level associated with the high irrigation level(HH) 
assumed for EPIC-PST simulation runs ranges from 90 lb/A for Port silt loam 
soil to 150 lb/A for Cobb fine sandy loam soil. The highest nitrogen level under 
dryland condition (LH) ranges from 20 lb/A for Port silt loam soil to 70 lb/A for 
Cobb fine sandy loam soil. The differences in nitrogen use between the high 
and subsequent levels are 20 lb/A under irrigation and 10 lb/A dryland. 
Phosphorus recommendations for wheat vary from 20 lb/A of P20 5 to 80 lb/A of 
P 20 5, and potassium recommendations vary from 20 to 60 lb/A of K20 (OSU 
Cooperative Extension Service, 1985). Phosphorus rates assumed for wheat 
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are 40 lb/A for the high irrigation level, 30 lb/A for the medium irrigation level, 
and 20 lb/A under dryland condition. Assumed potassium rates for wheat are 
40 lb/A for the high irrigation level, and 30 lb/A and 20 lb/A, respectively for the 
subsequent irrigation levels. 
Weeds compete with wheat for soil moisture, nutrients, and light. Weeds 
commonly found in wheat fields are grouped as (1) fall germinating annual 
broadleaf weeds, such as mustards and henbit; (2) winter annual grassy weeds, 
such as cheat and wild oats; (3) spring and summer annual broadleaf weeds, 
such as buckwheat; (4) summer annual grasses; and, (5) perennial weeds such 
as bindweed. Weed control practices that reduce or eradicate weed 
infestations are grouped as:(1) preventive control, such as the use of weed-free 
seeds; (2) cultural control including cover crops and crop rotations; (3) 
mechanical control removing weeds from the soil, burying weeds, or weakening 
weeds through root pruning; and, (4) chemical control killing weeds with 
herbicides (OSU Cooperative Extension Service, 1985). Herbicides commonly 
applied to control weeds in wheat are Glean, Ally, MCPA, 2,4-0, Banvel, 
Roundup, and Finesse. The greenbug is the most important insect pest of 
wheat in the study area. Insecticides used to control greenbug are Marathion, 
Parathion, Methyl Parathion, Dimethoate, and Di-Syston. Disease problems 
are not serious in wheat production. Moreover, the cost of applying fungicides 
for foliar disease control in wheat often exceeds the benefits in increased yields. 
Thus, it is assumed that pesticide applications for disease control are not 
required in wheat production. Detailed assumptions regarding wheat herbicide 
and insecticide applications, such as type, rate, and time of application are 
presented in Table 33, Appendix. 
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Government Program Participation 
All four crops included in the analysis are program commodities for which 
price and income support is granted through legislative action. The policy 
instruments used differ from commodity to commodity. Important policy 
instruments currently in effect for at least one of the four crops are the acreage 
reduction program (ARP), farmer-owned reserve (FOR) program, nonrecourse 
loans, marketing loans, marketing quotas, target prices/deficiency payments, 
triple-base program, and underplanting provisions (Hallberg, 1992). 
The acreage reduction program (ARP), often referred to as setaside, is a 
voluntary short-term land retirement program in which farmers plant less than 
their base acreage. In general, it is an unpaid acreage reduction that is 
required for participation in other farm programs, such as the nonrecourse loan 
and deficiency payment programs (Hallberg, 1992). 
FOR is a producer-held storage program for wheat and feed grains to be 
accomplished through an extended price support loan of three to five years' 
duration. Producers receive storage payments and the Secretary of Agriculture 
adjusts or waives interest charges on farmer-held reserves. The Secretary of 
Agriculture has the authority to increase the interest rate to encourage 
redemption of the loan when market price exceeds the release price at which a 
farmer may sell his/her farmer-owned reserve grain and repay the loan without 
penalty. This program was designed to protect against production shortfalls 
and to provide a buffer against wide price fluctuations (Hallberg, 1992). 
The nonrecourse loan is a commodity loan made by the government to 
farmers as a means of providing a floor price for the commodity. The loan is 
secured by a commodity stored in approved facilities. It is a nonrecourse loan 
in the sense that if the farmer does not sell the commodity by the due date, the 
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commodity becomes the property of the government in full payment of the loan. 
The farmer may choose to repay the loan at any time before maturity. When the 
loan is ~edeemed, interest and service charges are added to the face value of 
the loan. Farmers who participate in the program are allowed to gain from any 
price rise with no risk of loss {Hallberg, 1992). 
The marketing loan is a nonrecourse loan which may be paid off by the 
farmer at a repayment rate less than the announced loan rate. The difference 
between the announced loan rate and the repayment rate, which is referred to 
as a marketing loan payment, constitutes an income support payment to the 
farmer. In general, the repayment rate is some percentage of the loan rate or 
world market price {Hallberg, 1992). 
When supplies of a commodity become excessive, certain means of 
regulating supplies are needed. A marketing quota is a means of regulating the 
marketing of a commodity to which the quota is applicable under the law. A 
national marketing quota for a commodity is set at a level that would provide 
adequate market supplies. The national quota is apportioned to individual 
farms based on their past production. Once approved in a producer 
referendum, marketing quotas are mandatory on all producers {Hallberg, 1992). 
The target price is a commodity price guaranteed to farmers who 
· participate in certain farm programs. When the average market price falls below 
the target price for a specified time period, farmers who meet the eligibility 
criteria are eligible to receive a direct income support payment. The payment 
rate is the difference between the target price and the higher of the average 
market price or loan rate, and is referred to as a deficiency payment. The total 
deficiency payment to a farm is the product of (1) the payment rate; (2) the base 
acreage; and, (3) the program yield established for the farm. A base acreage is 
derived from a 5-year moving average of plantings of the crop on the farm. A 
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program yield is the crop yield of record for an individual farm established at the 
average yield for the previous five years exclusive of the high and low years 
(Hallberg, 1992). The triple-base plan is mandated by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990. Under the triple-base plan, a producer's base 
acreage is divided into three portions: (1) program acres; (2) flexible acres; and 
(3) conserving-use acres. The program acres should be planted to a program 
crop for which deficiency payments are paid. The flexible acres may be planted 
to any program crop, oilseed crop, or nonprogram crop other than fruits and 
vegetables, but production on the flexible acres is not eligible for deficiency 
payment. The conserving-use acres are the acres to be idled by participants, 
and are subject to the restrictions that normally apply to ARP acres (Hallberg, 
1992). 
Under an underplanting provision which was authorized by the Food 
Security Act of 1985, producers who plant between 50 and 92 percent (the 
50/92 provision) of their base acres to the program commodity, and devote the 
remaining 8 percent of base acres to a conserving use, are eligible to receive 
deficiency payments on 92 percent of the base acreage. This provision has 
been changed to the 0/92 provision for wheat and feed grains, while the 50/92 
provision is still available to cotton and rice producers (Hallberg, 1992). 
Current farm programs that apply to peanuts are marketing quotas, a two-
price support system, and nonrecourse loans. A quota holder may produce in 
excess of the quota, but can only receive the higher (quota price) of the two 
price support levels for peanuts produced up to the quota. For peanuts 
produced in excess of the quota, referred to as additional peanuts, producers 
receive the lower of the two price support levels. The marketing quota is 
transferable within a county. Acreage allotment for peanuts was suspended by 
the 1981 act (Hallberg, 1992). 
85 
Farm programs that are currently available for wheat and grain sorghum 
producers are (1) nonrecourse loans; (2) acreage reduction program; (3) target 
price/deficiency payments; (4) farmer-owned reserve program; (5) 0/92 
underplanting provisions; and, (6) triple-base provision. Farm programs for 
cotton that are currently in effect are: (1) nohrecourse loans; (2) marketing 
loans; (3) acreage reduction program; (4) target price/deficiency payment 
program; (5) 50/92 underplanting provision; and (6) triple-base provision 
(Hallberg, 1992). In the analysis, it is assumed that the hypothetical farm has a 
peanut poundage quota of 300 thousand pounds, and a 100-acre wheat base 
with a program yield of 35 bushels per acre. A 5 percent set-aside and a 15 
percent normal flex acreage rule are assumed as the triple-base for wheat. On 
the other hand, it is assumed that the farm does not participate in farm programs 
for either cotton or grain sorghum. 
Assumptions on Prices and Costs 
The mathematical programming model requires data on operating costs 
and crop prices. Operating costs include costs for tillage, fertilizer applications, 
seed, pesticide applications, cultivation, irrigation, harvest, labor, and so on. 
Among these, outlays for nitrogen fertilizer, pesticides, and the variable cost for 
irrigation were separated out for easier simulation of various policy scenarios. 
To determine operating costs by crop, excluding the above costs, the Expanded 
Budget Generator developed by Norris (1990) was used. The prices for crops 
and operating inputs used in this study are based onthe 1991 expected state 
prices reported in the OSU Enterprise Budget. 
Variable costs of irrigation are based on estimates of fuel, lubrication, 
repair, and labor costs from Dale et al. (1989). The price of fuel (natural gas) is 
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updated to $3.00/mcf. The assumed depth of the pump lift was 150 feet. The 
variable costs of irrigation for high pressure center pivot systems are estimated 
to be $2.73 per acre inch. To estimate the economic consequences of irrigation 
system conversions from a high pressure center pivot system to LEPA, 
investment costs for conversion were incorporated in the variable costs for the 
LEPA system. Conversion from a high pressure system to a LEPA system 
requires replacing high pressure impact sprinklers with goose necks, flexible 
drop tubes spaced at 60 inch intervals, and low pressure nozzles. Total 
investment cost for the conversion, excluding pressure regulators, was 
estimated to be $8,255 {Earls, 1989). Based on 16 acre-inch annual 
applications and a 7 year normal accepted life for sprinkler heads, this 
investment cost was converted to an additional per acre inch irrigation cost, and 
added to the variable costs for the LEPA irrigation system estimated by Dale et 
al. (1989). The variable costs of irrigation for the LEPA system calculated using 
the above method was $2.79 per acre inch. 
CHAPTERV 
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF POLLUTION 
CONTROL POLICY OPTIONS 
In this chapter, the mathematical programming model described in 
Chapter 3 is used to predict optimal agricultural production decisions, net 
returns to the farm, and effluent discharge levels under alternative pollution 
control policies. The information obtained from the model is utilized to assess 
both economic and environmental effects of the optimum behavior of the farm in 
response to the policy options aimed at controlling agricultural pollution. 
The first section of this chapter reviews the policy scenarios for 
agricultural pollution control tested in this study. The next section reports results 
obtained from the mathematical programming model and analyzes the impact of 
various policy options on pollution abatements and net returns to the farm. The 
last section addresses implications of the results and the prospects of 
agricultural pollution control. This discussion will provide some insight for 
policy recommendations. 
An Overview of Policy Alternatives 
In choosing an agricultural pollution control policy option to be 
implemented, administration costs and practicality of the option should be 
considered, along with its estimated effects on water quality. Comparing the 
economic implications of differing policy options is also important. This section 
outlines the policy scenarios for agricultural pollution control tested in this study. 
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Four efficient policy options for agricultural pollution control were 
discussed in Chapter 2. These were nonpoint standards, nonpoint incentives, 
management practice standards, and management practice incentives. Once 
the upper limits of effluent discharges from a farm are determined, then policy 
parameters for every option are determined simultaneously. Each of these four 
policy options induces the least-cost rearrangement of production activities to 
comply with the given policy restrictions. To implement these efficient policy 
options, detailed information on weather, chemical, hydrologic, and 
topographical characteristics of the farm land, and on the producer's 
management practices for crop production, are required. The correct 
application of this information will provide estimates of effluent production from 
the farm. However, these efficient policy options inevitably involve high 
transaction costs due to the data requirements. 
Some of the frequently mentioned pollution control policy options may 
have advantages of less transaction costs since they do not require such 
detailed information. These policy options include truces on nitrogen fertilizer 
and pesticides, restrictions on nitrogen use, truces on irrigation water use, and 
restrictions on the amount of irrigation. These may be more acceptable policy 
options for addressing agricultural pollution problems when transaction costs of 
implementing policies are considered. An overview of these control policy 
options is presented below. 
Imposing Taxes on Polluting Inputs 
One of the most frequently mentioned control mechanisms to protect 
water quality is the imposition of excise truces on inputs that cause pollution. As 
discussed in Chapter II, imposing a true on pollution-generating inputs is 
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equivalent to forcing the marginal social cost of pollution to be reflected in the 
cost of the input. The response of farmers to this control mechanism depend~ 
on the ratio of marginal value product to the price of the input including the tax. 
Thus, a substantial tax rate may be required to induce a significant reduction in 
pollution-generating input use. 
The major advantage of an input tax would be the ease of 
implementation and relatively low administrative costs. A drawback of the input 
tax policy is the difficulty in determining farmers' response in the input use to a 
given tax rate and its adverse economic impact on the farm sector. A low tax 
rate would not result in significant reductions in the use of polluting inputs. On 
the other hand, an excessively high tax rate would be met by strong opposition 
from the farm sector and agricultural chemical industry {Francis, 1992). For the 
empirical analysis, a policy scenario imposing a 100 percent excise tax on 
nitrogen fertilizer and pesticides and another scenario imposing a tax on 
irrigation water use are tested. 
Restricting Total Input Use 
An example of this control mechanism is restricting total nitrogen 
applications. This scenario represents a policy in which each farmer is granted 
a certain amount of nitrogen based on crop needs and in proportion to the 
number of acres of historic crop production. Additional information, such as soil 
type, residual soil nitrogen, or the availability of manure, could be used in 
determining the total nitrogen use. However, the farmer is free to allocate the 
nitrogen across crops and soils as he/she desires. One approach to 
implementing this policy would be to issue annual coupons or certificates to 
each farmer allowing the purchase of a given quantity of nitrogen fertilizer 
{Francis, 1992}. For the empirical analysis, this policy scenario involves 
restricting total nitrogen use to 50 percent of the benchmark result. 
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Another example of a control mechanism is restricting total volume of 
irrigation water use. Using less irrigation water reduces chemical movements, 
especially chemical losses with deep percolation. This policy could induce a 
shift in irrigation technology from a less efficient to a highly efficient system. To 
implement the restriction on total irrigation water applications, the maximum 
amount of irrigation was set at 50 percent of the total quantity of irrigation water 
applied in the benchmark solution. 
Restricting Per Acre Nitrogen Application 
Pollution control policies that restrict the total amount of input use do not 
control the intensity of input use. The policy goal of reducing total input use 
does not address the problems of misuse and mismanagement. An alternative 
to the policy restricting the total amount of nitrogen application is a restriction on 
per acre nitrogen applications. If high levels of nitrogen fertilizer use on certain 
crops cause unacceptable levels of pollution, then a policy restricting per acre 
nitrogen application could be more effective in reducing pollution. A 
reasonable degree of compliance could be attained with strict penalties 
combined with random spot checks. To achieve an acceptable degree of 
compliance with lower enforcement costs, an approach that shifts the burden of 
proof of compliance to the producer could be used {Francis, 1992}. A 
disadvantage of this policy option is that administrative and enforcement costs 
would be higher than those with the policy restricting the total amount of 
nitrogen application. 
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Results and Analysis 
In this section, analyses of results obtained under the base (current) 
situation and under various water quality policy measures are conducted. The 
analyses focus on both economic and environmental consequences of the 
producer's optimizing behavior to comply with the various policy scenarios. In 
addition, four different irrigation scenarios described in Chapter 4 are evaluated 
under each policy scenario. Analyses related to imposing water quality policy 
options are conducted after the benchmark solution is established. 
EPIC-PST Simulation Results 
EPIC-PST simulations provide detailed data on the effects of different 
agricultural practices on crop yield, nutrient and pesticide losses with surface 
runoff, sediment movement, and leaching below the crop root zone. EPIC-PST 
simulation results of crop production activities most relevant to this study are 
reported in Table 5. These EPIC-PST simulation results include crop yield, 
nitrate runoff, nitrogen percolation, toxicity index of pesticides moved with runoff 
water (PST runoff index), and health hazard index of pesticides leached below 
the crop root zone (PST percolation index) associated with a set of selected 
crop production activities. Notice that the values in Table 5 represent the 
means of 28 year simulation runs. 
In the name of each crop production activity, the first character identifies 
the soil for each production activity: (1) C denotes Cobb fine sandy loam soil; (2) 
G denotes Grant loam soil; (3) N denotes Pond Creek fine sandy loam soil; and, 
(4) P denotes Port silt loam soil. The second character identifies the crop: (1) P 
denotes peanuts; (2) G denotes grain sorghum; (3) W denotes wheat; and (4) C 
denotes cotton. The third character (number) represents the rotational effect. 
Irrigation 
Scenario 
High 4-14 
(Peanuts) 
High 4-14 
(Cotton) 
TABLES 
EFFLUENT LEVELS AND CROP YIELDS 
FOR SELECTED ACTIVITIES 
Activity N03 N PST 
Name Runoff Percol. Runoff 
(Kg/A) (Kg/A) Index 
CP1HL 2.02 2,550 
CP1ML 2.02 1,920 
GP1HL 2.43 2,005 
GP1ML 2.43 1,572 
NP1HL 2.43 0.40 1,679 
NP1ML 2.43 0.40 1,277 
PP1HL 2.43 0.81 1,528 
PP1ML 2.43 0.81 1,107 
CC1HH 6.48 1,416 
CC1HM 4.86 1,416 
CC1HL 3.64 1,423 
CC1MH 5.26 1,175 
CC1MM · 4.05 1,175 
CC1ML 2.43 1,185 
GC1HH 8.91 0.40 1,010 
GC1HM 6.88 1,010 
GC1HL 4.45 1,001 
GC1MH 6.48 0.40 957 
GC1MM 4.45 957 
GC1ML 2.43 960 
NC1HH 7.69 1.21. 905 
NC1HM 6.07 0.81 899 
NC1HL 4.05 0.40 891 
NC1MH 6.48 0.81 656 
NC1MM 4.45 0.40 665 
NC1ML 2.43 0.40 654 
PC1HH 4.05 0.40 811 
PC1HM 3.24 0.40 807 
PC1HL 2.02 819 
PC1MH 3.24 0.40 556 
PC1MM 2.43 OAO 557 
PC1ML 1.21 560 
CC2HH 6.88 1,416 
CC2HM 5.26 1,416 
CC2HL 3.64 1,423 
CC2MH 5.67 1,167 
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PST 
Percol. 
Index Yield 
71.69 3,115 lb 
46.71 2,776 
0.22 3,195 
0.22 2,856 
0.11 3,249 
0.09 2,829 
0.07 3,302 
0.06 2,740 
36.68 766 lb 
36.59 744 
37.25 671 
30.07 646 
30.37 612 
25.39 505 
0.01 780 
0.01 758 
0.01 702 
0.01 715 
0.01 676 
0.01 576 
0.34 783 
0.34 756 
0.25 688 
0.25 690 
0.27 649 
0.27 537 
793 
778 
749 
690 
676 
649 
36.65 739 
36.60 719 
37.27 654 
30.91 622 
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TABLE 5 (Continued} 
Irrigation Activity N03 N PST PST 
Scenario Name Runoff Percol. Runoff Percol. 
(Kg/A} (Kg/A} Index Index Yield 
High 4-14 CC2MM 4.05 1,167 31.13 593 lb 
(Cotton} CC2ML 2.43 1,177 26.08 495 
GC2HH 9.31 0.40 1,010 0.01 751 
GC2HM 6.88 1,010 0.01 734 
GC2HL 4.86 .1,001 0.01 683 
GC2MH 6.48 0.40 935 0.01 690 
GC2MM 4.45 957 0.01 654 
GC2ML 2.83 960 0.01 566 
NC2HH 8.10 1.21 899 0.34 754 
NC2HM 6.07 0.81 899 0.34 732 
NC2HL 4.45 0.40 891 0.29 671 
NC2MH 6.48 0.81 654 0.25 668 
NC2MM 4.45 0.40 660 0.26 629 
NC2ML 2.83 0.40 656 0.27 527 
PC2HH 4.05 0.40 820 766 
PC2HM 3.24 0.40 823 754 
PC2HL 2.43 0.40 811 727 
PC2MH 3.64 0.40 563 668 
PC2MM 2.43 0.40 563 656 
PC2ML 1.62 0.40 556 629 
High 3-7 CP1HL 2.02 2,592 40.67 3,231 lb 
(Peanuts} CP1ML 2.02 1,941 41.52 2,785 
GP1HL 2.43 - 2,072 0.04 3,302 
GP1ML 2.43 1,522 0.04 2,776 
NP1HL 2.83 0.40 1,665 0.05 3,311 
NP1ML 2.43 0.40 1,226 0.06 2,829 
PP1HL 2.43 1,560 3,240 
PP1ML 2.43 0.40 1,108 0.01 2,749 
High 3-7 CC1HH 6.88 1,914 16.82 821 lb 
{Cotton} CC1HM 5.26 1,861 17.02 785 
CC1HL 3.64 1,863 17.27 690 
CC1MH 5.26 1,401 17.00 673 
CC1MM 3.64 1,403 19.25 632 
CC1ML 2.43 1,420 16.59 510 
GC1HH 7.69 1,512 829 
GC1HM 6.07 1,460 805 
GC1HL 4.05 1,532 736 
GC1MH 6.88 1,040 739 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Irrigation Activity N03 N PST PST 
Scenario Name Runoff Percol. Runoff Percol. 
(Kg/A) (Kg/A) Index Index Yield 
High 3-7 GC1MM 4.86 1,045 690 lb 
(Cotton) GC1ML 2.83 1,043 583 
NC1HH 8.10 0.40 1,088 0.06 815 
NC1HM 6.07 0.40 1,087 0.06 788 
NC1HL 4.05 0.40 1,107 0.06 707 
NC1MH 6.48 0.40 854 0.05 719 
NC1MM 4.45 0.40 831 0.05 668 
NC1ML 2.83 820 0.06 549 
PC1HH 4.05 1,097 815 
PC1HM 3.24 1,101 797 
PC1HL 2.02 1,093 768 
PC1MH 3.24 670 693 
PC1MM 2.43 672 683 
PC1ML 0.40 672 654 
CC2HH 6.88 1,914 16.87 790 
CC2HM 5.26 1,914 16.81 761 
CC2HL 4.05 1,915 17.30 676 
CC2MH 5.67 1,415 16.39 649 
CC2MM 4.05 1,402 16.23 612 
CC2ML 2.43 1,415 16.77 500 
GC2HH 8.10 0.40 1,512 797 
GC2HM 6.07 1,502 778 
GC2HL 4.05 1,512 717 
GC2MH 6.88 1,018 710 
GC2MM 4.86 1,070 673 
GC2ML 2.83 · 1,046 .. 571 
NC2HH 8.10 0.81 1,100 0.07 785 
NC2HM 6.07 0.40 1,095 0.07 761 
NC2HL 4.45 0.40 1,098 0.06 690 
NC2MH 6.48 0.40 854 0.05 695 
NC2MM 4.45 0.40 785 0.05 651 
NC2ML 2.83 0.40 825 0.06 539 
PC2HH 4.45 1,089 785 
PC2HM 3.24 1,097 773 
PC2HL 2.43 1,093 746 
PC2MH 3.64 667 671 
PC2MM 2.43 667 661 
PC2ML 1.62 682 636 
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TABLE 5 (Continued} 
Irrigation Activity N03 N PST PST 
Scenario Name Runoff Percol. Runoff Percol. 
(Kg/A} (Kg/A} Index Index Yield 
LEPA 3-10 CP1HL 1.21 723 49.25 3,249 lb 
(Peanuts} CP1ML 1.21 576 52.82 2,829 
GP1HL 1.62 716 0.31 3,338 
GP1ML 1.21 638 0.31 2,991 
NP1HL 1.62 0.40 603 0.33 3,383 
NP1ML 1.62 0.40 456 0.28 2,892 
PP1HL 1.62 0.40 599 0.05 3,369 
PP1ML 1.21 0.40 476 0.03 2,767 
LEPA 3-10 CC1HH 3.64 333 38.21 826 lb 
(Cotton} CC1HM 2.83 333 38.18 800 
CC1HL 2.02 342 40.24 717 
CC1MH · 3.24 276 34.67 695 
CC1MM 2.43 277 35.08 656 
CC1ML 1.62 275 30.59 532 
GC1HH 4.45 0.40 327 0.01 841 
GC1HM 3.64 327, 0.01 822 
GC1HL 2.43 331 0.01 756 
GC1MH 3.64 230 0.01 749 
GC1MM 2.43 232 0.01 712 
GC1ML 1.62 226 602 
NC1HH 4.45 1.21 217 _ 0.48 846 
NC1HM 3.24 0.81 225 0.65 816 
NC1HL 2.43 0.40 225 0.41 736 
NC1MH 3.64 0.81 162 0.33 736 
NC1MM 2.43 0.40 161 0.32 688 
NC1ML 1.62 0.40 157 0.26 568 
PC1HH 2.43 286 841 
PC1HM 1.62 286 822 
PC1HL 1.21 287 785 
PC1MH 2.02 148 724 
PC1MM 1.21 . 148 707 
PC1ML 0.81 148 673 
CC2HH 3.64 333 38.14 795 
CC2HM 2.83 333 38.13 773 
CC2HL 2.02 342 40.30 700 
CC2MH 3.24 270 31.39 668 
CC2MM 2.43 281 32.93 639 
CC2ML 1.62 273 32.40 522 
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TABLE 5 (Continued} 
Irrigation Activity N03 N PST PST 
Scenario Name Runoff Percol. Runoff Percol. 
(Kg/A) (Kg/A} Index Index Yield 
LEPA 3-10 GC2HH 4.45 0.40 327 0.01 810 lb 
(Cotton} GC2HM 3.64 259 0.01 793 
GC2HL 2.43 330· 0.01 736 
GC2MH 3.64 0.40 233 0.01 719 
GC2MM 2.43 236 0.01 690 
GC2ML 1.62 230 593 
NC2HH 4.45 1.21 217 0.48 815 
NC2HM 3.24 0.81 219 0.48 790 
NC2HL 2.43 0.81 224 0.64 722 
NC2MH 3.64 0.81 162 0.35 710 
NC2MM 2.83 0.40 162 0.33 671 
NC2ML 1.62 0.40 157 0.28 556 
PC2HH 2.43 0.40 287 810 
PC2HM 2.02 286 795 
PC2HL 1.21 286 766 
PC2MH 2.02 0.40 152 702 
PC2MM 1.62 158 683 
PC2ML 0.81 149 656 
LEPA 2-5 CP1HL 1.21 644 37.53 3,151 lb 
(Peanuts} CP1ML 1.21 583 37.58 2,687 
GP1HL 1.62 690 0.04 3,249 
GP1ML 1.21 551 0.01 2,758 
NP1HL 1.62 0.40 529 0.04 3,249 
NP1ML 1.21 0.40 432 0.04 2,749 
PP1HL 1.21 557 3,124 
PP1ML 1.21 449 2,669 
LEPA 2-5 CC1HH 4.05 347 15.78 817 lb 
(Cotton} CC1HM 3.24 346 16.18 795 
CC1HL 2.43 352 16.26 715 
CC1MH 3.24 264 14.09 668 
CC1MM 2.43 262 11.99 636 
CC1ML 1.62 260 10.96 527 
GC1HH 4.45 0.40 288 827 
GC1HM 3.24 287 815 
GC1HL 2.43 280 758 
GC1MH 3.24 190 715 
GC1MM 2.43 194 693 
GC1ML 1.62 200 600 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Irrigation Activity N03 N PST PST 
Scenario Name Runoff Percol. Runoff Percol. 
(Kg/A) (Kg/A) Index Index Yield 
LEPA 2-5 NC1HH 4.45 0.81 213 0.05 819 lb 
(Cotton) NC1HM 3.23 0.40 216 0.05 805 
NC1HL 2.43 0.40 224 0.05 734 
NC1MH 3.64 0.40 163 0.04 707 
NC1MM 2.43 0.40 159 0.04 676 
NC1ML 1.62 158 0.04 568 
PC1HH 2.02 207 778 
PC1HM 1.62 210 771 
PC1HL 1.21 210 749 
PC1MH 1.62 159 676 
PC1MM 1.21 160 666 
PC1ML 0.81 159 644 
CC2HH 4.45 347 15.83 785 lb 
CC2HM 3.24 345 17.10 768 
CC2HL 2.43 350 17.13 697 
CC2MH 3.24 259 11.58 644 
CC2MM 2.43 264 11.53 617 
CC2ML 1.62 261 13.32 517 
GC2HH 4.45 0.40 287 795 
GC2HM 3.24 287 785 
GC2HL 2.43 288 739 
GC2MH 3.64 0.40 190 685 
GC2MM 2.43 196 673 
GC2ML 1.62 198 588 
NC2HH 4.45 1.21 219 0.05 788 
NC2HM 3.64 0.40 219 0.05 775 
NC2HL 2.43 0.40 216 0.05 719 
NC2MH 3.64 0.81 163 0.04 680 
NC2MM 2.43 0.40 164 0.03 656 
NC2ML 1.62 157 0.04 556 
PC2HH 2.43 212 751 
PC2HM 1.62 211 744 
PC2HL 1.21 210 727 
PC2MH 2.02 160 649 
PC2MM 1.21 160 644 
PC2ML 0.81 159 627 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Irrigation Activity N03 N PST PST 
Scenario Name Runoff Percol. Runoff Percol. 
(Kg/A) (Kg/A) Index Index Yield 
Dryland CP1LL 0.81 179 16.77 1,651 lb 
(Peanuts) GP1LL 0.81 177 1,651 
NP1LL 0.81 0.40 159 1,741 
PP1LL 0.81 169 1,660 
Dryland CC1LH 1.21 131 0.90 376 lb 
(Cotton) CC1LM 0.81 131 0.90 351 
CC1LL 0.81 131 0.90 295 
GC1LH 1.21 0.40 126 380 
GC1LM 0.81 126 371 
GC1LL 0.40 126 332 
NC1LH 1.21 0.81 94 393 
NC1LM 0.81 0.40 94 366 
NC1LL 0.40 95 307 
PC1LH 0.40 106 383 
PC1LM 0.40 106 374 
PC1LL 0.40 106 360 
CC2LH 1.21 131 0.90 363 
CC2LM 0.81 131 0.90 344 
CC2LL 0.81 131 0.89 290 
GC2LH 1.21 0.40 126 368 
GC2LM 0.81 126 358 
GC2LL 0.40 126 324 
NC2LH 1.21 0.81 94 378 
NC2LM 0.81 0.40 94 356 
NC2LL 0.40 0.40 95 302 
PC2LH 0.81 106 368 
PC2LM 0.40 106 359 
PC2LL 0.40 106 347 
Dryland CG1LH 2.02 0.40 3 0.66 33.2 cwt 
(Sorghum) CG1LM 1.62 3 0.66 32.1 
CG1LL 1.21 3 0.66 30.4 
GG1LH 2.43 2.02 5 33.1 
GG1LM 2.02 1.21 5 32.5 
GG1LL 1.62 0.81 5 31.1 
NG1LH 2.43 1.21 5 37.3 
NG1LM 1.62 0.81 5 36.2 
NG1LL 1.21 0.40 5 34.0 
PG1LH 1.21 5 37.7 
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TABLE 5 {Continued) 
Irrigation Activity N03 N PST PST 
Scenario Name Runoff Percol. Runoff Percol. 
(Kg/A) (Kg/A) Index Index Yield 
· PG1LM 1.21 5 36.5 cwt 
PG1LL 0.81 5 34.8 
Dryland CW1LH 3.24 0.05 34.8 bu 
(Wheat) CW1LM 2.83 0.04 33.6 
CW1LL 2.43 0.04 30.1 
GW1LH 2.83 36.1 
GW1LM · 2.43 34.7 
GW1LL 2.02 31.7 
NW1LH 2.83 36.9 
NW1LM 2.43 35.1 
NW1LL 2.02 31.8 
PW1LH 2.43 36.0 
PW1LM 2.02 34.8 
PW1LL 1.62 32.7 
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The number 1 indicates that there are no adverse rotational effects. In the 
names representing cotton production activities, the number 2 represents the 
second year of cotton in a two-year continuous cotton production activity, and 
the number 3 represents a three-year continuous cotton production activity. 
In peanut production activity names, the number 2 indicates that the 
peanut production activity is practiced in a soil which was planted to peanuts 
two years ago but planted to other crops a year ago; the number 3 represents 
the second year of peanut in a two-year continuous peanut production activity. 
As was described in the previous chapter, the last two characters represent the 
irrigation level and the nitrogen application level, respectively. Most three-year 
rotation systems appearing in the following analysis are composed of activities 
in Table 5. For example, a three year rotation system cotton(HH)-cotton(HH)-
grain sorghum(LH) practiced in Port silt loam soil is composed of PC1 HH, 
PC2HH, and PG1 LH. Among them, PC1 HH stands for cotton production in Port 
silt loam soil at high level of irrigation and nitrogen with no rotational effects; 
PC2HH stands for cotton production in Port silt loam soil at high level of 
irrigation and nitrogen but with a 5 percent less yield; PG1 LH stands for grain 
sorghum produced in Port silt loam soil under dryland condition at the high level 
of nitrogen with no adverse rotational effects. Another example of a three-year 
rotation system peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) practiced in Pond 
Creek fine sandy loam soil is composed of NP1 HL, NC1 HH, and NG1 LH. 
Notice that results of individual dryland production activities are identical 
regardless of irrigation scenarios. 
Results indicate that peanut and cotton production activities produce 
relatively large amounts of pesticide runoff and percolation. The intensive 
pesticide applications in peanut and cotton production appear to be the major 
reasons for the large amount of pesticide losses through runoff and percolation. 
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On the other hand, both grain sorghum production activities and wheat 
production activities create only a negligible amount of pesticide movement. 
Contrarily, both wheat production activities and grain sorghum production 
activities generate larger amount of nitrate runoff than peanut or cotton 
production activities. Grain sorghum production activities create the largest 
amount of nitrogen percolation. 
The amount of pesticide percolation is quite different across soils. Under 
a given crop management practice, the magnitudes of pesticide percolation 
depend largely on the organic carbon content of the soil (Rao et al., 1983). For 
example, Cobb fine sandy loam soil which has the lowest organic carbon 
content generates the maximum amount of pesticide percolation. Port silt loam 
soil which has the highest organic carbon content generates the minimum 
amount of pesticide percolation, given the crop and the input use level. Crop 
yields also differ across soils. In most cases, Port silt loam soil produces the 
highest yield while Cobb fine sandy loam soil produces the lowest yield, given 
the crop and the input use level. Differences in the soil organic matter content 
appear to be responsible for the differences in crop yields. Soils high in organic 
matter have a high cation exchange capacity and hold vast quantities of 
nutrients as exchangeable ions which are partially available for plant growth 
(Gardener et al., 1985, pp. 101-2). 
Since water is the medium which transports agricultural wastes from farm 
land to receiving water bodies, intensive irrigation may produce high levels of 
agricultural pollution. EPIC-PST simulation results support this point (see Table 
5). In this production situation, irrigation has a great influence on the amount of 
pesticide runoff, pesticide percolation, and nitrate runoff. The amount of 
nitrogen percolation appears to be affected mainly by the amount of nitrogen 
applied, soil organic matter content, or crop uptake of nitrogen, rather than 
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irrigation. For example, the differences in nitrogen percolation levels between 
NC1 HH (90 lb; 2.7 lb), NC1 HM (70 lb; 1.8 lb), and NC1 HL (30 lb; 0.9 lb) can be 
explained by the amount of nitrogen applications. Notice that numbers in 
parentheses indicate respective per acre nitrogen application and nitrogen 
percolation levels. The identical nitrogen percolation levels produced by 
GC1 HH (90 lb; 0.9 lb; 780 lb), GC1 MH (70 lb; 0.9 lb; 715 lb), and GC1 LH (30 lb; 
0.9 lb; 380 lb) may be explained mainly by the differences in crop uptake. 
Notice that the third number in each parenthesis indicates cotton lint yield. The 
difference in nitrogen percolation levels between CC1 HH (100 lb) and PC1 HH 
(40 lb) can be explained mainly by the differences in soil organic matter content. 
The stability in nitrogen percolation values, which can be observed in Table 5, 
appears to be caused by the interaction of those factors. 
Results under Current Situation 
In Chapter 4, it was assumed that a high pressure center pivot system 
with the maximum single irrigation volume of 4 acre inches and the minimum 
irrigation interval of 14 days (High 4-14) represents the current irrigation 
method. Thus, to be exact, the benchmark results describe the behavior 
expected under the current production environment involving the High 4-14 
irrigation scenario in the absence of water quality control measures. For 
notational convenience, assume that th_e baseline scenario is denoted by High 
4-14/No policy. Also assume that the other three irrigation scenarios in the 
absence of pollution control policy options are denoted by High 3-7/No policy, 
LEPA 3-10/No policy, and LEPA 2-5/No policy. To avoid confusion, assume 
that results obtained under the High 4-14/No policy scenario are named 
benchmark results while results obtained under the High 3-7/No policy, LEPA 
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3-10/No policy, and LEPA 2-5/No policy scenario are named base case results. 
The benchmark results and the base case results are summarized in Table 6. 
These results represent the most profitable cropping systems given resources 
and irrigation scenarios in the absence of pollution control policy measures. 
Effluent discharge levels are not considered in the decision making process 
because no policy restrictions are imposed. 
Under the High 4-14 scenario, the producer plants 24 percent of the total 
acreage in a three-year cotton-cotton-grain sorghum rotation (C-C-G), 57 
percent of the total acreage in a 3-year peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum rotation 
(P-C-G), and 19 percent in program wheat. A soil planted to peanuts in a 
particular year is not going to be planted to peanuts the next two years. Both 
cotton and peanuts are grown under the high irrigation level, while grain 
sorghum and wheat are grown under dryland conditions due to the constraint 
on irrigated acres. Peanuts are grown with the low nitrogen level since peanuts 
require only a small amount of nitrogen as starter fertilizer. All other crops are 
grown with the high nitrogen level. Net returns to the farm are estimated to 
average $193 per acre. 
Per acre irrigation applications averaged over the crop mix under the 
High 4-14 scenario are 20.7 acre inches. The average per acre nitrogen 
fertilizer application is 56.2 pounds. The average nitrate (N03) loss with surface 
runoff is estimated to be 8.5 pounds per acre, which is about 15.1 percent of the 
average nitrogen application level. The average nitrogen loss with deep 
percolation is estimated to be 1 .0 pound per acre, which is about 2 percent of 
the nitrogen application level. These relatively low estimates of the nitrate loss 
with surface runoff and the nitrogen loss with deep percolation do not 
necessarily imply that the study area does not have water quality problems 
caused by nitrogen fertilizer. That is because the nitrogen level in each EPIC-
Cropping System 
Higb+l4 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
High3-7 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
LEPA 3-10 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
LEPA2-5 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
TABLE 6 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF 
POLLUTION CONTROL MEASURES 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total 
acre 
114 114 
36 150 90 276 
6 84 90 
120 120 150 90 480 
26 90 116 
94 30 150 274 
90 90 
120 120 150 90 480 
120 3 123 
27 150 90 267 
90 90 
120 120 150 90 480 
113 113 
7 120 150 277 
90 90 
120 120 150 90 480 
Resource Use 
Effluent Discharges 
Net Returns 
Water (acre inch) 5,393 
Nitrogen (lbs.) 26,970 
N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,852 
N Percolation (Kg) 222 
PST Runoff Index 343,700 
PST Percol. Index 2,836 
Net Returns $92,633 
Water (acre inch) 5,455 
Nitrogen (lbs.) 25,150 
N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,806 
N Percolation (Kg) 137 
PST Runoff Index 414,000 
PST Percol. Index 2,127 
Net Returns $97,744 
Water (acre inch) 4,709 
Nitrogen (lbs.) 27,160 
N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,285 
N Percolation (Kg) 194 
PST Runoff Index 104,800 
PST Percol. Index 3,125 
Net Returns $102,761 
Water (acre inch) 4,399 
Nitrogen (lbs.) 26,690 
N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,386 
N Percolation (Kg) 234 
PST Runoff Index 105,300 
PST Percol. Index 1,349 
Net Returns $99,220 
104 
%of 
Bench-
mark 
Results 
101.1 
93.3 
97.5 
61.7 
120.5 
75.0 
105.5 
87.3 
100.7 
69.4 
87.4 
30.5 
110.2 
110.9 
81.6 
99.0 
74.8 
105.5 
30.6 
47.6 
107.1 
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PST simulation run was specified at or below the level which equates the 
marginal value product of nitrogen to the price of nitrogen fertilizer. The indices 
for both pesticide runoff and percolation indicates that substantial amounts of 
pesticides are lost into surface water with runoff. For illustration, the toxicity of 
pesticides moved with runoff from the farm for a year is equivalent to that of 31 
pounds of Treflan active ingredient. The degree of health hazard caused by 
pesticides lost with percolation is equivalent to that caused by approximately 5 
ounces of Treflan active ingredient. 
The optimal cropping patterns for the other irrigation scenarios are quite 
similar to the benchmark results. However, the crop mix across the four soils is 
somewhat different. Changes in relative productivity of soils according to the 
changes in irrigation scenarios appear to be a reason for the variations in crop 
mix across soils. Table 7 presents the shadow price of each soil under 
alternative irrigation scenarios. Each shadow price reflects the marginal profit 
an additional acre of corresponding soil can generate by rearranging 
production decisions, under given resource constraints. The differences in 
shadow prices of the four soils are not uniform across irrigation scenarios. 
Under the High 4-14, High 3-7, and LEPA3-10 scenarios, for example, Port silt 
loam soil has the highest shadow price: Under the LEPA 2-5 scenario, 
however, the shadow price for Port silt loam soil is lower than that of Pond 
Creek fine sandy loam soil and Grant loam soil. This result indicates that an 
irrigation strategy involving more frequent irrigation with lower volume per 
irrigation is not appropriate for Port silt loam soil. Crop yield data reported in 
Table 5 support this argument. 
The expected returns to the High 3-7 scenario are 6 percent higher than 
the expected returns to the base irrigation scenario (High 4-14). The nitrate 
runoff level, nitrogen percolation level, and the pesticide percolation index are 
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lower for the High 3-7 scenario than for the base irrigation scenario. However, 
the pesticide runoff index of the High 3-7 scenario is 21 percent higher than that 
of the base irrigation scenario. The greater possibility of coincidental rainfall 
occurring directly after an automatic irrigation during the period of frequent 
pesticide application appears to be the cause of the high pesticide runoff level. 
Irrigation 
Scenario 
High 4-14 
High 3-7 
LPEA 3-10 
LEPA 2-5 
TABLE 7 
SHADOW PRICES FOR SOILS IN THE ABSENCE OF 
POLLUTION CONTROL MEASURES 
Soil Shadow Prices ($) 
Cobb fine sandy loam 60.55 
Grant loam 68.39 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 77.66 
Port silt loam 87.47 
Cobb fine sandy loam 63.28 
Grant loam 68.39 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 73.62 
Port silt loam 74.76 
Cobb fine sandy loam 61.10 
Grant loam 68.39 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 78.06 
Port silt loam 80.90 
Cobb fine sandy loam 69.60 
Grant loam 77.50 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 82.66 
Port silt loam 72.42 
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Because the application efficiency of the LEPA system is higher than that 
of the high pressure center pivot system, the expected returns to the two LEPA 
scenarios are higher than the expected returns to both irrigation scenarios 
involving the high pressure center pivot system. In addition, the LEPA 3-10 
irrigation scenario uses 13 percent less total irrigation water, and the LEPA 2-5 
scenario uses 18 percent less total irrigation water than the benchmark result. 
Both nitrate and pesticide runoff levels are much lower under the LEPA 
scenarios than under the high pressure center pivot scenarios. These results 
occur because the application efficiency of the LEPA technology is higher than 
that of the high pressure center pivot technology. On the other hand, the 
pesticide percolation level of the LEPA 3-1 O scenario and the nitrogen 
percolation level of the LEPA 2-5 scenario are slightly higher than the 
benchmark results. Higher application efficiency and a relatively large volume 
of each irrigation application appear to be responsible for the higher pesticide 
percolation level under the LEPA 3-1 O scenario. The reason for a slight 
increase in the nitrogen percolation level of the LEPA 2-5 scenario is not 
obvious. 
Excise Jax on Nitrogen fertilizer and Pesticides 
To determine the extent of the farmer's responsiveness to input taxes, a 
100 percent excise tax was imposed on both nitrogen fertilizer and pesticides. 
The influences of this policy on optimal production decisions, net returns, and 
on nitrogen and pesticide losses are summarized in Table 8. Because the 
differences in profitability among activities reflected in the model are relatively 
uniform even with a 100 percent excise tax imposed on both nitrogen and 
pesticides, this policy option has little impact on the use of these inputs or 
TABLE 8 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER INPUT TAX POLICY 
(100% EXCISE TAX ON NITROGEN 
FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDES) 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total 
Cropping System 
acre 
High 4-14 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 114 114 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 150 90 240 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LM) 36 36 
Program Wheat(LH) 6 84 90 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 
High 3-7 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 26 90 116 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 94 150 244 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LM) 30 30 
Program Wheat(LH) 90 90 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 
1.EPA~·lQ 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 30 90 120 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 90 150 240 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LM) 30 30 
Program Wheat(LH) 90 90 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 
I.EPA 2-5 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G{LH) 113 113 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 7 150 157 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LM) 120 20 
Program Wheat(LH) 90 90 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 
Resource Use 
Effluent Discharges 
Net Returns 
Water (acre inch) 5,393 
Nitrogen (lbs.) 26,850 
N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,847 
N Percolation (Kg) 212 
PST Runoff Index 343,700 
PST Percol. Index 2,836 
Net Returns $59,337 
Water (acre inch) 5,455 
Nitrogen (lbs.) 25,050 
N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,801 
N Percolation (Kg) 129 
PST Runoff Index 414,000 
PST Percol. Index 2,126 
Net Returns $64,812 
Water (acre inch) 4,717 
Nitrogen (lbs.) 25,170 
N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,229 
N Percolation (Kg) 185 
PST Runoff Index 107,500 
PST Percol. Index 3,457 
Net Returns $69,877 
Water (acre inch) 4,399 
Nitrogen (lbs.) 26,290 
N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,369 
N Percolation (Kg) 201 
PST Runoff Index 105,300 
PST Percol. Index 1,349 
Net Returns $65,960 
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%of 
Bench-
mark 
Results 
100.0 
99.6 
99.7 
95.6 
100.0 
100.0 
64.1 
101.1 
92.9 
97.2 
58.0 
120.5 
75.0 
70.0 
87.5 
93.3 
66.4 
83.5 
31.3 
121.9 
75.4 
81.6 
97.5 
73.9 
90.9 
30.6 
47.6 
71.2 
cropping patterns. The primary impact of this policy option is to significantly 
reduce expected net returns. 
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Under the High 4-14 scenario, the only difference in the optimal cropping 
system compared to the benchmark result is the shift in 36 acres of Grant loam 
soil from peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) to peanuts(HL)-
cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LM). This shift indicates that the 100 percent 
increase in nitrogen fertilizer price made a dryland grain sorghum production 
activity using the medium nitrogen level (GG1 LM) more profitable than an 
activity using the high nitrogen level (GG1 LH). This type of shift did not occur on 
other soils. The shift described above resulted in a decrease in total nitrogen 
fertilizer use by 0.4 percent, a decrease in the total nitrate runoff by 0.3 percent, 
and a decrease in total nitrogen percolation by 4.4 percent from the benchmark 
levels. The total pesticide runoff and percolation indices did not change. 
The results under the High 3-7 scenario, if compared to the 
corresponding base case results, reveal basically the same type of changes: 
(1) a shift in 30 acres of Grant loam soil from peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain 
sorghum (LH) to peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LM); (2) total nitrogen 
use decreased by 0.4 percent; (3) total nitrate runoff decreased by 0.3 percent; 
and, (4) total nitrogen percolation decreased by 3.7 percent. Again, the total 
pesticide runoff and percolation levels are same as the base case results. 
There are some shifts in the crop mix across soils under the LEPA 3-1 O 
scenario. For example, 90 acres of Port silt loam soil has shifted from 
peanuts{HL)-cotton{HH)-grain sorghum(LH) to cotton(HH)-cotton(HH)-grain 
sorghum(LH). EPIC-PST simulation results reveal that Port silt loam soil 
requires the least amount of nitrogen to produce a same amount of crop among 
the four soils, and that cotton(HH)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) requires more 
nitrogen than peanuts(HH)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH). It appears that the 
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increase in the price of nitrogen fertilizer provided an incentive to shift the 
nitrogen saving Port silt loam soil from peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain 
sorghum(LH) which requires a lesser amount of nitrogen to cotton(HH)-
cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) which requires a greater amount of nitrogen. 
Another major change is the shifting of 90 acres of Cobb fine sandy loam soil 
from cotton(HH)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) to peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-
grain sorghum(LH). It appears that the 100 percent excise tax imposed on 
nitrogen fertilizer provided an incentive to shift Cobb fine sandy loam soil from a 
rotation system cotton(HH)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) to peanuts(HL)-
cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) since Cobb fine sandy loam soil requires a 
larger amount of nitrogen to attain a given yield. Consequently, compared to 
the corresponding base case results, total nitrogen use decreased by 7.4 
percent, total nitrate runoff decreased by 3.0 percent, and total nitrogen 
percolation decreased by 3.9 percent. On the other hand, total pesticide runoff 
(the pesticide runoff index) increased by 0.8 percent and total pesticide 
percolation (the pesticide percolation index) increased by 11. 7 percent. The 
shift of 90 acres of Cobb fine sandy loam soil from cotton(HH)-cotton(HH)-grain 
sorghum(LH) to peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) is responsible for 
the increase since peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) produces 
greater amounts of pesticide runoff and percolation. 
Changes in results under the LEPA 2-5 scenario are (1) the shifting in 
120 acres of Grant loam soil from peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH) 
to peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LM); (2) total nitrogen use decreased 
by 1.5 percent; (3) total nitrate runoff decreased by 0.9 percent; and, (4) total 
nitrogen percolation decreased by 14.6 percent. No changes occur in the total 
pesticide runoff and percolation levels since the change (1) above does not 
affect pesticide movement. 
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In summary, neither cropping patterns nor effluent discharge levels are 
affected much by the 100 percent excise tax imposed on nitrogen fertilizer and 
pesticides. The only major change is approximately a 36 percent decrease in 
net returns from the base case results under all irrigation scenarios. Even with 
these large reductions in net returns, the advantage of two LEPA scenarios over 
the two High scenarios is maintained. Higher tax rates may induce major 
changes in the cropping pattern and higher reductions in effluent discharge 
levels. However, the political acceptability of this policy option with excessively 
high tax rates is questionable due to the expected strong resistance from the 
group of affected farmers. 
Restricting Total Nitrogen Use 
This policy option imposes limits on the total quantity of nitrogen fertilizer 
that can be applied on the entire farm. To determine the extent of the farmer's 
responsiveness to this policy alternative, the maximum allowable nitrogen 
application was set at 50 percent of the benchmark result. The farmer is free to 
allocate the total quantity of nitrogen to any crop or crop rotation under dryland 
or irrigated crop production within the limit. The results of this policy option are 
summarized in Table 9. 
To meet the limit on total nitrogen applications, the crop mix and the input 
use levels are altered under all irrigation scenarios. A major change in the 
optimal crop mix is the exclusion of the acreage for program wheat. Another 
change is 29 acres of continuous irrigated cotton appeared in the optimal crop 
mix of the LEPA 3-1 O scenario. The major portion of the reduction in nitrogen 
use is met by removing from 19 to 24 percent of total acreage from crop 
production and by lowering nitrogen application levels in cotton and grain 
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TABLE 9 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER TOTAL NITROGEN 
APPLICATION LIMIT (50% OF THE 
BENCHMARK RESULT) 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total Resource Use o/o of 
Effluent Discharges Bench-
Cropping System Net Returns mark 
acre Results 
High 4-14 
C(HM)-C(HM)-G(LL) 5 5 Water (acre inch) 5,271 97.7 
C(HM)-C(HL)-G(LL) 85 85 Nitrogen (lbs.) 13,485 50.0 
C(MM)-C(MM)-G(LL) 20 20 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,115 60.2 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 30 150 180 N Percolation (Kg) 137 61.8 
P(HL)-C(MM)-G(LL) 100 100 PST Runoff Index 329,200 95.8 
PST Percol. Index 1,120 39.5 
Total 30 120 150 90 390 Net Returns $82,756 89.3 
($60,196) (65.0) 
High 3-Z 
C(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 90 90 Water (acre inch) 5,359 99.4 
C(HM)-C(MM)-G(LL) 18 18 Nitrogen (lbs.) 13,485 50.0 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 20 102 150 272 N03 Runoff (Kg 1,140 61.6 
N Percolation (Kg) 92 41.7 
Total 20 120 150 90 380 PST Runoff Index 369,300 107.4 
PST Percol. Index 402 14.2 
Net Returns $86,653 93.5 
($60,870) (65.7) 
LEPA3-1o 
C(HM)-C(HL)-G(LL) 78 78 Water (acre inch) 4,761 88.3 
C(HL)-C(HL)-C(HL) 17 12 29 Nitrogen (lbs.) 13,485 50.0 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 15 103 150 268 N03 Runoff (Kg) 722 39.0 
N Percolation (Kg) 108 48.8 
Total 15 120 150 90 375 PST Runoff Index 106,300 30.9 
PST Percol. Index 509 17.9 
Net Returns $91,650 98.9 
($64,046) (69.1) 
LEPA 2-5 
C(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 90 90 Water (acre inch) 4,265 79.1 
C(HM)-C{HL)-G(LL) 22 22 Nitrogen (lbs.) 13,485 50.0 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 30 22 150 202 N03 Runoff (Kg) 702 37.9 
P(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 76 76 N Percolation (Kg) 92 41.7 
PST Runoff Index 96,320 28.0 
Total 30 120 150 90 390 PST Percol. Index 550 19.4 
Net Returns $89,302 96.4 
($65,906) (71.1) 
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sorghum production. The acreage removed from production is dryland acres 
under all irrigation scenarios. The nitrogen application level in all dryland 
production activities (grain sorghum) is lowered to the low level. The nitrogen 
application level in irrigated cotton production activities is lowered to the 
medium or low level. Under the High 4-14 and High 3-7 scenarios, the 
irrigation level also is reduced from the high level to the medium level in part of 
the cotton production activities. Under every irrigation scenario, the reduction in 
planted acreage occurs solely on Cobb fine sandy loam soil which requires the 
largest amount of nitrogen among the four soils. Port silt loam soil, which 
requires the least amount of nitrogen, is planted solely to cotton-cotton-grain 
sorghum (C-C-G) which requires relatively large amounts of nitrogen. 
Table 1 o presents the shadow prices of individual soils under this policy 
scenario. Each shadow price reflects the additional profit an additional acre of 
corresponding soil can generate by rearranging production decisions, under 
given resource and policy constraints. The shadow price of Port silt loam soil is 
much higher than that of other soils. This indicates that Port silt loam soil 
requires considerably less nitrogen to attain a given yield. On the other hand, 
the shadow price of Cobb fine sandy loam soil is zero since this soil has slack 
acres. These results suggest that the restriction on total nitrogen applications 
may cause considerable changes in land resource values. 
The reduction in total planted acreage and in the nitrogen application 
levels on cotton and grain sorghum causes reductions in net returns to the farm. 
However, the reduction in net returns is relatively small because both the 
acreage and the input use level of the most profitable crop (peanuts) are 
maintained at previous levels. Compared to the corresponding base case 
results, net returns under this policy scenario decreased by 12 percent under 
the High 3-7 and LEPA 3-10 scenarios, and by 11 percent under the High 4-14 
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and LEPA 2-5 scenarios. As expected, substantial reductions in nitrate runoff 
and nitrogen percolation are attained under all irrigation scenarios. Reductions 
in pesticide runoff and percolation are also attained mainly by removing part of 
the Cobb fine sandy loam soil which has the highest potential of pesticide runoff 
and percolation from production. 
Irrigation 
Scenario 
High 4-14 
High 3-7 
LPEA 3-10 
LEPA 2-5 
TABLE10 
SHADOW PRICES FOR SOILS UNDER TOTAL 
NITROGEN APPLICATION LIMITS (50% OF 
THE BENCHMARK RESULT) 
Soil Shadow Prices ($) 
Cobb fine sandy loam 
Grant loam 22.42 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 26.09 
Port silt loam 96.33 
Cobb fine sandy loam 
Grant loam 20.56 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 23.79 
Port silt loam 100.22 
Cobb fine sandy loam 
Grant loam 23.40 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 28.98 
Port silt loam 106.60 
Cobb fine sandy loam 
Grant loam 21.46 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 24.69 
Port silt loam 81.84 
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The same level of reduction in total nitrogen applications and the same 
level of pollution abatement can be attained by imposing a tax on nitrogen 
fertilizer. The appropriate tax rate for achieving the 50 percent reduction in total 
nitrogen applications and the same level of pollution abatement is the shadow 
price of the constraint in the mathematical programming model that imposes the 
limit on total nitrogen use. Each shadow price reflects the marginal value 
product of nitrogen fertilizer at the level of the limit on total nitrogen applications, 
under given resource constraints. Thus, the shadow price is the dual of the 
corresponding total .nitrogen application constraint. The estimated shadow 
prices of the total nitrogen application constraints are (1) $1.67/lb under High 4-
14; (2) $1.91/lb under High 3-7; (3) $2.05/lb under LEPA 3-1 O; and, (4) $1.74/lb 
under LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenario. The price of nitrogen fertilizer used for the 
analysis is $0.16/lb. Notice that extremely high tax rates (over 1,000 %) are 
required to achieve the same policy goal. If the tax policy is implemented 
instead of the policy restricting total nitrogen applications, the producer would 
be subjected to a significantly greater loss in income. The values in 
parentheses represent net returns obtainable when tax rates, that are equal to 
the shadow prices of the total nitrogen application constraints, are imposed on 
nitrogen fertilizer. Notice the substantial difference in net returns caused by the 
tax policy. Notice also that the highest net return is acquired under LEPA 2-5 
scenario, and that there is no considerable difference between the net return 
associated with the High 3-7 scenario and the net return associated with the 
High 4-14 scenario under the nitrogen tax policy. These results occur since the 
tax rates were determined at the margin for each irrigation scenario. 
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Restricting Per Acre Nitrogen Use 
Under this policy, crop land was zoned according to allowable nitrogen 
application rates. In other words, crop and soil information were combined 
when determining allowable per acre nitrogen application rates. To implement 
the per acre nitrogen application limit, crop production activities associated only 
with the low nitrogen levels were allowed to appear in the optimal farm plan, 
regardless of the irrigation level. The proportion of the low nitrogen level to the 
high level varies depending on soil, crop, and the irrigation level. Results of this 
policy are reported in Table 11. Under all irrigation scenarios, the cropping 
patterns are almost the same as the corresponding base case results. The 
acreage planted to cotton-cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G) ranges from 23 to 25 
percent of the total acreage, and the acreage planted to peanuts-cotton-grain 
sorghum (P-C-G) ranges from 56 to 58 percent of the total acreage, according to 
the irrigation scenario. The acreage allocated to program wheat is 19 percent 
of total acreage under all irrigation scenarios. 
Large reductions in nitrogen applications are attained under this policy. 
In every irrigation scenario, there is approximately a 40 percent reduction in 
total quantity of nitrogen applied. Nevertheless, the high irrigation levels in 
peanut and cotton production activities are maintained. This result indicates 
that the complementary relationship between irrigation water and nitrogen 
fertilizer was not strong enough to lower the irrigation level. Consequently, total 
irrigation water use remains virtually at the same level as that in the absence of 
pollution control policy measures. However, the result might be different if the 
amounts of nitrogen for the low nitrogen level (i.e. HL) were much less than 
those specified in this study. 
Cropping System 
High 4-14 
C(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 
P(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 
Program Wheat(LL) 
Total 
Hjgh3-Z 
C(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 
P(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 
Program Wheat(LL) 
Total 
LEeA3-1Q 
C(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 
P(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 
Program Wheat(LL) 
Total 
LEM2-5 
C(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 
P(HL)-C(HL)-G(LL) 
Program Wheat(LL) 
Total 
TABLE 11 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER PER ACRE 
NITROGEN APPLICATION LIMITS 
{LIMITED TO THE LOW 
NITROGEN LEVEL) 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total Resource Use 
Effluent Discharges 
Net Returns 
acre 
20 90 110 Water (acre inch) 5,425 
30 100 150 280 Nitrogen (lbs.) 16,240 
90 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,175 
N Percolation (Kg) 104 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 331,300 
PST Percol. Index 1,125 
Net Returns $83,614 
27 90 117 Water (acre inch) 5,525 
30 93 150 273 Nitrogen (lbs.) 16,340 
90 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,178 
N Percolation (Kg) 92 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 388,400 
PST Percol. Index 596 
Net Returns $87,349 
32 90 122 Water (acre inch) 4,763 
30 88 150 268 Nitrogen (lbs.) 16,400 
90 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 848 
N Percolation (Kg) 92 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 107,700 
PST Percol. Index 952 
Net Returns $92,547 
23 90 113 Water (acre inch) 4,263 
30 97 150 277 Nitrogen (lbs.) 16,270 
90 90 NQa Runoff (Kg) 849 
N Percolation (Kg) 92 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 96,680 
PST Pe.reel. Index 546 
Net Returns $90,540 
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%of 
Bench-
mark 
Results 
100.6 
60.2 
63.4 
47.1 
96.4 
39.7 
90.3 
102.4 
60.6 
63.6 
41.7 
113.0 
21.0 
94.3 
88.3 
60.8 
45.8 
41.7 
31.3 
33.6 
99.9 
79.0 
60.3 
45.8 
41.7 
28.1 
19.3 
97.7 
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Reductions in per acre nitrogen applications result in large reductions in 
nitrate runoff and nitrogen percolation losses. Nitrate runoff levels are reduced 
from the base case levels by (1) 37 percent under High 4-14; (2) 34 percent 
under High 3-7; and; (3) 24 percent under LEPA 3-1 O; and, (4) 29 percent under 
LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenario. Nitrogen percolation levels are reduced from the 
base case levels by (1) 53 percent under High 4-14; (2) 20 percent under High 
3-7; (3) 46 percent under LEPA 3-10; and, (4) 64 percent under LEPA 2-5 
irrigation scenario. 
Larger reductions in pesticide percolation levels are attained under all 
irrigation scenarios. However, these reductions in pesticide losses are not the 
result of reductions in per acre nitrogen application but the results of shiftings in 
cropping systems across soils: shiftings of large portions (75 - 79%) of Cobb 
fine sandy loam soil from peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum (P-C-G) or cotton-
cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G) to program wheat. Although not substantial, 
reductions in pesticide runoff are also attained. 
In summary, this policy option gives the producer less flexibility in using 
nitrogen fertilizer. However, if high intensity of nitrogen applications in specific 
crop production or in certain soils is the major cause of nitrogen pollution, this 
policy could be more effective than the policy restricting the total quantity of 
nitrogen applied. The influences of this policy are (1) a large reduction in total 
quantity of nitrogen application; (2) large reductions in nitrate runoff and 
nitrogen percolation losses; and (3) 1 O to 11 percent reductions in the 
producer's income. The reductions in net returns are relatively small because 
both the acreage and the input use of the most profitable crop (peanuts) are 
maintained at previous levels. The profit advantage of the two LEPA systems 
over the two high pressure center pivot systems is still maintained under this 
policy. 
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Tax on Irrigation Water Use 
Since water is the main source of nitrate and pesticide movements, 
abatement in agricultural pollution can be attained by policy alternatives that 
induce reductions in irrigation water use. Reductions in irrigation water use can 
be attained by imposing an additional cost on irrigation water use or by 
imposing a limit on total irrigation water use. To predict the influences of an 
additional cost of irrigation applications on water quality and producer's income, 
a tax was imposed on irrigation water use. The tax rate was assumed to be 
equal to the variable cost per acre inch of irrigation water pumped by the high 
pressure center pivot system. Results of the water tax policy are summarized in 
Table 12. 
Results obtained under this policy are almost identical with the 
corresponding base case results, except for producer's income. Because the 
differences in profitability among activities reflected in the model are relatively 
uniform even with the tax imposed on irrigation water use, this policy option has 
little impact on optimal crop production decisions or the quantity of irrigation 
water use. Hence, little changes occur in nitrogen and pesticide losses. The 
only notable impact of this policy option is to reduce producer's income. 
Compared to the corresponding base case results, reductions in producer's 
income under this policy scenario range from 13 percent to 16 percent. The 
advantage of the LEPA irrigation scenarios over the High scenarios is more 
eminent under this policy since LEPA technology uses less water to attain a 
given yield. Results imply that higher tax rates, or taxes targeted to specific 
irrigation systems, are required to induce reductions in irrigation water use. 
Cropping System 
High 4-14 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program \/Jheat(LH) 
Total 
High 3-7 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program \/Jheat(LH) 
Total 
L.!;eA 3-lQ 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
. P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program \/Jheat(LH) 
Total 
L.!;eA 2-5 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program \/Jheat(LH) 
Total 
TABLE12 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER AT AX 
ON IRRIGATION WATER (100% OF 
VARIABLE COST OF IRRIGATION) 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total Resource Use 
Effluent Discharges 
Net Returns 
acre 
114 114 \/Jater(acreinch) 5,393 
36 150 90 276 Nitrogen (lbs.) 26,970 
6 84 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,852 
N Percolation (Kg) 222 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 343,700 
PST Percol. Index 2,836 
Net Returns $77,909 
25 90 115 \/Jater (acre inch) 5,443 
120 5 150 275 Nitrogen (lbs.) 25,050 
90 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,181 
N Percolation (Kg) 140 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 415,200 
PST Percol. Index 2,332 
Net Returns $82,862 
120 3 123 \/Jater (acre inch) 4,709 
27 150 90 267 Nitrogen (lbs.) 27,160 
90 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,285 
N Percolation (Kg) 194 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 104,800 
PST Percol. Index 3,125 
Net Returns $89,905 
113 113 \/Jater (acre inch) 4,399 
7 120 150 277 Nitrogen (lbs.) 26,690 
90 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,386 
N Percolation (Kg) 234 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 105,300 
PST Percolation Index 1,349 
Net Returns $87,212 
120 
%of 
Bench-
mark 
Results 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
84.1 
100.9 
92.9 
63.8 
63.2 
120.8 
82.2 
89.5 
87.3 
100.7 
69.4 
87.4 
30.5 
110.2 
97.1 
81.6 
99.0 
74.8 
105.5 
30.6 
47.6 
94.1 
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Restricting Total Irrigation Water use 
To implement this policy, the total volume of irrigation water use is limited 
to 50 percent of the benchmark level. A summary of results obtained under this 
policy scenario is presented in Table 13. Several changes occur under this 
policy. First, a large part of cotton production shifts from the high irrigation level 
to dryland. These shifts occurred to meet the limit on total irrigation water use. 
There is also a slight increase (1 O acres) in the acreage allocated to program 
wheat. It appears that the increase in program wheat acreage has occurred 
since a three-year rotation system cotton-cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G) 
becomes less profitable as irrigation water became too scarce to be allocated to 
cotton production activities within the rotation system. Another portion of the 
reduction in irrigation water use is met by reducing irrigated acres. The 
reductions in irrigated acres are (1) 124 acres under High 4-14; (2) 122 acres 
under High 3-1 O; (3) 104 acres under LEPA 3-1 O; and, (4) 90 acres under 
LEPA 2-5. Under High 4-14, High 3-7, and LEPA 3-10 scenarios, the 
reductions in irrigated acres occur mainly in Cobb fine sandy loam soil since 
Cobb fine sandy loam soil requires more water than other soils to attain a given 
yield. Under the LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenario, on the other hand, the reduction 
in irrigated acres occurs mainly in Port silt loam soil since, as discussed above, 
LEPA 2-5 is not an appropriate irrigation strategy for that soil. Interestingly, 
Cobb fine sandy loam soil is irrigated most intensively under the LEPA 2-5 
irrigation scenario. This result indicates that an irrigation strategy involving 
more frequent irrigation with less per irrigation volume is most appropriate for 
soils with considerably high sand contents. 
In most cases, large reductions in nitrogen and pesticide losses are 
attained due to the reduction in the irrigated acres and the shifts in a large part 
TABLE 13 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER TOTAL IRRIGATION 
WATER USE LIMIT (50% OF THE 
BENCHMARK RESULT) 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total Resource Use 
Effluent Discharges 
Cropping System Net Returns 
acre 
High 4-14 
C(LH)-C(LH)-G(LH) 103 103 Water (acre inch) 2,697 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 20 90 110 Nitrogen (lbs.) 19,330 
P(HL)-C(MH)-G(LH) 20 20 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,105 
P(HL)-C(LH)-G(LH) 17 130 147 N Percolation (Kg) 192 
Program Wheat(LH) 100 100 PST Runoff Index 208,400 
PST Percol. Index 500 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 Net Returns $79,646 
($65,808) 
High 3-7 
C(LH)-C(LH)-G(LH) 20 85 105 Water {acre inch) 2,697 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 140 140 Nitrogen (lbs.) 19,070 
P(HL)-C(LH)-G(LH) 120 10 5 135 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,221 
Program Wheat(LH) 100 100 N Percolation {Kg) 137 
PST Runoff Index 254,300 
Total 120 120 50 90 480 PST Percol. Index 1,695 
Net Returns $81,373 
($64,506) 
Ll;PA3-lQ 
C{LH)-C(LH)-G(LH) 92 20 112 Water {acre inch) 2,697 
P{HL)-C{HH)-G{LH) 109 90 199 Nitrogen {lbs.) 20,860 
P(HL)-C(LH)-G(LH} 28 41 69 N03 Runoff {Kg) 1,018 
Program Wheat(LH) 100 100 N Percolation {Kg) 18 
PST Runoff Index 84,040 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 PST Percol. Index 579 
Net Returns $87,231 
($64,981) 
LEPA2-5 
C{HH)-C{LH)-G(LH) 9 9 Water (acre inch) 2,697 
C(LH)-C(LH)-G(LH) 90 90 Nitrogen {lbs.) 20,770 
P{HL)-C{HH)-G(LH) 120 11 90 221 N03 Runoff {Kg) 1,036 
P(HL)-C(LH)-G(LH) 60 60 N Percolation (Kg) 154 
Program Wheat(LH) 100 100 PST Runoff Index 86,020 
PST Percol. Index 2,162 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 Net Returns $86,702 
{$65,827) 
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Results 
50.0 
71.7 
59.7 
86.7 
60.6 
17.6 
86.0 
(71.0} 
50.0 
70.7 
65.9 
61.6 
74.0 
59.8 
87.8 
(69.6} 
50.0 
77.3 
55.0 
82.3 
24.5 
20.4 
94.2 
{70.1) 
50.0 
77.0 
55.9 
69.7 
25.0 
76.2 
93.6 
{71.1} 
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of cotton production from the high irrigation level to dryland. There is a large 
increase in pesticide percolation under the LEPA 2-5 scenario .. Intensive 
irrigation applications on Cobb fine sandy loam soil planted to the peanuts-
cotton-grain sorghum (P-C-G) rotation system is responsible for the increase in 
pesticide percolation. The reductions in net returns range from 14 percent 
(LEPA 2-5) to 18 percent (High 3-7) relative to the corresponding base case 
results. 
A 50 percent reduction in total irrigation water use and the same level of 
pollution abatement can be attained by imposing a tax on irrigation water use. 
The appropriate tax rate for achieving the reduction in total irrigation water use 
and the same level of pollution abatement is the shadow price of the total 
irrigation water use constraint. Each shadow price reflects the marginal value 
product of irrigation water at the level of the 50 percent limit, under given 
resource constraints. Thus, the shadow price is the dual of the corresponding 
total irrigation water use constraint. The shadow prices estimated are (1) $5.13 
per acre inch under High 4-14; (2) $6.25 per acre inch under High 3-7; (3) $8.25 
per acre inch under LEPA 3-1 O; and, and, (4) $7.94 per acre inch under LEPA 
2-5 irrigation scenario. If the tax policy is implemented instead of the policy 
restricting total quantity of irrigation water use, the producer is subject to a much 
higher income loss. The values in parentheses represent net returns 
obtainable when the tax rates, that are equal to the shadow prices of the total 
irrigation constraints, are imposed on irrigation water use. Notice the difference 
between the net returns under the tax policy and the net returns under the 
standard policy. Notice also that the levels of profits are nearly the same for 
each of the irrigation schemes since the tax rates were determined at the 
margin for each irrigation scenario. 
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Restricting Pesticide Percolation 
This policy specifies the maximum level of pesticide percolation the farm 
may generate without penalty. To implement this policy, the maximum 
allowable pesticide percolation index was set at 50 percent of the pesticide 
percolation index estimated under the benchmark scenario. Notice that the 
amount of various pesticide ingredients moved with deep percolation is 
converted to the percolation index to reflect potential adverse health effects. 
Notice also that the amount of pesticide ingredients moved with runoff water or 
sediment is converted to the pesticide runoff index to reflect it's toxicity {see 
Chapter Ill). A summary of results obtained under this policy alternative is 
presented in Table 14. 
Because the pesticide percolation constraint is not binding under the 
LEPA 2-5 scenario, the optimal crop mix and the net return for the LEPA 2-5 
irrigation scenario under this policy are not different from the corresponding 
base case results. This result suggests that the LEPA 2-5 irrigation strategy is 
the most efficient in reducing pesticide percolation. The optimal crop mixes and 
net returns for other irrigation scenarios are almost the same as the 
corresponding base case results. This implies that the 50 percent reduction in 
pesticide percolation can be attained without difficulty. In general, the reduction 
in pesticide percolation is attained by shifting part of the rotation systems that 
generates large amounts of pesticide percolation from Cobb fine sandy loam 
soil to Grant loam soil. 
A policy which targets just one type of pollutant {pesticide percolation in 
this case) could induce increases in the discharge of other pollutants. 
Compared to the benchmark results, for example, nitrate runoff and nitrogen 
percolation for the High 4-14 scenario increase 7 percent and 21 percent, 
Cropping System 
Higb 4-14 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH}-G(LH) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
High 3-Z 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH} 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
LEEA 3-lQ 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
LEEA 2-5 
C (HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
TABLE 14 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER A PESTICIDE 
PERGOLA TION LIMIT (LIMITED TO 50% 
OF THE BENCHMARK RESULT) 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total Resource Use 
Effluent Discharges 
Net Returns 
acre 
56 58 114 Water (acre inch) 5,391 
36 150 90 276 Nitrogen (lbs.} 27,490 
64 26 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,976 
N Percolation (Kg) 268 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 328,200 
PST Percol. Index 1,418 
Net Returns $92,622 
27 90 117 Water (acre inch) 5,482 
57 66 150 273 Nitrogen (lbs.) 25,620 
36 54 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,841 
N Percolation (Kg) 156 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 402,700 
PST Percol. Index 1,418 
Net Returns $97,644 
53 70 123 Water (acre inch) 4,728 
27 150 90 267 Nitrogen (lbs.) 27,760 
67 23 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,356 
N Percolation (Kg) 247 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 104,600 
PST Percol. Index 1,418 
Net Returns $102,725 
113 113 Water (acre inch) 4,399 
7 120 150 277 Nitrogen (lbs.) 26,690 
90 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,386 
N Percolation (Kg) 234 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Runoff Index 105,300 
PST Percol. Index 1,349 
Net Returns $99,220 
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100.0 
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100.0 
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99.4 
70.5 
117.2 
50.0 
105.4 
87.7 
102.9 
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111.6 
30.4 
50.0 
110.9 
81.6 
99.0 
74.8 
105.5 
30.6 
47.6 
107.1 
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respectively, under this policy. Nitrate runoff and nitrogen percolation levels for 
the High 3-7 and LEPA 3-10 irrigation scenarios are also slightly higher under 
this policy than for the corresponding base case results. The shifting of irrigated 
cotton production activities from Cobb fine sandy loam soil to Grant loam soil 
caused the increase in nitrate runoff and nitrogen percolation. These results 
suggests the need for a pollution control policy targeting most pollutants 
simultaneously. 
This policy, which imposes an upper limit on pesticide percolation for the 
* farm, is an example of nonpoint standards (z2 ) discussed in Chapter II. The 
* corresponding nonpoint incentive (.112 ), which is the dual of the nonpoint 
standard, is the shadow price of the pesticide percolation constraint. It is 
interpreted as the marginal cost for reducing an additional unit of the pesticide 
percolation index. The optimal non point incentives are: (1) $0.007 under the 
High 4-14; (2) $0.14 under the High 3-7; and (3) $0.021 under the LEPA 3-10. 
The nonpoint incentive for the LEPA 2-5 scenario is zero because the pesticide 
percolation constraint is not binding. These nonpoint incentives can be 
charged as effluent taxes to each unit of pesticide percolation index. Under this 
policy, the effluent taxes charged to pesticide percolation would not cause 
substantial losses in the producer's income since the tax rates are infinitesimal. 
Under the LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenario, there is no need of imposing a nonpoint 
incentive because the policy goal has been attained already. 
The optimal production decisions represent the management practice 
* standards (x ) that are interpreted as the farm production activity levels 
specified by a regulatory agency. In other words, the farmer is forced to adopt 
those activity levels as a way to achieve the water quality objective. The 
* management practice incentives are tax rates (.112 'G2) imposed on the activity 
* vector (x) chosen by the farmer. Under this policy, .u2 is a scalar since only 
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one pollutant is targeted. G2 is also a vector composed of the pesticide 
percolation indices associated with all crop production activities. Notice that the 
amount of tax paid under the management practice incentive policy is identical 
with the amount paid under the nonpoint incentive policy. Because G2x 
represents the total sum of the pesticide percolation generated by crop 
* production activities and J12 represents the optimal nonpoint incentive, 
* . J12 'G2x is the amount of tax charged to the. total sum of pesticide percolation 
(indices} generated by crop production activities in the farm. Notice that the 
* optimal production decisions (x } that result from any of the four policy tools, 
including nonpoint standards, nonpoint incentives, management practice 
standards, and management practice incentives, is consistent with each other. 
To illustrate, assume that (1} x1 denotes the level of the activity NP1 HL 
(Table 5}; (2) x2 denotes the level of NC1 HH; (3) x3 denotes the level of NG1 LH; 
(4) g1 denotes the level of pesticide percolation generated by one unit of x1; (5) 
g2 denotes the level of pesticide percolation generated by one unit of x2; and (6) 
g3 denotes the level of pesticide percolation generated by one unit of x3. Then 
the formula for calculating the amount of the management practice incentive 
charged to x1+x2+x3 acres of a three-year rotation system NP1 HL-NC1 HH-
NG1 LH is: 
(5.1} 
Under the High 4-14 irrigation scenario, equation (5.1} is converted to 
$0.007 [0.11 0.34 0][50 50 50]' = $0.158 
Under the High 3-7 irrigation scenario, equation (5.1} is converted to 
$0.140 [0.05 0.06 0][50 50 50]' = $0. 770 
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Under the LEPA 3-10 irrigation scenario, equation (5.1) is converted to 
$0.021 [0.33 0.48 0][50 50 50]' = $0.851 
. 
Notice that 150 acres of Pond Creek fine sandy loam soil is allocated to the 
rotation system NP1 HL-NC1 HH-NG1 LH (Table 14). The values for x1, x2, and 
x3 are identically 50 because of the rotational linkages established in the 
mathematical programming model. 
In summary, a 50 percent abatement of pesticide percolation can be 
attained by any of the four types of policies, including nonpoint standards, 
nonpoint incentives, management practice standards, and management 
practice incentives. If policy parameters for these policies are set properly, then 
every result, except producer's income, would be identical. If either of the two 
incentive policies is implemented, then the producer's income decreases. 
Preceding discussions on the four types of least cost policy options apply to the 
following policy scenarios. 
The tax rates associated with the incentive policies are infinitesimal 
under this policy restricting pesticide percolation. Thus, the loss in producer's 
income is trivial even though one of the two incentive policies is implemented to 
attain a 50 percent abatement of pesticide percolation. 
Restricting Nitrogen Percolation 
This policy specifies the maximum level of nitrogen percolation the farm 
may generate without penalty. To implement this policy, the maximum 
allowable nitrogen percolation level was set at 50 percent of the benchmark 
result. Results of this policy are summarized in Table 15. To meet the nitrogen 
percolation limit, the nitrogen application level in part of the cotton and sorghum 
Cropping System 
Higb 4-14 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LM) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LM) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LL) 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
Higb 3-Z 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LM) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LM) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
LEeA 3-lQ 
C(HH)-C(HM)-G(LH) 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LM) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LL) 
Program Wheat(LH) 
Total 
LEeA 2-5 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LM) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LL) 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 
Program Wheat(LL) 
Total 
TABLE15 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER A NITROGEN 
PERCOLATION LIMIT (LIMITED TO 50% 
OFTHEBENCHMARKRESULD 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total Resource Use 
Effluent Discharges 
Net Returns 
acre 
90 90 Water (acre inch) 5,428 
17 17 Nitrogen (lbs.) 23,190 
103 103 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,689 
106 60 166 N Percolation (Kg) 111 
14 14 PST Runoff Index 374,100 
90 90 PST Percol. Index 4,184 
Net Returns $91,385 
120 120 150 90 480 ($88,157) 
90 90 Water (acre inch) 5,455 
26 26 Nitrogen (lbs.) 24,610 
136 136 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,782 
94 30 14 138 N Percolation (Kg) 111 
90 90 PST Runoff Index 414,000 
PST Percol. Index 2,127 
120 120 150 90 480 Net Returns $97,655 
($97,053) 
2 2 Water (acre inch) 4,732 
120 120 Nitrogen (lbs.) 25,490 
81 99 88 268 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,204 
39 51 90 N Percolation (Kg) 111 
PST Runoff Index 108,700 
120 120 150 90 480 PST Percol. Index 3,117 
Net Returns $101,983 
($99,623) 
113 113 Water (acre inch) 4,399 
7 7 Nitrogen (lbs.) 23,590 
135 135 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,222 
120 15 135 N Percolation (Kg) 111 
90 90 PST Runoff Index 105,200 
PST Percol. Index 1,349 
120 120 150 90 480 Net Returns $98,397 
($96,581) 
129 
%of 
Bench-
mark 
Results 
100.6 
86.0 
91.2 
50.0 
108.8 
147.5 
98.7 
95.2 
101.1 
91.2 
96.2 
50.0 
120.5 
75.0 
105.4 
104.8 
87.7 
94.5 
65.0 
50.0 
31.6 
109.9 
110.1 
107.5 
81.6 
87.5 
66.0 
50.0 
30.6 
47.6 
106.2 
104.3 
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production activities shifts from the high level to the medium or the low level 
under every irrigation scenario. On the other hand, overall crop mixes are 
almost identical with the corresponding base case results. Because the high 
irrigation level is maintained in spite of the low nitrogen application level, the 
total amount of irrigation water use in every irrigation scenario is almost 
identical with the corresponding base case result. 
Under the High 4-14 irrigation scenario, the total quantity of nitrogen 
applied decreases by 14 percent. Also the total amount of nitrogen runoff 
decreases by 9 percent. However, the pesticide runoff index and the pesticide 
percolation index increase by 9 percent and 48 percent, respectively. Notice 
the significant increase in the pesticide percolation index. The sift of the rotation 
system peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LM) to the Cobb fine sandy 
loam soil appears to be responsible for the significant increase in the pesticide 
percolation index since both the rotation system and the soil have high 
pesticide leaching potential. This result suggests the need for a pollution 
control policy that focuses on all types of pollutants simultaneously. Although 
the nitrogen application level in part of the cotton and grain sorghum activities is 
lowered to the medium or the low level, the reduction in the producer's income 
is about 2 percent less than the benchmark result. 
Under the High 3-7 irrigation scenario, the total quantity of nitrogen 
applied and the nitrogen runoff level decrease slightly. However, the pesticide 
runoff and percolation indices remain at the same level. The producer's income 
also remains at about the same level: there is only a 0.1 percent decrease 
when compared with the corresponding base case result. 
Under the LEPA 3-1 O irrigation scenario, the total quantity of nitrogen 
applied decreases by 6 percent. The reduction in the amount of nitrate runoff is 
about 4 percent. While the pesticide percolation index decreases slightly, the 
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pesticide runoff index increases slightly. The producer's income declines only 
0.8 percent from the corresponding base case result. 
Under the LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenario, the total quantity of nitrogen 
applied decreases by 12 percent. The amount of nitrogen runoff also 
decreases by 13 percent. On the other hand, both the pesticide runoff index 
and the pesticide percolation index remain at the same level. As under the 
other irrigation scenario, the decrease in the producer's income is small: there 
is only a 0.9 percent decrease from the level of the LEPA 2-5/No policy case. 
* Under this policy scenario, the nonpoint standard (z2 ) is the upper limit 
on the amount of nitrogen percolation. The corresponding rionpoint incentive 
* (J12 ) is the shadow price of the nitrogen percolation constraint in the 
* mathematical programming model. Under this policy, J12 is a scalar since just 
one type of constraint is imposed. These shadow prices (nonpoint incentives) 
are {1) $29.08 under the High 4-14 irrigation scenario; (2) $5.43 under the High 
3-7 irrigation scenario; (3) $21.26 under the LEPA 3-10 irrigation scenario; and, 
(4) $16.36 under the LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenario. Each shadow price is 
interpreted as the marginal cost incurred to the producer for reducing an 
additional unit (kg) of nitrogen percolation under respective irrigation scenarios. 
To attain the nonpoint standard, which is a 50 percent reduction in the amount 
of nitrogen percolation, these nonpoint incentives can be charged as effluent 
taxes to each unit of nitrogen percolation. If these effluent taxes are charged to 
each unit of nitrogen percolation, there would be some reductions in the 
producer's income. The values in parentheses (Table 15) represent net returns 
when these effluent taxes are charged to each unit of nitrogen percolation. The 
reductions in net returns under the effluent taxes range from 0.6 percent to 3.5 
percent, depending upon the irrigation scenario. 
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* The management practice standards (x ) are represented by the optimal 
* production decisions. The management practice incentives (J12 'G2) are tax 
rates imposed on each unit of various crop production activities. As discussed 
above, the management practice incentives involve reductions in the producer's 
income which are equal to the reductions associated with the nonpoint 
incentives. 
In summary, abatement of nitrogen percolation can be attained by 
shifting the nitrogen application level in part of cotton and grain sorghum 
activities from the high level to the medium or the low level. Along with the 
reductions in nitrogen percolation, reductions in nitrogen runoff are also 
attained. In most occasions, pesticide runoff and percolation levels remain 
basically at the same level as the corresponding base case results. Under the 
High 4-14 irrigation scenario, however, pesticide percolation increases 
significantly. This suggests the need for a policy that focuses on all types of 
agricultural pollutants simultaneously. The reductions in producer's income are 
not significant under all irrigation scenarios because quota peanut production, 
which is considerably more profitable than other crops, remains at the same 
level. 
Restricting Both Pesticide and Nitrogen Percolation 
To determine the extent of the farmer's response to a policy that restricts 
the amount of both pesticide and nitrogen percolation, the upper limits of 
pesticide and nitrogen percolation are set at the level which is equivalent to 50 
percent of the benchmark results. The influences of this policy on optimum 
production decisions, net returns, and on nitrogen and pesticide losses are 
summarized in Table 16. 
TABLE16 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER PESTICIDE AND 
NITROGEN PERCOLATION LIMITS (LIMITED TO 
50% OF THE BENCHMARK RESULTS) 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total Resource Use 
Effluent Discharges 
Cropping System Net Returns 
acre 
Higb 4-14 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LM) 56 56 Water (acre inch) 5,414 
C(HH)-C(HL)-G(LH) 35 35 Nitrogen (lbs.) 22,730 
Continuous Cotton(HM) - 14 14 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,621 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 106 117 223 N Percolation (Kg) 111 
P(HL)-C(HL)-G(LH) 55 55 PST Runoff Index 337,100 
Program Wheat(LH) 64 33 97 PST Percol. Index 1,418 
Net Returns $89,631 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 ($78,937) 
Hjgb 3-Z 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 1 1 Water (acre inch) 5,445 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LM) 115 115 Nitrogen (lbs.) 26,390 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 136 89 225 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,867 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LM) 5 30 14 49 N Percolation (Kg) 111 
Program Wheat(LH) 90 90 PST Runoff Index 407,800 
PST Percol. Index 1,418 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 Net Returns $97,546 
($96,727) 
LEeA 3-lQ 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LM) 53 53 Water (acre inch) 4,762 
C(HH)-C(HM)-G(LH) 69 69 Nitrogen (lbs.) 23,260 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LL) 21 21 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,147 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LL) 6 56 N Percolation (Kg) 111 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 120 71 191 PST Runoff Index 108,300 
Program Wheat(LH) 67 23 90 PST Percol. Index 1,418 
Net Returns $101,099 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 ($95,352) 
LEPA2-s 
C(HH)-C(HH)-G(LH) 113 113 Water (acre inch) 4,399 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LM) 7 7 Nitrogen (lbs.) 23,590 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LL) 135 135 N03 Runoff (Kg) 1,222 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 120 15 135 N .Percolation (Kg) 111 
Program Wheat(LL) 90 90 PST Runoff Index 105,200 
PST Percol. Index 1,349 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 Net Returns $98,397 
($96,580) 
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The optimal crop mixes under this policy present numerous rotation 
options. However, the dominance of the three cropping systems, peanuts-
cotton-grain sorghum (P-C-G), cotton-cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G), and 
program wheat, is still maintained under most irrigation scenarios. The only 
exception is the 14 acres of continuous cotton which appeared under the High 
4-14 irrigation scenario. In most cases, the reductions in pesticide percolation 
are attained by shifting either the peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum (P-C-G) or the 
cotton-cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G) rotation system from Cobb fine sandy 
loam soil to other soils. Under the LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenario, however, the 
acreage of Cobb fine sandy loam soil allocated to the peanuts-cotton-grain 
sorghum (P-C-G) and the cotton-cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G) rotation system 
remained at the same level since the pesticide percolation limit was already 
attained. Under all irrigation scenarios, the reductions in nitrogen percolation 
are attained mainly by lowering per acre nitrogen applications. The high 
irrigation levels in peanut and cotton production activities are still maintained. 
The resulting total irrigation water use and profit to the farm are not considerably 
different from the corresponding base case results. The total nitrogen 
application levels are significantly lower (well over 10 percent) under all 
irrigation scenarios except the High 3-7 irrigation scenario. Under the High 3-7 
irrigation scenario, the total quantity of nitrogen applied increases by 4.5 
percent even though the per acre nitrogen application level in some of the grain 
sorghum production activities is lowered to the medium level. It appears that 
115 acres of Cobb fine sandy loam soil allocated to the cotton(HH)-cotton{HH)-
grain sorghum{LM) rotation system is responsible for the increase in the total 
quantity of nitrogen application since both the soil and the rotation system 
require relatively a large amount of nitrogen. 
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Under this policy, the dimension of the nonpoint incentive vector is 2x1 
since two types of limits are imposed as the nonpoint standards. The optimum 
nonpoint incentives for the pesticide percolation are {1} $1.37 under the High 4-
14 irrigation scenario; {2} $0.15 under the High 3-7 irrigation scenario; (3) $0.81 
under the LEPA 3-1 O irrigation scenario; and, (4) zero under the LEPA 2-5 
irrigation scenario since the pesticide percolation constraint is not binding 
under this irrigation scenario. The optimum nonpoint incentives for the nitrogen 
percolation standard are (1) $78.84 under the High 4-14 irrigation scenario; {2} 
$5.43 under the High 3-7 irrigation scenario; {3} $41.51 under the LEPA 3-10 
irrigation scenario; and, (4) $16.36 under the LEPA 2-5 scenario. Compared to 
the nonpoint incentives for the corresponding nonpoint standards under the 
previous two policy scenarios, these nonpoint incentives are considerably 
higher under the High 4-14 and LEPA 3-10 irrigation scenarios. These results 
imply the following: (1) additional abatement of pesticide and/or nitrogen 
percolation over the 50 percent level would entail substantial costs to the 
producer because of the double constraints; {2} if either the nonpoint incentives 
or the management practice incentives are employed as pollution control tools, 
then the costs incurred for the producer will increase significantly; {3} the High 
3-7 and the LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenarios have a relative advantage over the 
High 4-14 and the LEPA 3-10 irrigation scenario for reducing both pesticide and 
nitrogen percolation at the same time. The values in parentheses {Table 16) 
represent the reduced profit associated with the two incentive policies. 
Restricting Nitrate Runoff, Nitrogen Percolation, 
Pesticide Runoff, and Pesticide Percolation 
This policy targets all types of agricultural pollutants considered in this 
study: (1) nitrate runoff; (2) nitrogen percolation; {3} the pesticide runoff index; 
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and, (4) the pesticide percolation index. To implement this policy, the maximum 
allowable level of these pollutants is set at 50 percent of those levels estimated 
under the benchmark scenario. A summary of results of this policy is presented 
in Table 17. 
The optimal crop mixes under this policy present the widest set of rotation 
options. Under the High 4-14 irrigation scenario, the nitrogen application level 
in many of the grain sorghum and cotton production activities shifts to the 
medium or low level to abate nitrate runoff and percolation. The irrigation level 
in some peanut and cotton production activities shifts to the low level (dryland 
condition) to abate pesticide runoff and percolation. The appearance of a three-
year rotation system (peanut-wheaVgrain sorghum double cropping-cotton) in 
the optimal farm plan is a notable change. Total irrigation water use and total 
nitrogen applications decrease by 56 percent and 39 percent, respectively. 
Total irrigated acreage decreases by 55 percent. Net returns to the farm 
decrease by 18 percent. 
Under the High 3-7 irrigation scenario, the nitrogen application level in 
part of the grain sorghum and cotton production activities shifts to the medium or 
low level to abate nitrate runoff and percolation. The irrigation level in some 
part of the peanut and cotton production activities also shifts to the low level 
(dryland condition) to abate pesticide runoff and percolation. Total irrigated 
acreage decreases by 58 percent. Compared to the corresponding base case 
result, total irrigation water use decreases by 62 percent. The total quantity of 
nitrogen applied decreases by 34 percent. The reduction in net returns under 
the High 3-7 irrigation scenario is even greater than under the High 4-14 
irrigation scenario: a 23 percent decrease from the corresponding base case 
result. 
Cropping System 
High 4-14 
C(HH)-C(HM)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 
P(HL)-C(HL)-G(LH) 
P(HL)-C(LH)-G(LL) 
P(HL)-C(LM)-G(LL) 
P(LL)-C(LH)-G(LM) 
TABLE 17 
OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER LIMITS ON 
PESTICIDE PERCOLATION, PESTICIDE 
RUNOFF, NITROGEN PERCOLATION, 
AND NITRATE RUNOFF (LIMITED TO 
50% OF BENCHMARK RESULTS) 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total Resource Use 
Effluent Discharges 
Net Returns 
acre 
38 38 Water (acre inch) 2,347 
31 31 Nitrogen (lbs.) 6,350 
10 10 N03 Runoff (Kg) 926 
21 21 N Percolation (Kg) 111 
140 14 PST Runoff Index 171,850 
8 8 PST Percol. Index 742 
120 120 Net Returns $76,335 
P(LL)-W(LL)/G(LL)-C(LM) - 12 12 ($55,276) 
Program Wheat(LH) 100 100 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 
High 3-7 
C(HH)-C(HM)-G(LH) 1 1 Water (acre inch) 2,138 
C(HH)-C(MM)-C(LH) 36 36 Nitrogen (lbs.) 16,040 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LH) 53 53 N03 Runoff (Kg) 926 
P(HL)-C(LH)-G(LM) 150 150 N Percolation (Kg) 109 
P(LL)-C(LH)-G(LM) 120 120 PST Runoff Index 171,850 
P(LL)-C(LH)-G(LL) 20 20 PST Percol. Index 736 
Program Wheat(LH) 29 29 Net Returns $76,557 
Program Wheat(LM) 71 71 ($54,722) 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 
LEeA3-1Q 
C(HH)-C(HM)-G(LH) 2 2 Water (acre inch) 4,768 
C(HM)-C(HM)-G(LH) 88 88 Nitrogen (lbs.) 20,210 
C(HH)-C(LH)-G(LL) 102 102 N03 Runoff (Kg) 926 
C(LH)-C(LH)-G(LL) 18 18 N Percolation (Kg) 111 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 118 113 231 PST Runoff Index 115,800 
P(HL)-C(LH)-G(LL) 26 26 PST Percol. Index 1,418 
P(HL)-C(LM)-G(LL) 11 11 Net Returns $99,470 
Program Wheat(LM) 2 2 ($83,021) 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 
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%of 
Bench-
mark 
Results 
43.5 
60.6 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
26.2 
82.4 
(59.7) 
39.6 
59.5 
50.0 
49.2 
50.0 
26.0 
82.6 
(59.1) 
88.4 
74.9 
50.0 
50.0 
33.7 
50.0 
107.4 
(89.6) 
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TABLE 17 (Continued) 
Cobb Grant Creek Port Total Resource Use %of 
Effluent Discharges Bench-
Cropping System Net Returns mark 
acre Results 
LEPA2-s 
C(HM)-C(HM)-G(LL) 22 22 Water (acre inch) 4,328 80.3 
C(HH)-C(LH)-G(LL) 74 74 Nitrogen (lbs.) 20,230 75.0 
C(HM)-C(LL)-G(LH) 90 90 N03 Runoff (Kg) 926 50.0 
C(HM)-C(LH)-G(LL) 16 16 N Percolation (Kg) 92 41.7 
P(HL)-C(HM)-G(LL) 98 150 248 PST Runoff Index 107,810 31.4 
P(HL)-C(HH)-G(LL) 30 30 PST Percol. Index 1,068 7.7 
Net Returns $96,641 104.3 
($83,326) (90.0) 
Total 120 120 150 90 480 
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Under the LEPA 3-1 O irrigation scenario, the rotation system cotton-
cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G) replaces most program wheat acreage in order to 
meet the nitrate runoff constraint. The nitrogen application level in most grain 
sorghum production activities and some cotton production activities shifts to the 
medium or low level. Consequently, the total quantity of nitrogen applied 
decreases by 24 percent. Although part of the irrigated cotton acreage is 
replaced by dryland cotton acreage, total irrigated acreage remains at the 
maximum level (260 acres) since most dryland wheat acreage is replaced by 
the rotation system cotton-cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G). Consequently, the 
total amount of irrigation water use increases slightly. The reduction in the 
producer's income is not as significant as under the preceding two irrigation 
scenario: a 3.5 percent decrease from the corresponding base case result. 
Further, net returns are still 7 percent higher than the benchmark result. 
Under the LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenario, the optimum farm plan consists 
of two rotation systems: the peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum (P-C-G) rotation 
(56%) and the cotton-cotton-grain sorghum (C-C-G) rotation (44%). The 
nitrogen application level of most grain sorghum production activities and many 
cotton production activities in these rotation systems is the medium or low level. 
Consequently, the total quantity of nitrogen applied decreases by 24 percent 
from the corresponding base case result. The irrigation level in all peanut 
production activities and most cotton production activities is maintained at the 
high level and total irrigated acreage remains at the maximum level (260 acres). 
The resulting total amount of irrigation water use is slightly lower than the 
corresponding base case result. The producer's income is reduced 2.8 percent 
from the corresponding base case result, but is still 4 percent higher than the 
benchmark result. 
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Not all of the constraints which impose limits on the amounts of the four 
types of pollutants are binding. Under the High 4-14 irrigation scenario, binding 
constraints include the nitrate runoff constraint ($9.54), the nitrogen percolation 
constraint ($18.81 ), and the pesticide runoff constraint ($0.059). Monetary 
values in parentheses represent the shadow prices (nonpoint incentives) of the 
respective constraints (nonpoint standards). Under the High 3-7 irrigation 
scenario, the nitrate runoff constraint ($10.03) and the pesticide runoff constraint 
($0.073) are binding. Under the LEPA 3-1 O irrigation scenario, the nitrate runoff 
constraint ($14,27), nitrogen percolation constraint ($26.25), and pesticide 
percolation constraint ($0.229) are binding. Under the LEPA 2-5 irrigation 
scenario, only the nitrogen runoff constraint ($14.38) is binding. If these 
shadow prices are charged to each unit of pollutants as either nonpoint 
incentives or management practice incentives, substantial income losses will be 
incurred to the producer. The values in the parentheses (Table 17) show those 
reduced net returns to the farm. 
Interpretation of the shadow prices estimated under this policy is tedious 
and unrewarding since four constraints are imposed at the same time. 
However, comparison of shadow prices under this policy scenario with those 
under the preceding three policy scenarios (Table 18) provides additional 
insight. First, High 3-7 is the best irrigation scenario for abating nitrogen 
percolation, given the quantity of nitrogen applied. This interpretation is drawn 
from (1) the least profit loss ($89) under policy scenario I; (2) the lowest shadow 
price ($5.43) for the nitrogen percolation constraint under policy scenarios I and 
II; and (3) the zero shadow price for the nitrogen percolation constraint under 
the policy scenario IV. Second, the most efficient irrigation scenario for abating 
pesticide percolation is LEPA 2-5. The zero shadow price for the pesticide 
percolation constraint under policy scenarios II, Ill, and IV support this 
Scenario 
(Target) 
TABLE18 
COMPARISON OF SHADOW PRICES OBTAINED 
UNDER VARIOUS POLLUTION CONTROL 
MEASURES 
Pollutant 
N 
Percol. 
(PRKN) 
PST 
Runoff 
(Is) 
PST 
Percol. 
(lg) 
I. Nitrogen Percolation (PRKN) 
High 4-14 
High 3-7 
LEPA 3-10 
LEPA 2-5 
II. Pesticide Percolation (lg) 
High 4-14 
High 3-7 
LEPA 3-10 
LEPA 2-5 
$29.08 
5.43 
21.26 
16.36 . 
$0.007 
0.140 
0.021 
Ill. Nitrogen Percolation (PRKN) and. Pesticide Percolation (lg) 
Hi 4-14 
Hi 3-7 
LEPA 3-10 
LEPA 2-5 
$78.84 
5.43 
41.51 
16.36 
$1.371 
0.153 
0.806 
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Profit 
Loss 
$1,248 
89 
778 
823 
$11 
100 
36 
$3,002 
198 
1,662 
824 
IV. Nitrate Runoff (YN03), Nitrogen Percolation (PRKN), Pesticide Runoff (18), 
and Pesticide Percolation (lg) 
Hi 4-14 
Hi 3-7 
LEPA 3-10 
LEPA 2-5 
$9.54 
10.32 
14.27 
14.38 
$18.81 
26.25 
$0.059 
0.073 
0.229 
$16,298 
21,187 
3,291 
2,579 
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interpretation. Third, the two LEPA irrigation scenarios are more efficient than 
the two High irrigation scenarios in abating pesticide runoff. The zero shadow 
price for the respective pesticide runoff constraints support this interpretation. 
Fourth, LEPA 2-5 is the most efficient irrigation scenario for abating all types of 
pollutants at the same time. This interpretation is drawn from the least profit loss 
($2,579) and the zero shadow prices for the nitrogen percolation constraint, the 
pesticide runoff constraint, and the pesticide percolation constraint. 
In summary, stricter water quality goals can be attained by changing 
management practices from high per acre input use levels to lower per acre 
input use levels without major changes in overall cropping systems. Under the 
two high pressure center pivot irrigation scenarios, however, more than half of 
the irrigated acreage is converted to dryland production. Under-utilization of 
agricultural inputs, such as nitrogen fertilizer and irrigation water, entails 
substantial profit losses. Contrarily, under the two LEPA irrigation scenarios, 
neither the irrigated acreage nor the total amount of irrigation water use 
decreases in order to satisfy the nonpoint standard since the LEPA technology 
is much more efficient in irrigation water applications than the high pressure 
center pivot technology. Consequently, profit losses are small under the LEPA 
irrigation scenarios even for strict nonpoint standards. 
Implications of Results and Recommendations 
The results obtained under the various policy scenarios provide a 
number of implications for agricultural pollution control. An overall summary of 
results and the implications that are drawn from the results of preceding 
analyses are described in this section. 
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Summary of Results 
1. Pesticide runoff and percolation are caused mainly by the irrigated 
peanut and irrigated cotton production activities. Nitrate runoff is caused mainly 
the irrigated cotton production activities. Nitrogen percolation is caused mainly 
\ 
by grain sorghum and cotton production activities. 
2. Cobb fine sandy loam soil, which has the lowest organic carbon 
content and the highest sand content, is extremely vulnerable to pesticide 
percolation, whether or not it is irrigated. Other soils do not have high pesticide 
percolation potential. Under the dryland condition, other soils analyzed have 
very small pesticide percolation potential, regardless of crops grown in those 
soils. 
3. Abatement of nitrogen percolation or pesticide percolation to a certain 
extent can be attained just by changing irrigation schemes. 
4. The LEPA irrigation technology is more profitable than the high 
pressure center pivot technology, even including the costs for converting the 
system from a high pressure center pivot system to a LEPA system. This 
superiority in profitability is maintained under most pollution control policy 
scenarios considered in this study. 
4. An 100 percent tax imposed on agricultural inputs, including nitrogen 
fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation water, are not much effective in reducing 
water pollution. Extremely high tax rates could induce reductions in effluent 
discharge levels. However, a policy option imposing extremely high input tax 
rates would be resisted by affected farmers, and probably is not viable. 
5. Policy options restricting per acre or total nitrogen applications are 
effective in reducing nitrate runoff and nitrogen percolation. However, they 
144 
entail a substantial profit loss. Furthermore, these policies do not necessarily 
reduce pesticide runoff and percolation. 
6. The policy restricting the total irrigation water use can reduce most 
types of agricultural pollutants, but with substantial profit losses. A large 
proportion of irrigated acreage shifts to the dryland production under this policy. 
7. A 50 percent abatement of nitrogen percolation and/or pesticide 
percolation is possible with relatively little profit losses under all irrigation 
scenarios. In general, shifts in cropping systems across soils or small 
reductions in per acre nitrogen application levels are sufficient to attain the 50 
percent abatement of nitrogen percolation and/or pesticide percolation. When 
all types of pollutants are targeted, however, substantial profit losses are 
incurred under the two high pressure center pivot irrigation scenarios. On the 
other hand, the two LEPA irrigation scenarios can still attain a 50 percent 
reduction in all types of pollutants with relatively little profit losses. 
8. Four efficient pollution control policies, including nonpoint standards, 
nonpoint incentives, management practice standards, and management 
practice incentives, are tested under several policy scenarios which target 50 
percent abatement of some or all types of pollutants. Standards and incentives 
result in same crop mix and pollution levels, but incentives entail additional 
profit losses. Since the optimum incentives are determined at the margin for 
each irrigation scenario, the additional losses in profit resulting from the 
incentives sometimes changes the order of profitability among the four different 
irrigation scenarios. 
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lmpHcatjons of Results 
1. Each soil has a different potential for creating and/or abating various 
types of agricultural pollutants. Thus, agricultural pollution control policies 
should have soil-specific characteristics in order to address the agricultural 
nonpoint pollution problem effectively. Here, soil characteristics include 
chemical, physical, and topographical properties. 
2. Because relatively small changes in the crop mix across soils, or 
reductions in per acre input use, can achieve substantial pollution abatement 
with relatively little cost, changes in crop mixes across soils should be 
considered for voluntary adoption. These crop management practices could be 
considered as best management practices {BMPs). Examples are (1) 
encouraging Cobb fine sandy loam soil be planted to crops other than peanuts 
or cotton; (2) rotating peanuts and cotton with other crops more intensively; (3) 
shifting irrigated acreage from highly percolating soils to less percolating soils; 
(4) changing irrigation strategy in accordance with soil properties; (5) converting 
to irrigation systems with high application efficiency; and, (6) reducing per acre 
nitrogen applications. Incentives could be employed, if needed, such as linking 
these shifts to eligibility conditions for farm program participation or for peanut 
quota endowments. 
3. Input tax policies, including excise taxes on nitrogen fertilizer, 
pesticides, or water, should probably be avoided since the effectiveness of 
these policies is questionable. Among the four efficient pollution control 
policies, nonpoint incentives or management practice incentives should 
probably be avoided if there is no urgent need of imposing taxes on effluent 
discharges within the acceptable water quality standards. 
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4. A policy which focuses on a single type of pollutant may not reduce 
agricultural pollution as a whole, and may actually exacerbate other pollution 
problems. Thus, all types of agricultural pollutants should be considered 
simultaneously when an agricultural pollution control policy is established. 
5. A model which connects biophysical processes and farmers' 
optimizing behavior is quite useful in the evaluation of agricultural pollution 
control policies, while the process of acquiring data for model construction is 
tedious and time consuming. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Agricultural production processes generate pollution, such as pesticide 
and nutrient residuals, which may contaminate both ground water and surface 
water. In recent years, public concern over possible adverse effects of water 
pollution on both human health and the environment has been growing. 
Historical policy prescriptions for improving water quality have focussed 
primarily on voluntary adoption of recommended crop management practices. 
But they have not been generally effective in attaining required water quality 
standards. Agricultural pollution control measures imposing regulations or 
economic incentives that motivate farmers to make necessary changes for 
attaining reasonable water quality standards may be needed. It is important to 
examine regulations and/or economic incentives that may reduce or eliminate 
agricultural pollution. This study provides insight into the effectiveness of 
alternative methods of achieving water quality objectives, as well as the 
associated costs. 
Objectives and Procedures 
The main objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness and 
distributional effects of pollution control policy alternatives for a Caddo County 
farm situation. The specific objectives are (1) to identify alternative crop 
management practices involving various rotation systems, input use levels, and 
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irrigation technologies available to farm operators in the study area; (2) to 
simulate crop yields and the magnitude of agricultural pollutants generated from 
alternative farm management practices; (3) to develop a modeling framework 
that will determine sets of production activities which maximize net returns, 
subject to both resource, environmental, and policy constraints; and, (4) to 
analyze both economic and water quality consequences of alternative 
agricultural pollution control policy measures. 
The analytical framework utilized in this study is composed of two parts: 
a biophysical simulation model and a mathematical programming model. 
Formulating the analytical framework requires an accurate representation of the 
production environment, crop yield responses to alternative crop management 
practices, cost and returns estimates, and determination of the amount of 
pollution generated by the agricultural production process. A representative 
farm and the typical crop management practices were identified using 
combinations of published data available from various sources and interviews 
with the County Agricultural Extension Agent. To simulate crop growth and the 
magnitude of agricultural pollutants, EPIC-PST was used. EPIC-PST is able to 
simulate the effects of alternative crop management practices on crop yields 
and nutrient/pesticide losses by surface runoff, sediment movement, and 
leaching below the crop root zone. The mathematical programming model is 
utilized to predict optimum production decisions and economic and 
environmental consequences under alternative pollution control policies. 
Nine pollution control policy alternatives are analyzed utilizing the 
mathematical programming model. The first imposes an 100 percent excise tax 
on nitrogen fertilizer and pesticides. The second limits the total quantity of 
nitrogen applications to 50 percent of the benchmark result. The third restricts 
per acre nitrogen application to the low level (see Chapter Ill for a detailed 
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description). The fourth imposes a tax on irrigation water use which is equal to 
100 percent of the variable cost for applying an acre inch of irrigation water 
using a high pressure center pivot system. The fifth restricts the total amount of 
irrigation water use to 50 percent of the benchmark result. Four additional 
policies explained below are intended to achieve a specific set of water quality 
standards. The sixth intends to attain a 50 percent reduction in pesticide 
percolation from the benchmark result. The seventh aims to attain a 50 percent 
reduction in nitrogen percolation from the benchmark result. The eighth intends 
to achieve a 50 percent reduction in both pesticide percolation and nitrogen 
percolation from the corresponding benchmark results. The last intends to 
attain a 50 percent abatement of nitrate runoff, nitrogen percolation, pesticide 
runoff, and pesticide percolation from the corresponding benchmark results. 
Four alternative irrigation scenarios are tested under each policy. Two 
irrigation technologies (high pressure center pivot and LEPA irrigation), and 
four irrigation management strategies are combined to formulate four irrigation 
scenarios: (1) a high pressure center pivot system with the maximum single 
irrigation volume of 4 acre inches and the minimum irrigation interval of 14 days 
(High 4-14) ; (2) a high pressure center pivot system with the maximum single 
irrigation volume of 3 acre inches and the minimum irrigation interval of 7 days 
(High 3-7); (3) a LEPA irrigation system with the maximum single irrigation 
volume of 3 acre inches and the minimum irrigation interval of 1 O days (LEPA 3-
1 O); and, (4) a LEPA irrigation system with the maximum single irrigation 
volume of 2 acre inches and the minimum irrigation interval of 5 days (LEPA 2-
5). To simulate the four irrigation scenarios, four separate EPIC-PST simulation 
runs were conducted with three different sets of parameters that determine (1) 
the efficiency of irrigation; (2) the minimum application interval; and (3) the 
maximum volume allowed for single irrigations. If the plant water stress factor 
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reaches a certain level after the specified minimum application interval, EPIC-
PST triggers an irrigation automatically. 
EPIC-PST simulation results associated with each irrigation scenario and 
policy parameters associated with individual pollution control policy scenarios 
were combined to formulate a separate mathematical program. Results 
obtained under the High 4-14 irrigation scenario in the absence of control policy 
measures were referred to as benchmark results. Results obtained under other 
irrigation scenarios in the absence of control policies were referred to as base 
case results. In evaluating individual policy options, results obtained under 
individual policy/irrigation scenarios were compared with the benchmark results 
or the base case results. 
Results and Conclusions 
Results for the Unrestricted Case 
Under the High 4-14 scenario, the producer plants 24 percent 
of the total acreage in a cotton-cotton-grain sorghum rotation, 57 percent in a 
peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum rotation, and 19 percent in program wheat. Both 
cotton and peanuts are grown under the high irrigation level, while grain 
sorghum is grown under dryland conditions. Peanuts are grown with the low 
nitrogen level, while cotton and program wheat are grown with the high nitrogen 
level. Per acre irrigation applications average 20. 7 acre inches. Per acre 
nitrogen applications average 56.2 pounds. Per acre nitrate loss with runoff 
and nitrogen loss with percolation are 8.5 pounds and 1.0 pound per acre, 
respectively. The pesticide runoff and percolation indices indicate that 
substantial amounts of pesticides are lost. The toxicity of pesticides lost with 
runoff, for example, is about the same as the toxicity of 31 pounds of Treflan 
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active ingredient. The degree of health hazard caused by pesticides lost with 
percolation is equivalent to approximately 5 ounces of Treflan active ingredient. 
Per acre net returns average $193. 
Under other irrigation scenarios, the optimum crop mix is almost identical 
with the benchmark result. However, the crop mix across soils is somewhat 
different. Under the High 3-7 irritation scenario, per acre irrigation applications 
increase by 1.1 percent. Per acre nitrogen applications decrease by 6. 7 
percent. Compared to the High 4-14 irrigation scenario, this irrigation scenario 
produces (1) about the same amount of nitrate runoff; (2) less amount of 
nitrogen percolation; (3) more amount of pesticide runoff; and, (4) less amount 
of pesticide percolation, given individual crop/input use level combinations. 
Nitrate runoff and nitrogen percolation decrease by 2.5 percent and 38 percent, 
respectively. Pesticide runoff increases by 21 percent, while pesticide 
percolation decreases by 25 percent. Per acre net returns increase 5.5 by 
percent. 
Under the LEPA 3-10 scenario, per acre irrigation applications decrease 
by 13 percent. Per acre nitrogen applications increase by 0. 7 percent. 
Compared to the High 4-14 irrigation scenario, this irrigation scenario produces 
(1) less nitrate runoff; (2) less nitrogen percolation; (3) less pesticide runoff; and, 
(4) more pesticide percolation, given individual crop/input use level 
combinations. Nitrate runoff decreased by 31 percent. Despite the LEPA 3-10 
scenario uses about the same quantity of nitrogen fertilizer, nitrogen percolation 
. . 
decreased by 13 percent since the entire Cobb fine sandy loam soil, which 
produces a relatively small amount of nitrogen percolation, is planted to the 
rotation system cotton{HH)-cotton{HH)-grain sorghum{LH) which produces a 
relatively large amount of nitrogen percolation. Pesticide runoff decreases by 
152 
69 percent, while pesticide percolation increases by 1 O percent. Per acre net 
returns increase by 10.9 percent. 
Under the LEPA 2-5 scenario, per acre irrigation applications decrease 
by 18 percent. Per acre nitrogen applications decrease by 1 percent. 
Compared to the High 4-14 irrigation scenario, this irrigation scenario produces 
(1) less nitrate runoff; (2) about the same amount of nitrogen percolation; (3) 
less pesticide runoff; and, (4) less pesticide percolation, given individual 
crop/input use level combinations. Nitrate runoff decreased by 25 percent. 
Despite the LEPA 2-5 scenario uses about the same amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer, nitrogen percolation increases by 6 percent mainly due to the 84 acres 
of Grant loam soil shifted from wheat production to a three-year rotation system 
peanuts(HL)-cotton(HH)-grain sorghum(LH). Pesticide runoff and percolation 
decrease by 69 percent and 52 percent, respectively. Per acre net returns 
increase by 7.1 percent. 
Excise Jax on Nitrogen Fertilizer and Pesticides 
Under all irrigation scenario, neither optimum crop mixes nor effluent 
discharge levels are affected much since the differences in profitability among 
activities reflected in the mode are relatively uniform even with the 100 percent 
excise tax imposed on nitrogen fertilizer and pesticides. The only major 
changes are large reductions in net returns. Compared to the corresponding 
base case results, reductions in net returns are about 36 percent under all 
irrigation scenarios. The dominance of the LEPA scenarios in profitability over 
the High scenarios is still maintained. 
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Restricting Total Nitrogen Use 
The 50 percent reduction in the total quantity of nitrogen applied is met 
by lowering the nitrogen application level and by idling 19 to 22 percent of total 
acres. Program wheat is not part of the optimum farm plan. Per acre nitrogen 
applications in all dryland production (grain sorghum) are reduced to the low 
level. Nitrogen applications for all irrigated crops (peanuts and cotton) are 
reduced to the medium or low level. Consequently, compared to the 
benchmark results, nitrate runoff decreased by from 40 to 62 percent. Nitrogen 
percolation decreased by from 40 to 58 percent, depending upon the irrigation 
scenario. Reductions in pesticide runoff and percolation also were achieved 
mainly by removing most Cobb fine sandy loam soil from production. 
Compared to the base case results, reductions in net returns range from 11 to 
12 percent depending on the irrigation scenario. The dominance of the LEPA 
scenarios in profitability over the High scenarios is still maintained. 
Restricting Per Acre Nitrogen Use 
Although production activities only with the low nitrogen level were 
allowed to be part of the optimum farm plan, regardless of the irrigation level, 
optimum crop mixes are almost the same as the benchmark results. The total 
quantity of nitrogen applied is approximately 60 percent of the benchmark result 
under all irrigation scenarios. Compared to the corresponding benchmark 
results, nitrate runoff decreased by 37 to 54 percent, and nitrogen percolation 
decreased by 53 to 58 percent, depending upon the irrigation scenario. 
Reductions in pesticide runoff and percolation also are achieved mainly by 
shifting a large part of Cobb fine sandy loam soil from a cotton-cotton-grain 
sorghum rotation or a peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum rotation to program wheat. 
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Compared to the base case results, reductions in net returns range from 10 to 
11 percent depending on the irrigation scenario. The dominance of the LEPA 
scenarios in profitability over the High scenarios is still maintained. 
Jax on Irrigation Water use 
Because the differences in profitability among activities in the model are 
relatively uniform even with the tax, which is 100 percent of the variable cost of 
high pressure center pivot irrigation, this policy option has little impact on 
optimal production decisions or on the quantity of irrigation water use. Optimal 
crop mixes under the High 4-14, LEPA 3-10, and LEPA 2-5 are identical with 
base case results. Under the High 3-7 scenario, some shifts in cropping 
systems across soils occur while changes in the optimum crop mix are not 
notable. Compared to the corresponding base case results, nitrogen runoff 
decreases by 34 percent. Little change occurs in runoff or percolation of other 
pollutants. Compared to the base case results, the reductions in net returns due 
to the irrigation tax range from 13 to 16 percent depending on the irrigation 
scenario. The dominance of the LEPA scenarios in profitability over the High 
scenarios is more evident since the LEPA system requires less water. 
Restricting Total Irrigation Water Use 
Under all irrigation scenarios, the 50 percent reduction in the total 
irrigation water use is met mainly by changing a large part of the intensively 
irrigated cotton production activities to dryland production. Irrigated acres 
decrease by (1) 48 percent under the High 4-14 scenario; (2) 47 percent under 
the High 3-7 scenario; (3) 40 percent under the LEPA 3-1 O scenario; and, (4) 35 
percent under the LEPA 2-5 scenario. The high nitrogen application levels are 
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maintained in all cotton and grain sorghum production activities. Most types of 
pollutants decrease significantly. Compared to the corresponding base case 
results, net returns decrease by (1) 14percent under the High 4-14 scenario; (2) 
18 percent under the High 3-7 scenario; (4) 16 percent under the LEPA 3-1 O 
scenario; and (4) 13 percent under the LEPA 2-5 scenario. 
Restricting Pesticide Percolation 
In general, the 50 percent reduction in pesticide percolation is attained 
by shifting part of the crop rotation systems that generate relatively large amount 
of pesticide percolation (peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum and cotton-cotton-grain 
sorghum} from Cobb fine sandy loam soil to Grant loam soil. Under the LEPA 2-
5 irrigation scenario, the pesticide percolation limit is met even in the base case. 
The reductions in pesticide runoff vary depending upon the irrigation scenario. 
Under every irrigation scenario except LEPA 2-5, both nitrate runoff and 
nitrogen percolation increase due to the shift of peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum 
and cotton-cotton-grain sorghum crop rotation systems from Cobb fine sandy 
loam soil to Grant loam soil. Little changes occur in the total quantity of nitrogen 
applied and the total amount of irrigation water pumped. Decreases in net 
returns are trivial under all irrigation scenarios. 
Restricting Nitrogen Percolation 
In general, the 50 percent reduction in nitrogen percolation is met mainly 
by lowering the nitrogen application level in most grain sorghum production 
activities to the medium or low level. Consequently, the total quantity of 
nitrogen applied decreases by 2 to 14 percent depending on the irrigation 
scenario and the amount of nitrate in runoff and percolation decreases. 
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However, there is a 48 percent increase in pesticide percolation under the High 
4-14 scenario. The 103 acres of the peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum rotation on 
Cobb fine sandy loam soil appear to be responsible for the increase in pesticide 
percolation. This result suggests that a policy which focuses on a single type of 
pollutant may not reduce agricultural pollution as a whole, and may actually 
exacerbate other pollution problems. Compared to the base case results, the 
reductions in net returns are less than 2 percent. 
Restricting Both Pesticide and Nitrogen Percolation 
Optimum crop mixes under this policy contain many crop rotations. 
However, the dominance of the two crop rotation systems (peanuts-cotton-grain 
sorghum and cotton-cotton-grain sorghum) and program wheat acres is still 
maintained. In general, the pesticide percolation limit is met mainly by 
removing the peanuts-cotton-grain sorghum or cotton-cotton-grain sorghum 
rotation systems from Cobb fine sandy loam soil. The nitrogen percolation limit 
is met by lowering the nitrogen application level in most cotton and grain 
sorghum production activities from the high level to the medium or low level. 
The irrigation level in all peanut and cotton production activities remains at the 
high level. The resulting changes in nitrate runoff and pesticide runoff are small 
and variable, sometimes increasing a little, and sometimes decreasing a little. 
Compared to the base case results, the reductions in net returns are less than 4 
percent under every irrigation scenario. 
Restricting All Types of Pollutants 
This policy targets all types of agricultural pollutants considered in this 
study: nitrate runoff, nitrogen percolation, pesticide runoff, and pesticide 
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percolation. The optimum crop mixes under this policy contain the largest set of 
crop rotations. The four limits are met by lowering the irrigation level or the 
nitrogen application level in some peanut and cotton production activities. The 
reductions in irrigated acres were 55 percent under High 4-14 and 58 percent 
under High 3-7. Irrigated acres under the two LEPA scenarios remained at the 
same level. Compared to the base case results, the reductions in net returns 
are (1) 18 percent under High 4-14; (2) 17 percent under High 3-7; (3) 4 percent 
under LEPA 3-1 O; and, (4) 3 percent under LEPA 2-5 irrigation scenario. 
Nevertheless, net returns for LEPA 3-10 and LEPA 2-5 are still 7 percent and 4 
percent higher than the benchmark result, respectively. This result indicates 
that the LEPA irrigation scenarios are more profitable and environmentally 
sound than the High irrigation scenarios. 
Policy Implications 
Similar production practices on different soils will produce different levels 
of agricultural pollution. Thus, agricultural pollution control policies should 
perhaps be soil-specific to address the agricultural pollution problem effectively. 
Relatively small changes in crop mix across soils, or the reductions in per acre 
input use, can achieve substantial pollution abatement with relatively little cost. 
Thus, changes in crop mix across soils might be encouraged as part of the 
approach to reducing agricultural pollution. These crop management practices 
could be considered best management practices (BMPs). Examples based on 
this study are (1) removing peanut and cotton production from Cobb fine sandy 
loam soil {and soils with similar properties); (2) shifting irrigation from soils with 
high percolation potential to soils less likely to produce percolation; (3) reducing 
per acre nitrogen applications; and, (4) rotating peanuts and cotton with other 
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crops more intensively. If voluntary adoption of these practices was 
unsuccessful, eligibility conditions for farm program participation or for peanut 
quota acquisition could be tied to environmentally-enhancing practices. 
In this analysis, abatement of pesticide percolation could be attained by 
adopting more frequent, lower volume irrigation practices. In addition, the LEPA 
irrigation scenarios were more profitable and efficient in reducing overall water 
pollution than the High irrigation scenarios. Nevertheless, high pressure center 
pivot systems are used much more widely than LEPA irrigation systems in the 
study area. Extending education programs on the advantages of LEPA 
irrigation over high pressure center pivot systems, or cost-sharing programs for 
converting other irrigation systems to LEPA systems, would also reduce runoff 
and percolation losses of agricultural pollutants. 
Input tax policies, including excise taxes on nitrogen fertilizer and 
pesticides, or a tax on irrigation water, may not be effective in achieving water 
quality objectives unless tax rates are extremely high. In this analysis, 
producers' income were reduced substantially under input tax policies. In 
addition, nonpoint incentives and management practice incentives impose 
additional costs on the producer who complies with certain nonpoint standards. 
Nonpoint incentives and management practice incentives are probably 
politically unacceptable. 
A pollution control policy which focuses on just a single type of pollutant 
will not reduce agricultural pollution as a whole, and may actually exacerbate 
other pollution problems. Thus, all types of agricultural pollutants should be 
considered simultaneously when an agricultural pollution control policy is 
established. 
This study suggests that an analytical model which connects biophysical 
processes and farmers' optimizing behavior may be useful in evaluating 
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agricultural pollution control policies. Furthermore, management practice 
standards identified in this study might be encouraged as best management 
practices designed to achieve certain nonpoint pollution standards. 
Limitations and Need for Further Research 
This research has several limitations that should be addressed. First, the 
dates for various crop management practices, including tillage, fertilizer 
applications, planting, and pesticide applications, were fixed from year to year 
in the multi-year (28 years) simulation. In fact, the dates of individual crop 
management practices may change year by year in accordance with weather 
conditions or other factors. Also the dates and types of pesticide applications 
may change since crop pests vary from year to year. 
Second, the location of the representative farm relative to the watershed 
was not considered, nor was the volume of ground water in the underlying 
aquifer. In addition, the estimated amount of each pollutant moved in runoff and 
percolation through the soil profile does not necessarily indicate that the 
pollutant left the watershed or reached the aquifer. 
Third, in the mathematical programming model, it was assumed that 
irrigated production was limited to 260 acres, put freely among the four soils on 
the farm. This assumption provided the model more flexibility in choosing soils 
to be irrigated in order to comply with certain water quality standards. This 
flexibility may have exaggerated the ability of the farmer to comply with certain 
water quality standards or incentive policies. 
This study was confined to a farm-level analysis. A farm-level analysis 
may have certain limitations in representing water pollution problems in an area 
or region. A regional model or a model which incorporates multiple farms with 
different soil characteristics would likely provide different insight into the 
problem. 
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Biophysical simulation models play an important role in identifying 
optimal solutions to agricultural pollution problems. A more detailed and 
sophisticated model which is capable of simulating the crop-pest interaction 
process together with other biophysical processes might provide more detailed 
information for solving pesticide pollution problems. 
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TABLE19 
SOIL PROFILE CHARACTERIZATION DATA 
FOR COBB FINE SANDY LOAM 
Depth from the Surface to the Bottom of the Soil Layer (m) 
0.010 0.203 
Bulk Density (t/m3) 
1.40 1.40 
Wilting Point (m/m) 
0.081 0.081 
Field Capacity (m/m) 
0.224 0.224 
Sand Content (%) 
67.9 67.9 
Silt Content (%) 
20.1 
Soil pH 
6.7 
20.1 
6.7 
Organic Carbon(%) 
0.44 0.44 
0.762 1.524 
1.57 1.25 
0.183 0.010 
0.296 0.106 
54.5 100.0 
17.0 
7.3 7.3 
0.05 0.05 
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Source: USDA-SCS National Soil Survey Laboratory. 1990. Soil Parameter 
Preparation Program for the GLEAMS ModeL Lincoln, NE. 
TABLE 20 
SOIL PROFILE CHARACTERIZATION DATA 
FOR GRANT LOAM 
Depth from the Surface to the Bottom of the Soil Layer (m) 
0.01 0.15 0.20 0.41 0.56 0.81 1.07 1.27 
Bulk Density (t/m3) 
1.40 1.14 1040 1.40 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 
Wilting Point (m/m). 
0.106 0.106 0.106 0.130 0.135 0.143 0.153 0.152 
Field Capacity (rn/m) 
0.227 0.227 0.227 0.252 0.224 0.232 0.254 0.257 
Sand Content (%) 
21.8 21.8 21.8 18.0 19.6 21.2 37.2 35.2 
Silt Content (%) 
64.8 64.8 64.8 62.8 58.1 54.7 37.5 35.2 
Soil pH 
6.0 6.0 6.0 7.3 7.6 7.6 7.3 7.2 
Organic Carbon(%) 
0.89 0.89 0.89 0.64 0.55 0.48 0.35 0.31 
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1.63 2.00 
1.55 1.55 
0.159 0.140 
0.255 0.255 
41.5 39.0 
41.5 39.0 
7.3 7.0 
0.30 0.10 
Source: USDA-SCS National Soil Survey Laboratory. 1990. SQil earamatar 
ewgamtiQD e[Qg[a[D fQ[ tba GLl;AMS MQC~I- Lincoln, NE. 
TABLE 21 
SOIL PROFILE CHARACTERIZATION DATA 
FOR POND CREEK FINE SANDY LOAM 
Depth from the Surface to the Bottom of the Soil Layer (m) 
0.010 0.305 1. 727 
Bulk Density {tfm3) 
1 .450 1 .450 1 .550 
Wilting Point (m/m) 
0.105 0.105 0.191 
Field Capacity (m/m) 
0.252 0.252 0.310 
Sand Content (%) 
63.0 63.0 
Silt Content (%) 
23.0 
Soil pH 
6.2 
23.0 
6.2 
Organic Carbon (%) 
1.16 1.16 
36.5 
36.0 
7.3 
0.15 
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Source: USDA-SGS National Soil Survey Laboratory. 1990. Soil Parameter 
Preparation Program for the GLEAMS ModeL Lincoln, NE. 
TABLE 22 
SOIL PROFILE CHARACTERIZATION DATA 
FOR PORT SILT LOAM 
Depth from the Surface to the Bottom of the Soil Layer {m} 
0.010 0.690 1.830 
Bulk Density {t/ms} 
1 .410 10410 1 .560 
Wilting Point {m/m} -
0.120 0.120 0.180 
Field Capacity {m/m} 
0.320 0.320 0.320 
Sand Content {%} 
16.9 16.9 
Silt Content {%} 
65.0 
Soil pH 
6.7 
65.0 
6.7 
Organic Carbon{%} 
1.18 1.18 
36.5 
36.0 
7.3 
0.39 
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Source: USDA-SCS National Soil Survey Laboratory. 1990. Soil Parameter 
Preparation Program for the GLEAMS Mode!. Lincoln, NE. 
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TABLE 23 
FIELD OPERATIONS FOR PEANUT PRODUCTION 
Production Activities 
Tillage 
Tillage 
Weed Control 
Fertilization 
Tillage 
Tillage 
Disease Control 
Tillage 
Planting 
Insect Control 
Cultivation 
Disease Control 
Disease Control 
Cultivation 
Disease Control 
Disease Control 
Disease Control 
Disease Control 
Harvest 
Date i 
March 
March 
March 
April 
April 
April· 
May 
May 
May 
June 
June 
June 
July 
July 
July 
July 
August 
August 
October 
Implements 
Moldboard Plow 
Offset Disk 
Sprayer 
Fertilizer Spreader 
Tandem Disk 
Tandem Disk 
Band Applicator 
Springtooth 
Peanut Planter 
Sprayer 
Row Cultivator 
Custom Airplane 
Sprayer 
Row Cultivator 
Custom Airplane 
Sprayer 
Custom Airplane 
Custom Airplane 
Shaker-digger, Peanut Combine 
TABLE 24 
FIELD OPERATIONS FOR IRRIGATED GRAIN 
SORGHUM PRODUCTION 
Production Activities Date Implements 
Tillage 
Tillage 
Tillage 
Fertilization 
Tillage 
N Application 
Planting 
Weed Control 
Insect Control 
Cultivation 
Insect Control 
Harvest 
March 
March 
'April 
April 
April 
April 
May 
May 
July 
July 
August 
September 
TABLE 25 
Sweep/Chisel 
Sweep/Chisel 
Offset Disk 
Fertilizer Spreader 
Springtooth 
Anhydrous Applicator 
Planter 
Sprayer 
Sprayer 
Row Cultivator 
Sprayer 
Grain Combine 
FIELD OPERATIONS FOR DRYLAND GRAIN 
SORGHUM PRODUCTION 
Production Activities Date Implements 
Tillage 
Tillage 
Fertilization 
Tillage 
N Application 
Planting 
Weed Control 
Insect Control 
Cultivation 
Insect Control 
Harvest 
March 
April 
April 
April 
April 
May 
May 
July 
July 
August 
September 
Sweep/Chisel 
Offset Disk 
Fertilizer Spreader 
Springtooth 
Anhydrous Applicator 
Planter 
Sprayer 
Sprayer 
Row Cultivator 
Sprayer 
Grain Combine 
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Production Activities 
Stalk Destruction 
Tillage 
Tillage 
Tillage 
Fertilization 
Weed Control 
Tillage 
Disease Control 
Tillage 
Planting 
Cultivation 
Insect Control 
Cultivation 
Insect Control 
Cultivation 
Insect Control 
Insect Control 
Harvest 
TABLE 26 
FIELD OPERATIONS FOR IRRIGATED 
COTION PRODUCTION 
Date 
January 
February 
February 
March 
March 
April 
April 
May 
May 
May 
June 
July 
July 
August 
August 
August 
September 
November 
Implements 
Rotary Mower 
Moldboard Plow 
Sweep/Chisel 
Offset Disk 
Fertilizer Spreader 
Sprayer 
Offset Disk 
Band Applicator 
Springtooth 
Planter 
Row Cultivator 
Custom Airplane 
Row Cultivator 
Custom Airplane 
Row Cultivator 
Custom Airplane 
Custom Airplane 
Cotton Stripper 
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Production Activities 
Stalk Destruction 
Tillage 
Tillage 
Fertilization 
Weed Control 
Tillage 
Disease Control 
Tillage 
Planting 
Insect Control 
Cultivation 
Insect Control 
Insect Control 
Insect Control 
Harvest 
TABLE 27 
FIELD OPERATIONS FOR DRYLAND 
COTTON PRODUCTION 
Date 
January 
February 
March 
March 
April 
April 
May 
May 
May 
July 
July 
August 
August 
September 
November 
Implements 
Rotary Mower 
Moldboard Plow 
Offset Disk 
Fertilizer Spreader 
Sprayer 
Offset Disk 
Band Applicator 
Springtooth 
Planter 
Custom Airplane 
Row Cultivator 
Custom Airplane 
Custom Airplane 
Custom Airplane 
Cotton Stripper 
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Production Activities 
Tillage 
Tillage 
Tillage 
N Application 
Tillage 
Fertilization 
Cultivation 
Planting 
Weed Control 
N Application 
Insect Control 
Harvest 
Production Activities 
Tillage 
Tillage 
N Application 
Tillage 
Fertilization 
Cultivation 
Planting 
Weed Control 
N Application 
Insect Control 
Harvest 
TABLE 28 
FIELD OPERATIONS FOR IRRIGATED 
WHEAT PRODUCTION 
Date 
June 
July 
July 
August 
August 
August 
September 
September 
February 
March 
March 
June 
TABLE 29 
Implements 
Offset Disk 
Springtooth 
Springtooth 
Anhydrous Applicator 
Offset Disk · 
Fertilizer Spreader 
Field Cultivator 
Drill Planter 
Sprayer 
Liquid Fertilizer Spreader 
Sprayer 
Grain Combine 
FIELD OPERATIONS FOR DRYLAND 
WHEAT PRODUCTION 
Date 
June 
July 
August 
August 
August 
September 
September 
February 
March 
March 
June 
Implements 
Offset Disk 
Springtooth 
Anhydrous Applicator 
Offset Disk 
Fertilizer Spreader 
Field Cultivator 
Drill Planter 
Sprayer 
Liquid Fertilizer Spreader 
Sprayer 
Grain Combine 
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Pesticide Rate 
per Acre 
Prowl 1.5 pt 
RidomilG 20-25 lb 
TemikG 17-20 lb 
Orthene 0.75 lb aJ 
Bravo 1.5 pt 
Vitavax 2.5-3 pt 
Bravo 1.5 pt 
Vitavax 2.5-3 pt 
Bravo 1.5 pt 
Bravo 1.5 pt 
TABLE 30 
PESTICIDE APPLICATIONS FOR 
PEANUT PRODUCTION 
Time of Soil Partitioning 
Application HalfJife Coefficient 
April 8 5000 
May 25 35 
May 40 40 
June 2 300 
June 18 4000 
July 7 260 
July 18 4000 
July 7 260 
August 18 4000 
August 18 4000 
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Target 
Pest 
Annual Weeds 
and Grasses 
Pod Rot 
Nematodes 
Thrips 
Foliar Diseases 
Southern Blight 
Foliar Diseases 
Southern Blight 
Foliar Diseases 
Foliar Diseases 
Pesticide 
Atrazine 
Furadan4F 
Sevin 
Pesticide 
Lasso 
TemikG 
Bidrin 
Curacron 
Lorsban 
Lannate 
TABLE 31 
PESTICIDE APPLICATIONS FOR GRAIN 
SORGHUM PRODUCTION 
Rate 
per Acre 
2 qt 
0.5 lba.i. 
1.5 lb a.i. 
Rate 
per Acre 
3 pt 
5-10 lb 
0.2 lba.i. 
1 lb a.i. 
0.5 lba.i. 
0.5 lb a.i. 
Time of Soil Partitioning 
Application Halflife Coefficient 
May 18 160 
July 17 40 
August 7 229 
TABLE 32 
PESTICIDE APPLICATIONS FOR 
COTTON PRODUCTION 
Time of Soil Partitioning 
Application HaHlife Coefficient 
April 8 5000 
May 40 40 
July 7 20 
August 8 2000 
August 12 5300 
September 8 160 
185 
Target 
Pest 
Annual Weeds 
and Grasses 
Sorghum 
Greenbug 
Sorghum Midge 
Target 
Pest 
Annual Weeds 
and Grasses 
Nematodes 
Boll Weevil 
Bollworms 
Fleahoppers 
Bollworms 
Pesticide 
Glean 
Sevin 
Rate 
per Acre 
0.5 oz 
1 lb a.i. 
TABLE 33 
PESTICIDE APPLICATIONS FOR 
WHEAT PRODUCTION 
Time of Soil Partitioning Target 
Application Half life Coefficient Pest 
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February 160 1 Broadleaf Weeds 
March 7 229 Grasshoppers 
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